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Currently, there are at least two distinct approaches to the 
study of David Hume’s philosophy. On the one hand, Hume's writings are 
a popular source for the examination of specific philosophical perplex­
ities. For example, analysts find significant passages that merit their 
special attention on such topics as causality, induction, personal iden­
tity, the "is-ought" question, emotivism, the design argument, and the 
problem of evil. On the other hand, Hume remains a problematic philos­
opher for the expositor and historian. For example, contrary opinions 
divide the interpreters over whether Hume was advocating skepticism or 
naturalism, phenomenalism or realism, positivism or humanism, theism or 
atheism, etc. Further, at times it seems that the analyst (on the one 
hand) and the expositor (on the other) go their separate ways without 
giving serious consideration to the work of the other.
Although I shall work mainly in the second of these two tradi­
tions (i.e., the historical-expository), I hope my interpretation will 
show the importance of a careful exposition of the whole of Hume's phi­
losophy to the analysis of specific problems. For example, I will argue 
that Hume's distinctive interpretation of the problem of evil is obscured 
when his passages on that topic are examined in relation to a traditional
logical puzzle. I am persuaded that the issues raised by Hume occur in 
a web of beliefs that cannot be isolated from one another without serious 
distortion of the arguments he intends to make.
The specific interwoven set of beliefs in Hume which I want to 
examine is commonly classed as belonging to the philosophy of religion. 
However, as I hope to make clear, I believe these sorts of problems are 
connected with Hume’s moral philosophy as well as with his general phi­
losophy of man. Part of the overlapping of beliefs in Hume is imposed by 
the way he puts his questions. Since Hume is primarily concerned with 
answering questions about human nature,^ it is "man" rather than "God" 
that collects and meshes the various strands of thought which make up
Hume’s philosophy of religion. Further, since Hume’s primary interest in
2man is practical in the British philosopher’s broad sense of "moral," it 
is Hume's moral philosophy which provides the warp upon which the woof of 
his general philosophy is woven. The expositor who ignores the inter­
lacing of Hume’s beliefs will be misled as to the significance of Hume’s 
solutions.
Since the question that underlies the issues regarding religion 
in Hume's philosophy is the moral or practical one, for purposes of expo­
sition I will tentatively designate the question as the justification of 
morals. I will take Hume’s core question to be one which inquires: Does
religion provide a credible warrant for man’s moral beliefs? This heuris­
tic question is behind Nicholas Capaldi’s suggestion that
Hume's challenge may be put concisely. We cannot legitimately 
infer moral conclusions, that is, practical conclusions for guiding 
human behavior, from theological premisses. This challenge places 
in jeopardy one of the major institutions of Western civilization.^
In keeping with Capaldi’s suggestion and the heuristic question behind
it, I will examine Hume's account of the relation between religion and 
morals on the basis of the following heuristic principle:
(HP) Practical conclusions for guiding human behavior cannot be 
legitimately inferred from theological premisses.
In order to establish that the heuristic principle (HP) just 
stated not only informs Hume's concerns regarding religion, but also 
sheds new light upon Hume's resolution of them, I will do the following 
things. In Chapter I, I will review the secular justification of morals 
set out in Hume's moral theory. In Chapter II, I will relate Hume's 
story of the origin and development of popular theism. In Chapter III,
I will explore Hume's criticism of rational theology. In Chapter IV, I 
will collect Hume's scattered treatment of fideism. Together, the four 
chapters will comprise a first stage in the exposition and will demon­
strate the relevance of reading Hume as a moralist defending the autonomy 
of secular morals against religious demands or theistic justifications.
The second stage of my use of the HP treats the contrast between 
recent treatments of the philosophical problems regarding religion and 
that found in Hume. In Chapter V, I will challenge the notion that a 
strong thesis of atheism is the most appropriate interpretation of Hume. 
The strong thesis is stated as follows:
(ST) The appeal to God as the warrant for moral beliefs fails in 
every case because no valid proof that a Deity exists can be 
made.
My first reason for rejecting the ST (as embodying Hume's position) 
arises from a contrast of Hume's stance with that of Antony Flaw's "pre­
sumption of atheism." My second reason arises from a contrast between 
Hume's view of human suffering and Alvin Plantinga's treatment of the 
problem of evil. I will argue that Hume sees the problem of evil as
primarily a practical impasse between moral and religious attitudes in­
stead of as a logical contradiction in the principles of theism. I be­
lieve these two reasons will prove sufficient for dismissing the ST as 
reflecting Hume's own view.
Following the discounting of the ST interpretation of Hume, I 
will shift in Chapter VI to the examination of a weak thesis. The weak 
thesis is as follows:
(WT) The appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails because 
the nature of God is either morally indifferent or too ambigu­
ous to serve this purpose.
In testing the WT, I will show how it resolves certain issues in Hume's 
analysis of religion along the lines of his general philosophy. First,
I will show how Nelson Pike's effort to read Hume's argument from evil as 
atheistic collapses due to an oversight regarding the moral issue in con­
structing a theodicy (i.e., the HP). I will suggest that Pike's own sug­
gestions about Hume's theistic arguments constitute a better exposition 
of Hume when organized around the WT. Second, I will use H. H. Price's 
study of Hume's doctrine of belief to show how the doctrine of assent 
separates Hume's understanding of theism from the more traditional account 
advanced by Plantinga. Consequently, I will be able to show how the "con­
fession" passages in Hume's writings, which were wholly opaque under the 
ST, have become transparently clear under the WT. Thus, the second stage 
of testing the heuristic principle ends with the establishment of the 'fl 
as furnishing the expositor with the most consistent reading of Hume's 
philosophy.
To a limited extent, the results of my study of Hume's treatment 
of the relation between moral beliefs and religious attitudes turn upon
Hume’s use of "God" as a name for the unknown cause or causes of the uni­
verse.^ In Hume’s philosophy all additional conditions regarding the use 
of "God" remain problematic- In my inquiry, I adopt Hume’s minimal def­
inition and hold that all other notions found in traditional theism are 
separable from a bare or minimal concept of "God." This use of "God" 
makes it possible for Hume to admit some notion of deity without commit­
ting himself to traditional theism. This is to say, I shall argue that 
Hume is a religious skeptic in the special sense of being both a minimal 
theist and a moralist who is concerned to show that a full-blown tradi­
tional theism is not a credible or workable ethical alternative to the 




3Nicholas Capaldi, David Hume; The Newtonian Philosopher 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p. 196.
^NSR, pp. 28-29; D, p. 142.
A STUDY OF DAVID HUME'S ACCOUNT OF THE RELATION 
BEHIEEN MORALS AND RELIGION
CHAPTER I
A STUDY OF HUME'S JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS 
My purpose in this chapter is to uncover Hume's answer to the
question
Can a sufficient warrant for moral judgments be discovered within 
man's common life, without any appeal to religious beliefs?
This particular question addresses an important set of problems which 
Hume treats in his writings, but the particular formulation of the prob­
lem is never separated by Hume from other matters as a specific issue to 
be dealt with directly. Nevertheless, as my exposition will show, the 
question is directed to a significant concern of Hume's and one for which 
he provides us an answer, if only obliquely. Consequently, it will be 
necessary for me to reconstruct Hume's response from his writings on 
morals and religion. I believe that such a reconstruction can be effected 
through the exploration of three clusters of Hume's notions, which may be 
identified generally as (1) nature, (2) reason, and (3) objectivity. 
Further, in laying out Hume's answer to my question, I shall do three
things in this chapter. First, I will clarify the formulation of the 
question regarding Hume's inclusion of "common life" within his refined 
and expanded understanding of "natural." In doing so, I hope to show how 
Hume undercuts a rather common jump from "nature" to the full-blown "re­
ligious hypothesis" of natural theology. Second, I will examine Hume's 
position that reason is unable to perform the task that is required of it 
by the "religious hypothesis." It is Hume's opinion that rational theism 
considers reason as both the motive for assent as well as the motive for 
moral actions. From Hume's perspective, a motive is an efficient cause 
which is able to bring about either a belief or an action. Hume contends 
that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will."^
Once Hume's belief that reason lacks the power to function as a motive 
has been made clear, then I will be able to explain why Hume's limitation 
of morals to the demands of common life forecloses any further need for 
religious sanctions or explanations. Finally, I will examine Hume's argu­
ments that a secular ethic can achieve objectivity apart from the "arti­
ficial life" proposed through the needless supernatural sanctions advo­
cated by theists.
Naturalism
To begin with, it will be helpful to keep in mind that Hume in­
tends to free himself from the entanglement of a tradition that resolves 
any question concerning the justification of morals by an appeal to na­
ture. Hume believes that a great deal of the "religious hypothesis" is 
allowed to slip into moral philosophy surreptitiously through insuffi­
cient attention to the concept "nature." Since it is apparent that many 
understand nature as the artifice of the divine ruler, it is very easy
for these presuppositions to slip, without warrant, into the expanded 
notion that morals are detected in nature by "right reason" and founded 
on natural law. Hume undertakes a careful analysis of "nature" so as to 
stop any careless leakage of the "religious hypothesis" into what is per­
ceived as "natural."
Therefore, it is necessary to examine Hume’s analysis of the 
word "nature" as a means of nailing down what we are to understand by his 
repeated references to "common life," which is, so to speak, his alter­
native to the "religious hypothesis." Now, on the surface it might not 
appear to be very difficult to restate Hume’s analysis of "nature," es­
pecially since he explicitly deals with the definition of the word both
2in A Treatise of Human Nature and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles
3of Morals . But any attempt to dispose of the matter quickly gets caught 
on at least three snags. First, Hume finds the definitions that have been 
proposed anything but straightforward and concludes about the word "nature" 
that "there is none more ambiguous and equivocal."^ It is important that 
his reasons for this opinion be carefully assessed. Second, it is impor­
tant to note Hume’s move from "nature" to "natural" and determine whether 
the change suggests something significant. Finally, it is necessary to 
understand why Hume holds that "natural and unnatural" do not mark the 
same distinction as "virtuous and vicious." When we see how Hume frees 
the word "nature" from these entanglements, we shall have a valuable clue 
as to why Hume is not satisfied with a casual appeal to nature in moral 
philosophy.
To start with the first snag, the ambiguity that troubles Hume 
arises when philosophers fail to keep three different definitions of
10
"nature" distinct, Hume’s analysis in the Treatise^ formulates three 
negative definitions. In the first definition, Hume takes "nature" to 
be opposed to miracle. In such cases "nature" will include "every event 
which has ever happened in the world." Only "those miracles on which 
our religion is founded" are excluded. Finding something to be according 
to nature in this sense is "no extraordinary discovery." In fact, this 
sense includes any moral distinction that is made and offers us no illu­
mination whatsoever. If it allows anything, it is the separation between 
morals and religion. In the second definition, Hume notes that "nature" 
is opposed to what is rare or unusual. This use functions contextually. 
That is to say, the degree to which something is usual or unusual is 
determined in the particular case by what is being compared. For example, 
it is more usual to find Scotsmen in Edinburgh than in Moscow. Apart 
from the context of use, this sense of "nature" can neither provide a 
warrant for all moral judgments nor guide us in making moral distinctions. 
Turning then to the third definition, we find "nature" opposed to arti­
fice. Since this excludes "the designs and projects of men" from nature 
it is more likely to exclude morals from nature than men from morals. In 
summary, Hume believes that his analysis provides us with sufficient evi­
dence to conclude, "’Tis impossible, therefore, that the character of 
natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice 
and virtue."^
When Hume begins his account of the definitions, he uses the 
noun "nature." When he draws the conclusion about the relation to virtue 
and vice, he uses the adjective "natural." Hume’s conclusion is that 
"natural" does not qualify an action or state of mind in the same way as
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"virtuous." What the shift suggests about Hume's understanding of "na­
ture" needs some clarification. Traditionally, the question of the 
reference of the term "nature" has arisen from the inquiry "What is 
there?" Hume, however, believes the moralist would be better advised to 
ask, "What is in accord with definite orderly processes or principles?" 
This suggestion about Hume's intention gains further confirmation in the 
passage in the Treatise that immediately follows the discussion of defi­
nitions and introduces a new and "simple question." The new question 
that Hume proposes is "Why any action or sentiment upon the general view 
or survey gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness?"^ Hume's reformu­
lation has the distinct advantage of moving the problem from questions 
about definition and identity to matters subject t-; observation and 
testing. The new approach is Hume's basic "attempt to introduce the ex­
perimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." Thus, the move from 
"nature" to "natural," when fleshed out, relfects Hume's proposed change 
from a rationalistic moral theory dependent upon the teleological nature 
of things to a moral-sense theory dependent upon the causal appraisal of 
motives. It is the sort of transition the Treatise was written to effect.
An examination of the revised account in An Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals tends further to strengthen my exposition of 
the two passages in the Treatise. By the time of the Enquiry, Hume has 
moved the discussion from a preliminary treatment of the elements "Of 
Morals" to an appendix and confined his treatment of alternate senses to
g
a mere footnote. However, by this time he also feels free to speak of 
the several senses of "natural" as a mere "verbal exercise," mistakenly 
thought by some to mark out the boundaries of virtue. Not only does Hume
12
use the adjective "natural," but the alternate exclusions are also stated 
as adjectives: "unusual, miraculous, and artificial." Hume draws a
further conclusion from the analysis at this point. He says that "what 
necessarily arises from the exertion of his [man's] intellectual facul­
ties may justly be esteemed n a t u r a l . W h a t  I take Hume to be doing is 
offering a revised definition of what is included in the "natural" oper­
ations. His new term has two distinguishing marks: (1) the "natural"
is that which causes belief through its usual and constant occurrence, 
and (2) the "natural" is inclusive of any public and common custom which 
arises "as necessitated by the operations of human faculties." % a t  we 
need to explore further is how the refined notion of "natural" affects 
the conclusion that "nature" in any of the three senses cannot be used 
to mark the distinction between virtue and vice.
Hume believes that it is readily apparent from his analysis of 
"nature" that none of the ordinary senses of the word will serve the pur­
poses required by an appeal to "the nature of things" as a justification 
for the distinction between virtue and vice. Rather, as he says, virtue 
and vice are equally natural in any of the ordinary senses of "natural.” 
Given this state of affairs, Hume suggests we look elsewhere. What Hume 
proposes is that any artifice may be taken as natural to the degree it 
is necessary to human survival. It is "necessity" in the practical and 
not in the logical sense that Hume has in mind. Just those conventions 
and contrivances of human society that evolve as customs that benefit 
and perpetuate the "common life" of man are "natural to man." This in­
terpretation would add to the natural virtues that result immediately 
from the passions, a whole class of artificial virtues (e.g., justice.
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charity, promise-keeping, etc.), whose primary justification is their 
common utility. Virtues of this latter class are "natural" in the sense 
of being customary and useful, but they are nevertheless "artificial" in 
not having their origin in nature. However, it should be understood that 
Hume's use of "artificial" is not pejorative. An "artifact" or the "arti­
ficial" virtues are necessary extensions of human nature for physical sur­
vival and are natural institutions instigated by man for that purpose.
It is in the extended and refined sense of "natural" that Hume speaks of
the "common life" as natural.
In other words, Hume's refined concept of "natural" reveals that 
he is thinking in terms of "the operations of nature." Further, just as 
"the operations of nature" govern the attraction of planetary bodies, so 
they also direct the association of ideas. Relations of resemblance, 
contiguity, and cause-effect are the natural principles of association 
which are the grounds for the philosophical relation of ideas. Nature's
operations are to be felt before they are judged of. The very "force"
or "vivacity" evidenced in instinctive belief is the cement that joins 
our ideas with the operations of nature. Thus, although it is possible 
for the imagination to confuse fancy with fact, it cannot force stable 
belief. It is the instinctive inclination to believe, as well as the 
acquired habits in the natural associations of ideas, that gives force 
to the practical necessity of the "common life." The moral life is the 
ordinary, shared, and common arena where belief is of necessity limited 
to the utility that grows out of the repeated operations of habit and 
custom. The necessary and prudent practices of the common life are the 
court of last appeal in the ordinary distinctions between virtue and
14
vice. The habits of character that are useful to oneself or society are 
judged virtuous, and the ones which interfere with utility are deemed 
vices.
In addition to a technical sense, it should be noted that Hume 
uses "common life" in three less restrictive senses. In its broadest 
extension, Hume is speaking of the common opinions and conduct of men as 
distinguished frou. the narrow and special Lzed interests of theologians 
and other philosophers. In this looser use, the only criteria are that 
a particular use be general in scope and be known to originate from human 
faculties. This use would include fictions and the excesses of the imag­
ination. I will call this the popular sense. The second sense refers to 
established social customs. The criteria require that a custom must be 
of public utility and that, though contingent, the custom must not be 
arbitrary. Examples of conventions of this sort are enumerated by Hume 
as follows:
Thus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for 
common interest, without any promise or contract: thus gold and
silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and 
language are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is 
advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but 
what loses all advantage if only one perform, can arise from no other 
principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to 
enter into that scheme of conduct.
I will call this the public sense. The third sense deals only with indi­
vidual conduct since it is motivated by the passions. Although singular 
in motivation and occurrence, the passions are common and are shared 
inter-personally through sympathy. However, there are no criteria; the 
passions are felt immediately. I will call this the private sense.
Now that Hume's three senses of "common life" are laid out, it 
is possible to understand the special function of philosophy. The task
15
of philosophy is to protect the ongoing processes of common experience 
from being undercut by the excesses of imaginative opinions. To prevent 
deception, philosophers should apply "the experimental method of reason­
ing to morals." In this way, philosophers can reduce the danger that 
artificial alternatives will divert man from his natural abilities and 
needs. Philosophy is most serviceable as a practical aid to the improve­
ment of the "common life."
Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their 
researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate plea­
sure, attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are 
nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. 
But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as 
they consider the imperfections of those faculties which they employ, 
their narrow reach, and their inaccurate o p e r a t i o n s . 12
In other words, philosophy is and ought to be restricted to conventions
essential to the common life of man. Reason cannot become the motivating
force in the selection of another aim for life or in the departure from
the "common life" we already have. Hume is convinced that if our moral
judgments have any warrant it will be found in our common life because
there is no way any appeal to philosophy or theology can come up with
any alternative that is not pejoratively artificial and thus without
utility.
In summary, what we have discovered about Hume's concept of the 
"natural" boils down to five propositions. First, the word "nature" has 
no ordinary use that marks the same distinction as virtue and vice. Sec­
ond, "natural" represents Hume's own understanding of nature as a system 
which operates according to principle. Third, the principles by which 
nature operates extend throughout all of nature and apply equally to 
human faculties and to the movement of planetary bodies. Fourth, the
16
necessary conventional extensions of the human faculties constitute the 
arena of "common life." Fifth, the restriction of philosophy to the 
improvement of the "common life" is formative for Hume’s naturalism and 
excludes alternates to "common life" as amoral, simply because such 
alternatives are not rooted in the indispensable conditions of human 
survival.
Rationalism
A second cluster of notions gather around Hume’s interpretation
of the role of reason in moral philosophy. Hume gives a precise account
13of the relation between reason "in a strict and philosophical sense" 
and the source of man’s sense of morals. I will state what that relation 
is for Hume, delineate his reasons for thinking so, and sketch the con­
sequences of Hume’s position for theological accounts of moral beliefs.
Hume begins his comments with the following assertion: "The
mind can never exert itself in any action, which we cannot comprehend 
under the term of perception. S i n c e  perceptions are resolved into two 
kinds, viz., impressions and ideas, the question to be considered is: 
"Whether ’tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt 
vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praiseworthy?
From the start, the question is designed by Hume to deal with "those who 
affirm that virtue is nothing but a confoirmity to reason. Hume be­
lieves that it is by means of impressions, specifically the passions, 
and not by means of the reason, that man is able to distinguish between 
moral good and evil.
Ho one, I believe, will deny the justness of this inference; nor 
is there any other means of evading it, than by denying that principle, 
on which it is founded. As long as it is allow’d, that reason has no
17
influence on our passions and actions, 'tis in vain to pretend, 
that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason. An 
active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason 
be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and ap­
pearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, 
whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions 
of rational beings.
That reason's function is not a practical but a speculative activity of 
the mind is evidenced by the coordinate relation between reason and be­
liefs that are subject to being true or false.
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood [sic]. Truth or 
falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real 
relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. What­
ever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, 
is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our 
reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are 
not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original 
facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference 
to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, 
they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or 
conformable to reason.
Because the objects of reason are subject to being judged either true or
false, Hume concludes that reason cannot be the source of morals.
Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason.
Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active 
a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.
However, reason is employed in moral deliberations, but in a much more
restricted way than the rationalists claim.
It has been observ'd, that reason, in a strict and philosophical 
sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after tcfo ways:
Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of 
something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the 
connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting 
any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment, which can accom­
pany our actions, or can be said to produce them in any manner; and 
it must be allow'd, that these judgments may often be false and 
erroneous.20
Hume defends his belief that the influence of reason in morals 
is subordinate to the passions with three basic arguments. The first
18
grows out of his account of the operations of the mind. Hume classes all
actions of the mind, whether they be "actions of seeing, hearing, judging,
21loving, hating, and thinking," as in every case acts of perception.
Reasoning is restricted by Hume to comparing ideas and inferring matters
of fact. In light of these limitations, Hume is able to say that
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of 
itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of moral­
ity, therefore, are not conclusions of our r e a s o n . ^2
Hume's case hinges upon his claim that the two activities of reason make 
it impotent in moral matters. Hume indicates that reason is morally in­
different in the comparing of ideas.
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason 
for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of 
an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary 
to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my 
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the 
latter. . . .  In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some 
false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 
'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but 
the judgment.-3
By the mere comparison of ideas, reason is unable to determine what is a 
"laudable or blameable" action in the common life. Hume concludes that 
given the two functions of reason and their limited operations it fol­
lows "that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or 
produce any action or affection.
A second argument of Hume's is that the operations of reason 
are limited to judgments of relation. Briefly, Hume enumerates seven 
philosophical relations: resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety,
quantity or number, identity, space and time, and cause and effect. As 
a consequence, if moral distinctions are judgments concerning the rela­
tions between ideas, then they apply to any and everything, and "moral"
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does not indicate a separate class of distinctions. Hume illustrates
his argument with the following example:
To put the affair, therefore, to this trial, let us chuse any in­
animate object, such as an oak or elm; and let us suppose, that by 
the dropping of its seed, it produces a sapling below it, which 
springing up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent 
tree: I ask, if in this instance there be wanting any relation,
which is discoverable in parricide or ingratitude?25
Further, reason seems to be unable to mark a distinction as "moral" by
any other relation than the seven enumerated. He says he knows of no
other relation than the seven and is willing for anyone who does to name
it.
A third argument advanced by Hume is that reason cannot invent 
ends for human actions. Hume states the matter as follows:
It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can 
never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend them­
selves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind. . . .26
Hume believes that reason can guide man in the selection or correction
of any means employable in achieving a moral end. But reason, of itself,
is unable to prescribe an end for which the means is selected. IVhat Hume
holds is that the necessity of survival underlies the common life of a
society and the purposes for moral action. In the passions nature can
and often does overrule reason for the welfare of the species. Reason
cannot produce in itself a motive for living or another rationale as a
replacement for the ordinary desires or aversions that prompt human
conduct.
Hume's recital of reason's limitations in regard to moral judg­
ments leads to serious difficulties for the promulgation of theistic 
moral systems. For example, rational theologies quite regularly propose 
different motives, ends, and/or norms for human action than the ones
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which arise naturally from the human passions. Such modifications will
prove difficult, and perhaps impossible, if "reason is, and ought only
to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other of-
27fice than to serve and obey them." Hume’s conclusions suggest that 
religious grounds for moral principles are either unnecessary because 
they are not distinct from the normal workings of man’s moral sense, or 
impossible because they conflict with the naturally induced operations 
of the mind. In the latter case reason pretends to another office than 
that of slave to the passions. Hume gives some examples of the "artifi­
cial life" that accompany the effort of reason to escape from the bonds 
of common life.
An illustration of Hume’s understanding of what constitutes an 
"artificial life" occurs at the close of An Enquiry Concerning the Prin­
ciples of Morals. In "A Dialogue," Hume contrasts common life with
28"artificial life and manners." He offers two examples of artificial
life. In the first case, he selects Diogenes as "the most celebrated
model of extravagant philosophy," or Cynicism. Over against Diogenes is
placed the fideist Pascal. The withdrawal from the common life as the
moral arena is similar in either case. When men depart from "the maxims
of common reason," and
affect these artificial lives, as you call them, no one can answer 
for what will please or displease them. They are in a different 
element from the rest of mankind; and the natural principles of 
their mind play not with the same regularity, as if left to them­
selves, free from the illusions of religious superstition or philo­
sophical enthusiasm.29
But the examples of cynicism and fideism only suggest the ex­
tremes and do not exhaust the potential types of artificial life. As we 
shall see, the moral impasse between what the passions endorse and what
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the systems of theism propose in the name of reason provides Hume with 
his basic argument against all the forms of religion commonly practiced 
by men. From popular theism to scientific theology, the moral doctrines 
of religion are dependent upon the mistaken notion that "right reason" 
can be freed from bondage to the passions. However, as we shall see,
Hume holds the contrary belief that morality is enhanced when these in­
sidious reveries of the rational mind are spent and natural necessity 
draws men back into the conventional bonds of common affairs. For Hume, 
the danger in religion arises from its capricious interference with the 
regular demands of life.
In summary, what I have said about Hume’s assessment of the 
office of reason in relation to moral sentiments may be gathered into 
three conclusions. First, reason can operate effectively only as the 
slave of the passions. Second, reason has limitations because it is in­
ert, it is an instrument for relating ideas, and it is not the source of 
intrinsic values or ends. Third, whenever reason steps out of its ser­
vitude to the passions, it merely pretends an "artificial life."
Objectivism
I am now at a place in the development of Hume's account of 
moral judgment where it is essential to flesh out the correlation between 
morals and the common affairs of men. Up to this point I have done two 
things. First, I have shown how Hume has modified the traditional meanings 
of "natural" to include the requisite conditions for human survival which 
Hume speaks of as the common life. Second, I have reviewed Hume's argu­
ments supporting the conclusion that reason is inert and therefore unable 
to construct a plausible, practical alternative to man's common life. It
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remains to be seen whether a satisfactory account of moral judgments can 
be made within the context of common affairs. The question now to be 
answered is this: Does Hume think that an objective moral judgment can
arise out of the subjective conditions of human experience? In order to 
answer the question, I intend to do two things. First, I will set forth 
Hume’s account of the idiosyncratic nature of moral distinctions— idio­
syncratic because of their origin in the individual. Second, I will 
describe two different strategies Hume offers as to how human society 
develops a means of offsetting the idiosyncratic origin or moral judgment. 
The completion of these two steps should provide an explication of how 
moral objectivity can be obtained within man’s common life.
The task Hume takes on requires that he establish a correlation 
between the private feeling of morality and the public approval accorded 
certain actions. His theory of motive is the mediating instrument. As 
Hume puts it, "It appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive 
their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider’d merely as 
signs of those m o t i v e s . T h i s  proposition, Hume declares, is not
"merely a metaphysical subtility; but enters into all our reasonings in 
31common life." In other words, we have "an undoubted maxim, that no
action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature
32some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality."
This "undoubted maxim" indicates the theoretical model of motivation at 
work in Hume’s account of morals. The inner springs of human nature move 
the individual to act. In order to satisfy the instinctive drives of the 
individual, social conventions encourage individuals with sanctions rein­
forcing each "contrivance which arises from the circumstances and neces- 
33sity of mankind." Moreover, the task of reason is to serve the passions
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which provide the inner motivating forces of human action that inert 
reason cannot provide. Hume's positive ethics is his development of an 
account of how the idiosyncratic nature of the "primary impulses" of 
human nature can be refined into the social achievement of objectivity 
in moral judgments. My task is to relate the story of Hume's success.
For Hume, the story begins with the force in human sentiments' 
which emerges from the sensations of pain or pleasure. The impressions 
"operate upon us" so that a reflexive sentiment becomes the established 
propensity or habit of association that characterizes an individual and 
induces feelings of approval or disapproval as the case requires for hu­
man survival. These acquired propensities constitute an individual's 
character. The social utility of the dominant traits of character in an 
individual prompts the sympathetic approval of the social group or the 
pride of self-esteem in the individual himself. In other words, Hume 
defines virtue as "nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular 
kind from the contemplation of a character.
The moral judgment originates in the passions. The lineage be­
gins with an impression of pleasure or pain which gives birth in turn to 
joy or sorrow. When these latter passions become fixed, they prompt de­
sire or aversion. Once solid sentiments are formed, they constitute an 
individual's character and function as the wellsprings of motivation.
At this stage the moral judgment expresses the firm feelings of approval 
or disapproval that manifest the speaker's stable character as either 
virtuous or vicious. Hume's account of moral judgment would leave moral 
beliefs hopelessly subjective and merely the report of a personal state 
of mind were it not for three objectifying factors. First, the human 
constitution is universally similar and constant.
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The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same rea­
soning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most 
irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be ac­
counted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their 
character and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives 
a peevish answer: But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A
stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But
he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an 
action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, 
either by the person himself or by others; we know, in general, that 
the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and ir­
regular. This is, in a manner, the constant character of human na­
ture; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some 
persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a 
continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal principles 
and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these 
seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, clouds, 
and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by 
steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity 
and enquiry.
The idiosyncratic character of the "primary impulses" that "op­
erate upon us" and the practical necessity of "disinterested" employment 
of moral judgments in common life constitute a special problem requiring 
Hume's attention. Hume admits that it is absurd to require that every 
moral judgment should be traced so as to show "in every particular in­
stance, these sentiments are produc'd by an original quality and primary 
36constitution." The infinite number of our duties in relation to the 
small number of human passions or sentiments makes such a reduction im­
practical. What Hume observes is that people ordinarily use some general 
principles to bridge the gap between the duties of the social world and 
the primary impulses of human nature. In other words, Hume believes that 
the subjective character of sentiment is overcome by a common humanity. 
Since the sentiments are common to human nature, it is necessary to estab­
lish only those principles of morals that prove meritorious to common 
life. The principles that Hume has in mind are pleasure and utility.
But whatever the merits of these principles may be, the prior concern
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must be to demonstrate that they do indeed bridge the gap between inner 
sentiment and social well-being.
Consequently, Hume's second objectifying factor is a mechanism 
of sympathy. Hume believes that a mechanism of sympathy accounts for the 
transfer of feeling between individuals. The transfer takes place in 
stages. First, the observer has an impression of a bodily movement or 
gesture. Next, the observer associates with this impression the idea 
that is customarily attached to it. Third, the idea is converted in the 
observer's reflexions into his own impression or passion, which matches 
the passion that motivated the original gesture in the other person.
Each works on the principle of association. Hume thinks that the same­
ness of human nature restricts the degree of variance between minds and 
that the mechanism of sympathy overcomes the idiosyncratic origin of 
moral judgment.
In addition, Hume indicates a third objectifying factor in that 
"general rules" supplement the role of sympathy in moral judgments. Gen­
eral rules are needed as a safeguard against the bias and other limita­
tions of fellow feeling that can occur in spite of a common human nature 
and the mechanism of sympathy. For example, feelings for near friends, 
fellow countrymen, and next of kin come more readily to the passions 
than the proper regard for the welfare of some distant acquaintance, a 
foreigner, or some transient. Immediate desires and local issues engage 
the passions more easily than long-range goals and distant troubles. To 
effect a balance of attention and a moderation of the immediate orien­
tation of the passions, general rules are instituted by social convention 
as the correctives of limited perspective and the guidelines for consistent 
conduct.
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In summary, Hume achieves an objectivity for his attitudinal 
ethics without appeals beyond human nature and man’s necessary involve­
ment in common life. For Hume, the objectivity of morals is grounded 
upon a common human nature, a mechanism of sympathy, and general rules 
expressing social conventions. In Hume’s view, it is at least super­
fluous to make an appeal to Divine authority for the justification of 
moral-social principles.
Conclusion
Hume has shown that neither nature nor reason can contribute a 
clear alternative to the morals that evolve from the ordinary customs of 
human life. In addition, Hume has offered an account of how objectivity 
in moral judgments can arise from the necessary conditions of man’s com­
mon life. This is his positive answer to the question, "Is a secular 
ethic possible?" Hume, however, is not content with a positive answer. 
He will continually show why religion can neither provide for objectiv­
ity in moral judgments, nor offer a substitute manner of life by means 
of the "religious hypothesis." In the next three chapters, I will look 
at Hume’s negative response to the question "Is religion the only source 
of a warrant for moral judgments?"
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HUME'S STUDY OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION
In the preceding chapter I pointed out two things concerning 
the ethics of Hume that are of immediate significance for the problem to 
be explored in this chapter. First, I called attention to the fact that 
Hume's account of the justification of ordinary moral beliefs makes no 
appeal to the doctrines or beliefs of religion. Second, and of even more 
consequence, I noted that Hume's description of moral belief employs a 
procedure that is in marked contrast with the method used by natural 
theology. I showed that not only is Hume's procedure free from the need 
to appeal to religion; it proves to be totally incompatible with any ap­
peal to religion. Further, I indicated that it is Hume's intention to 
establish just such a conclusion.
In this chapter I intend to explore Hume's understanding of the
relation between religion and morals in light of the following question:
Is it the case that the beliefs of popular religion not only fail 
to serve as a warrant for moral beliefs but are also incompatible 
with the natural expressions of morality within man's social life?
I shall concentrate on the relation between religious beliefs and human




To answer the question I have proposed within the frame of 
Hume’s own thought, I will need to explore the nature of religious sen­
timents independently of the "religious hypothesis" of scientific theol­
ogy. For Hume, it is necessary to explore the origins of man's religious 
beliefs in order to be clear about their role and function in human expe­
rience. Hume treats the problem of origins explicitly in The Natural 
History of Religion. In addition to this special exposition, Hume refers 
to the matter in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as well as in 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. However, in laying out Hume’s 
position in these matters, I will depend primarily upon the first of these 
writings.
I intend to examine Hume’s history of the relation between the 
beliefs of religion and the human sentiments along five lines in order 
to clarity Hume’s account of the distinction between religious beliefs 
and moral attitudes. First, I will clarify the question Hume is answer­
ing in his natural history of religion. Second, I will assess Hume’s 
arguments concerning the historical priority of certain nocions about the 
plurality of gods. Third, I will recount Hume’s story of the motive or 
cause for men’s entertaining religious beliefs. Fourth, I will explore 
Hume’s conclusions concerning the moral attitudes that result from the 
doctrines of the historical religions. Finally, I will describe the 
moral impasse Hume discovers between the religious sentiments and the 
explanations of scientific theology. These tasks, when completed, will 
satisfy the need for a survey of Hume’s explanation of why man holds 
religious beliefs.
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The Question of Origins 
In examining the text of The Natural History of Religion, I will 
be interested in how Hume answers a question of the following type: What
are the perceptual origins of the beliefs of popular religion? A second 
question will follow upon the first: I-Jhat are the consequences of Hume's
account of the origin of religious beliefs for their use as warrants for 
moral judgments? I believe these two questions will explicate Hume's 
major concerns and go a long way toward establishing the relationship 
between religion and morals in his philosophy as a whole.
Hume's own division of the task into two distinct operations is 
as follows:
As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, 
there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, 
to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning 
its origin in human nature.1
Hume gives the first question a positive and brief response at this time
and then dismisses it from further consideration in The Natural History
of Religion. Hume's brief dismissal is as follows:
Happily, the first question, which is the most important, admits of 
the most obvious, at least, the clearest, solution. The whole frame 
of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer 
can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with re­
gard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.^
I-Jhat is to be made of Hume's treatment of "the most important question" 
will be reserved until the next chapter. However, as for the second 
question, I believe it is sufficiently important in its own right to re­
quire the special consideration which it will be given in this chapter. 
Furthermore, as my subsequent analysis will make evident, I believe the 
second question is important to Hume’s overall case for the independence 
of morals from religion.
32
To begin with Hume’s own assessment of the second question, it 
may be noted that he calls attention to two preliminary considerations. 
First, Hume believes that, unlike the first question, which allows for 
an "obvious" and clear solution, the second question leads to some pecu­
liar difficulties. A difficulty, on the one hand, arises from the evi­
dence gathered from travelers and historians that some nations have "no 
sentiments of religion." On the other hand, a difficulty emerges because 
there is no precise agreement concerning the "sentiments of religion" 
among the great variety of religions that are available for observation. 
Hume concludes on the grounds of those two difficulties that "the first 
principles of religion" are secondary to the primary sentiments of man.
In addition, Hume concludes that his investigation will need to relate 
"the first principles of religion" to the primary sentiments from which 
they arise. Hume puts it thus:
What those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, 
and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, 
is the subject of our present inquiry.^
Hume thinks the task may be broken down into three steps. First, one 
should trace the natural sentiments of religion to the original passion 
from which they evolve. Second, one should assess the significance of 
the original passion for the processes of its refinement into the senti­
ments by which popular religion flourishes. Third, one should evaluate 
the consequences of these sentiments for "the primary principles of 
religion."
Although Hume construes the problem as being concerned with the 
relation between "the first principles of religion" and the primary senti­
ments, the direction he takes in his inquiry is narrowed by a specific
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limitation he places on the relevance of religion to morals. Hume takes 
it for granted that the intelligibility and relevance of religion hinges 
upon the nature of God. He either overlooks or considers it of little 
interest that there might be a religion of some sort emerging from the 
primary sentiments of man and engendering no notion of God. Similarly 
he believes that the doctrines and rites of a particular religion are in 
some sense to be explained by a prior understanding of the nature of God. 
In other words, from Hume's perspective, everything about a religion 
turns on the formulation of a concept of God and on any valid assertions 
that might emerge from the correct and justified use of that concept.
If Hume intends to give a comprehensive account of all the pos­
sible expressions of religious sentiments, then he unduly restricts his 
inquiry to the examination of the causes of theistic belief. However, 
if Hume's major concern is the careful examination of the merits of an 
appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs, then his analysis is 
obliquely on target and has a much greater chance of success. It is a 
common practice for those who assent to Western theism to justify claims 
of moral obligation by appeal to the nature and authority of God. I be­
lieve my analysis will show that it is this Western concern with the na­
ture of God and the consequences of belief in His moral goodness that oc­
cupies Hume's attention. Further, my analysis should make it clear that 
Hume's primary concern is with the relation of religion and morals and 
that his prior concern with morality leaves him ambivalent about the pos­
sibility of atheism. Certainly, if Hume felt he could establish atheism, 
then any discussion concerning the relation of morals and religion would 
be a futile and empty exercise. Especially is this the case when Hume's
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assumption about the priority of theism and the nature of God is kept in 
mind.
The Question Concerning Historical Priority 
Hume believes that a moral relationship between God and man re­
quires some attributes in common between them. Therefore, Hume argues 
that the relation between human sentiment and God is contingent upon the 
solution of the problems dealing with the nature of God. Further, a 
definite understanding of divine nature is contingent upon the examina­
tion of the historical origins of religion for some hint whether it is 
more natural to believe that there is only one God instead of many. For 
these reasons, Hume considers it crucial to his whole enterprise to deter­
mine whether polytheism or monotheism is the earlier notion of God. And, 
in determining which is the earlier notion of divinity, Hume is interested 
in much more than which is first historically. He wants to determine 
which is the original idea surfacing from the instinctive operations of 
the mind. There are two historical reasons for Hume’s concern with this 
particular aspect of the problem. First, there were arguments floating
about that the idea of God advanced by scientific theology was innate to
Lthe operations of the mind. Second, there were the claims of the Deists 
that the scientific concept of God was the natural belief of man and as 
old as creation.^ In addition, there is a significant reason arising 
from his own philosophy of belief for Hume's conception of the problem. 
Since Hume held that legitimate beliefs are caused by either an impres­
sion of sense or a reflexion of the mind, Hume needed to connect the 
historically primitive idea of God with how that idea has its natural 
origin in the operations of the mind. Hume's position in this matter is 
as follows:
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. . .  if we consider the improvement of human society, from rude 
beginnings to a state of greater perfection, polytheism or idolatry 
was, and necessarily must have been, the first and most ancient 
religion of mankind.^
This formulation by Hume suggests that the problem is to be confirmed at 
two levels. It is established historically as "was" and causally as 
"necessarily must have been." Both of these levels of confirmation re­
quire further clarification, and I will begin with the first.
Hume provides two general pieces of evidence to confirm the 
contingent or historical proposition. First, without any known exceptions, 
a survey of less developed peoples reveals that they hold a form of poly­
theism. Second, without any clear exceptions, the historical records 
provide ample evidence that man's earliest forms of religion are poly­
theistic. Of course, it could be that both of the statements have ex­
ceptions. However, Hume believes the weight of the evidence supports the 
general historical priority of polytheism.
Hume is aware of the weakness of the historical evidence as well 
as of the vulnerability of an argument from the evidence of history. 
Therefore, he tries to bolster an inconclusive case with tighter argu­
ments. First, Hume argues that polytheism is psychogenetically prior to 
monotheism because of the natural progress of thought. Hume says:
It seems certain, that, according to the natural progress of 
human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some 
groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch 
their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the 
whole frame of nature.^
This manner of weighing the historical evidence is further explained:
The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior: By abstracting
from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And slowly
distinguishing the nobler parts of its own frame from the grosser, 
it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to 
its divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, 
but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead
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the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, 
at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the 
human and the divine nature.®
Hume believes there is a correlation between the manner in which 
the mind operates, which is the source of necessity in his account of 
causality, and a historical progression from an earlier polytheism to a 
later monotheism. Basic to Hume’s effort is his uncritical acceptance of 
a doctrine that the "original" ideas are always simple and are subsequently 
conjoined into complex ones. Hume seems to argue that since it is a ne­
cessity of the mind that its manner of operation be from the simple to 
the complex, then monotheism must be a later form of theism than polytheism.
An argument of this sort is far from satisfactory. The "neces­
sity" that Hume establishes is wholly dependent upon his sensationist ac­
count of perception and a highly suspect notion that "simple" primarily 
refers to an atomistic datum of perception. Since this "way of ideas" has 
ceased to have the status of a final account of perception, Hume's argu­
ment has fallen upon evil days. However, there is something for the ex­
positor of Hume to learn from the argument regardless of its weakness.
For example, there is a confusion in Hume's terms in addition 
to the questionable correlation. The movement from simple to complex (or, 
as Hume says, from inferior to superior) can mark two distinct sorts of 
appraisals. On the one hand, it suggests a move from the easy to the 
difficult. On the other hand, it suggests a move from the inadequate to 
the adequate. For example, someone might say: "Now that you have done
the simple ones (i.e., the easy ones) you are ready to take up more com­
plex problems (i.e., the difficult ones)." On the other hand, someone 
might say: "You have given me a simple (i.e., inadequate) answer while
the problem requires a more complex (i.e., adequate) one. In addition
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to these two uses, Hume uses "simple" and "complex" in a technical or 
philosophical sense. For example, something is a simple entity because 
it cannot be reduced into component parts in the manner one is able to 
divide a complex entity. Hume seems to need all three senses for his 
argument, but I am not so sure he has earned the right to use any of 
them.
Hume's second argument may be called the regularity case. It 
is made up of two component arguments. Hume points out that cases of 
early theism are built upon the rare and exceptional events in life and 
not upon a general hypothesis about the cause of design in the universe. 
As Hume says, "There is a great difference between historical facts and
9
speculative opinions." The "necessitous animal" will be forced to deal 
with issues "pressed by numerous wants and passions" and leave the grand 
inquiry for societies with leisure. In other words, the operations of 
the mind originate in the necessity of survival and must be tested by 
their utility to the common life. It is the regularity of practical 
necessity that governs the habit and customs of the mind. Hume believes 
that polytheism is psychogenetically prior to monotheism because it re­
flects the simply everyday needs of survival. Polytheism reflects a 
response to the pressing demands of life while monotheism is the by­
product of leisure. In addition, Hume says that there is an economy in 
an explanation that shows how monotheism can replace polytheism that is 
not available in the reverse order since the regular operations of the 
mind cannot account for the move from monotheism to polytheism.
But further, if men were at first led into the belief of one 
supreme Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could 
never possibly leave that belief, in order to embrace polytheism; 
but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and
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diffused over mankind, so magnificent an opinion, must be able, 
with greater facility, to preserve it. The first invention and 
proof of any doctrine is made more difficult than the supporting 
and retaining of it.^^
Thus, Hume is able to make a better case against the priority of mono­
theism than he is able to make for the necessity of the priority of 
polytheism.
Again Hume's argument is dependent upon his account of the 
operations of the mind. The regular order of experience evolves into 
habit and custom. This manner of the operation of the mind gives the 
"necessity" to cause and effect arguments. Hume believes that the poly­
theistic accounts record the operations of practical necessity while the 
monotheistic accounts draw a speculative analogy on the grounds of the 
operation. Hume seems to argue that, if the necessity in cause and ef­
fect arises from habits in the operations of the mind, then the ideas 
closer to that necessity occur first to the mind.
To summarize, David Hume makes three efforts to establish the 
priority of polytheism. First, the weight of the evidence supports its 
antiquity and the probability that polytheism is prior to monotheism. 
Second, if monotheism is the more adequate principle of religion, then 
it is most likely that the natural progression of the mind was from 
polytheism to monotheism. Third, the difficulty of explaining the move­
ment from monotheism to polytheism is far greater than that of the re­
verse order of development. Although these three arguments are depen­
dent upon Hume's theory of the mind and make up something less than an 
airtight case, the conclusion seems to survive because of the difficulty 
of making a counterclaim rather than because of the inherent merit of 
the supporting arguments.
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Before leaving this topic, I should make a further clarification. 
Hume wishes to classify theisms as inferior and superior on the basis of 
their primitive origins in human feeling and their logical adequacy as 
the foundation for human science and morals. The result is four types 
of theism. First, there is a pagan theism that is both pluralistic and 
incohesive. It is the original and popular type of theism. It may be 
spoken of as polytheism. Second, there is a refined type of popular 
theism. It is the outgrowth of the human needs in civil society for a 
consistent and cohesive supreme Being as a principle of unity, order, and 
power. It is popular in the sense that it emerges out of the motives in 
the human passions and is only accidentally in agreement with a scientific 
theism. Third, there is a natural theism in which the nature of God is 
arrived at by rational proof. This scientific theism is limited to what 
can be established by reason. Fourth, there is fideistic theism, which 
is founded upon special Divine revelation and exceeds what man can know 
or appropriate for his common life.
Hume's purpose in The Natural History of Religion is to explain 
how various types of theism arise from human instincts. He concludes 
that polytheism is the most primitive type and that the other types are 
merely refinements. Renovated theisms flourish in a society as a result 
of careful indoctrination. A secondary type of theism never overcomes 
its earlier origin. This is not to overlook the fact that polytheism is 
not an automatic response to the passions, but is itself a learned social 
custom.
When Hume's arguments for the priority of polytheism are con­
sidered in relation to the four types of theism which are found in his
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treatment of religion, his case for the primal origin of polytheism is 
more plausible. For example, neither scientific theism nor revealed 
theism is fitly judged to be original in Hume's sense of the term. This 
judgment is based on the fact that neither can arise out of the human 
sentiments and passions. It will be remembered that scientific theism 
is based on reason and fideistic theism on faith. There remain only two 
types of vulgar or popular theism, and Hume has for all practical pur­
poses shown polytheism to be the more primitive of these two. With this 
in mind, I will turn next to examine the account Hume gives of the rela­
tion between both forms of popular theism and the sentiments that motivate 
or cause religious belief.
The Motives Behind Popular Theism
Hume contends that popular theism is secondary in its origin in 
that it arises in the human understanding from the human sentiments. 
Further, he holds that the more original and primitive expression of 
religious sentiment is polytheistic, in contrast with the scientific 
theism of his own day. To further this account of theism, Hume seeks to 
clarify two things. First, he describes how polytheism emerges from 
human feeling and designates the distinct passions that give it birth. 
Second, he shows how monotheism emerges as a corrective of the human 
sentiments latent in polytheism. I will now proceed to develop each of 
these positions.
Hume begins with an inquiry into "the primitive religion of un­
instructed mankind." He is sure that its origin does not lie in the con­
templation of the design in nature but in a natural concern of man with 
the unwonted events of life. The "invisible powers" behind "the
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contrary events of life" are the arena in which popular religious beliefs
originate. Hume states the situation as follows:
Storms and tempests ruin what is nourished by the sun. The sun de­
stroys what is fostered by the moisture of dews and rains. War may 
be favourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the seasons af­
flicts with famine. Sickness and pestilence may depopulate a kingdom, 
amidst the most profuse plenty. The same nation is not, at the same 
time, equally successful by sea and by land. And a nation, which now 
triumphs over its enemies, may anon submit to their more prosperous 
arms. In short, the conduct of events, or what we call the plan of a 
particular providence, is so full of variety and uncertainty, that, 
if we suppose it immediately ordered by any intelligent beings, we 
must acknowledge a contrariety in their designs and intentions, a 
constant combat of opposite powers, and a repentance or change of 
intention in the same power, from impotence or levity.
For Hume, primitive religion is a response to life's vicissitudes. The
individual projects his feelings of fear or hope into an imaginary story
that tells how the gods create a particular threat or how the gods will
deliver him from apparent disaster.
There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all 
being like themselves, and to transfer to every object, those qual­
ities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they 
are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon, armies 
in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by ex­
perience and reflection, ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, 
that hurts or pleases us.12
When the events of the day are seen as "a constant combat of opposite 
powers," the religious man without the instruction of science will ac­
count for these events with polytheistic myths. The very motives which 
cause the bizarre tales will alternate between fear and hope as the 
conditions require.
It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry 
men’s intention beyond the present course of things, or lead them 
into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must 
be actuated by some passion, which prompts their thought and reflec­
tion; some motive, which urges their first enquiry. But what pas­
sion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of 
such mighty consequences? Not speculative curiosity, surely, or the
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pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross ap­
prehensions; and would lead men into enquiries concerning the frame 
of nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow 
capacities. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon 
such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the 
anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the ter­
ror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other 
necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially 
the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course 
of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of 
human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more dis­
ordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of 
divinity.13
The merit of polytheistic cultic practice is that it has a vital 
function within the ordinary realm of human conduct. At this level, 
religion participates in the common life. But unlike the moral sense, 
it is expressive of the sentiments of fear and hope and reflects an at­
titude toward the prospects of life. Moral sentiments reflect an atti­
tude of approval or disapproval toward things, oneself, or others. Thus, 
although the two types of sentiment function within the same realm of 
common life, they are not the same attitudes, and need not coalesce. 
However, the possible harmony of the two ivill be greatest in the early 
stages of primitive religion because polytheism is least removed from the 
regular needs of human society. Once the refinement process begins, the 
ratiocination about religious concepts tends to remove them from their 
social roots. The systematic improvement of the teaching of religions 
places a wedge between the human sentiments that give rise to religion 
and the moral sentiments natural to man.
At its primal source in the passions, religion is an effort on 
man's part to appease the secret powers of the universe that lie outside 
his understanding or control. Without fully understanding the situations 
in which his passions are excited, man engages in cultic acts to pacify 
his anxieties. His feelings of expiation moderate his attitudes between
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fear and hope. The cultic rites of popular religions are the endorsed 
social responses toward the vicissitudes of life. The local gods are 
the masks for the "secret powers" at work in the strange happenings of 
nature. In this manner polytheism emerges out of man’s fear that the 
forces of life are not beneficent. Primitive religion is a collective 
effort to regulate and tutor human fears and to offset every evil threat 
to society possible. It has the merit of providing some stability to a 
primitive society bound by ignorance.
In like manner, Hume argues, the.doctrine of one supreme deity
arises from the human sentiments and is itself not the result of rational
argument or scientific observation. Rather, it comes upon the vulgar,
Hume says, "by a certain train of thinking, more suitable to their genius
and c a p a c i t y . H o w e v e r ,  popular monotheism is the result of the social
process in which a particular god is elevated to a supreme status. Thus,
monotheism is the by-product of social custom and human habit. It is the
outgrowth of the accidental success of a cult whose triumph means the
exaltation of its deity to a supreme position of authority and adoration.
The process involves the reformulation of a concept by worshipers who
enlarge a notion to infinity through "pompous epithets of praise." The
change is due solely to an excess of zeal growing either from fear or
hope and is in no sense a resolution of rational insight. There is a
distinct difference in origins between popular theism and scientific
theism. Hume makes this clear in the following passage:
While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect being, the 
creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles 
of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to that notion, 
not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but by 
the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition.15
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To summarize, Hume's position is that polytheism and monotheism 
emerge from the fear of the vulgar and reflect man's struggle to cope 
emotionally with the flux of fortune in the events of daily life. There­
fore, the original human sentiment underlying religion and theism is 
fear. Such a passion as fear can hardly serve as an adequate motive of 
action in moral conduct. Moral conduct, according to Hume, is action 
motivated by the character of an individual. The character is consti­
tuted by the individual's propensity to respond favorably in cases of 
pleasure and unfavorably in cases of pain. The passions of fear and 
pleasure are distinct in kind because, while those of a moral type are 
sure and fixed by general rules and customs, those of a religious kind 
are uncertain and not subject to general rules or stable customs. I will 
have occasion to say more about this later. Suffice it for now to note 
that Hume holds that the moral sentiments are distinct in kind from the 
religious sentiments. Therefore, if religion retains its original asso­
ciation with fear or hope, it can hardly provide a warrant for moral 
judgment. In truth, it will most likely be an obstacle.
The Moral Ambiguity in Popular Theism 
Since Hume argues that both types of popular theism rest upon 
the same passions, he sees the natural history of religion as "the flux 
and reflux" of polytheism and monotheism. "The vulgar, that is, indeed 
all mankind, a few excepted," do not discover a supreme mind in nature. 
"They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish 
v i e w . A s  a result, the common masses are subject to changes of mood 
and degree of confidence in the unknown causes they adulate in their no­
tion of God. Men fluctuate between the particular and local power in
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polytheistic religions and the absolute and universal force in mono­
theistic religions. As a result of the alternation, the devotee is 
caught in a dilemma. His fear can be relieved by an emotionally avail­
able and local deity, or it can be allayed by an exaulted absolute power 
which is greatly removed in passion from man. If the Deity gains avail­
ability, He is subject to the loss of power; and if He gains infinite 
power. He is subject to the loss of immediacy. The religious feelings 
are never at peace in this flux and reflux of human sentiment. Further­
more, the very nature of the mood in which a selection is made has an ^
adverse effect upon moral conduct. The satisfaction of the religious 
sentiments disrupts the moral conditions they inspire.
First, there is the resulting flux between persecution and 
toleration. In the practice of polytheism there is a normal state of 
tolerance of other cults and notions of the gods so that there is a com­
mon respect for the space and time allotted by society to the different 
devotees. Quite a contrary practice emerges from the elevation of one 
God above all others. The gain in emotional security is purchased at 
the dangerous price of an intolerance of any detraction (real or imag­
ined) from the exalted God’s honor. The sad result for morals is in 
the fanatic acts such a religion is prone to engender.
A second result of the flux between notions of God is seen in 
the alternation between courage and abasement. With the elevation of 
the Deity to infinity, everything else is brought into mortification and 
submission. The natural sentiments of pride and courage are downgraded. 
Monkish values of penance and humility replace the necessary qualities 
that enrich a society.
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A third result is the exaltation of absurdity over reasonable­
ness. Since the elevation of the Deity is achieved by the extension of 
attributes to the extreme, the devotee develops an appetite for absurdity 
and contradiction as a means of exalting the Deity above the familiar. 
Mystery, amazement, and obscurity become the tools of the devout votaries. 
The outcome is that the usual merit of reasonableness within the common 
life is subverted.
Finally, Hume lists a fourth result of the flux. There is a new 
significance in doubt and conviction. What begins with the story and 
tradition and an evolving mythology is transformed into unquestioned 
authority to drive away any semblance of doubt. The desired result in 
the notion of God is gained through an excess of dogmatism and positive 
bigotry.
The Impasse between Popular Religion and Morals 
Of course Hume has not established a logically necessary rela­
tion between the improvement in the notion of God and a decline in the 
moral effectiveness of theism. All he can do is point to an all-too- 
common pathology that accompanies popular religion's struggle with the 
vicissitudes of life. The very vulnerability of popular theism is 
enough to raise reasonable doubts about the reliability of religion as 
either a source or warrant for moral conduct. The degree of flux in the 
flux in the religious response is governed by unknown and secret causes. 
Hume uses the simile of a theater to describe the helpless ignorance of 
man:
We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the 
true springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed from 
us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to
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prevent those ills, with which we are continually threatened. We 
hang in perpetual suspence between life and death, health and sick­
ness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human 
species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft un­
expected, and always unaccountable. These unknown causes, then, 
become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the pas­
sions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the 
events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of 
those powers, on which we have so entire a dependence.
Given the uncertain nature of the passions inherent in the sentiments of
religion, Hume believes that man is caught on the horns of a dilemma.
The dilemma is a sort of moral impasse. Fear cannot be a moral 
motive although Hume believes it is the primal motive of popular religion. 
Polytheism is the primitive form in which the imagination personifies the 
fears of man in regard to life's uncertainties. Monotheism is hardly 
better. Although monotheistic doctrines coincide with scientific or 
rational theology, the motive for belief remains the same as that in 
polytheism. The outcome is a moral impasse because the motive for be­
lieving in popular theism discredits that belief as a motive for moral 
beliefs. Morals require a different passion, are motivated by a dif­
ferent attitude, and neither the requisite passion nor the requisite 
attitude is found in a religion of ignorant fear or unreasonable hope.
The impasse is not the logical incoherence among belief assertions; it 
is the irresolvable conflict of the motives that give rise to those 
several beliefs. The cause of religious assent excludes it from 
morality.
To escape the horns of this dilemma, one of two things might 
be shown to undermine Hume’s case. First, one might show that religion 
does not commonly arise from fear. Second, one might show that elevating 
the notion of God transforms the sentiments so as to provide new springs
u
of action for moral conduct. The first of these alternatives is found
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in scientific theism, the motive for which is taken to be reason rather 
than fear. I will explore Hume's examination of this option in the 
next chapter. The second alternative is developed by fideistic theism.
It holds that the purification of the notion of God cleanses the soul of 
man as well, through the operation of faith. I will follow Hume's treat­
ment of this position in Chapter IV.
Conclusion
I will conclude this chapter with a brief summary of Hume's 
account of the pathology of the religious sentiments. First, the origin 
of religions lies in the passions of fear or hope. Second, the most 
primitive notion of God is polytheistic. Third, the elevation of poly­
theism to monotheism is the by-product of the need of the passion of 
either fear or hope and is not the reasoned reform conceived by scien­
tific theism. Therefore, the practical consequence is a dilemma that 
results from the motives that prompt belief in God. The motive for be­
lief in God is in open conflict with the motive that causes approval of 
good. The conflicting motives not only have nothing in common, but they 
also cancel each other out. The conclusion is that Hume has effectively 
utilized his pathology of man's religious beliefs to establish the 
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HUME'S CRITICISM OF SCIENTIFIC THEISM
In Chapter II, I looked at Hume’s assessment of popular theism 
and the dilemma it creates for anyone who tries to appeal to the practice 
of religion in the justification of morals. In this chapter I intend to 
examine an alternative account of theism that might be able to avoid the 
dilemma and provide a theistic warrant for moral beliefs. I refer to 
that type of theism that seeks to establish the whole of the "religious 
hypothesis" upon human reason. It is spoken of as "natural theology" 
or "scientific theism."
My interest in the problems of scientific theism is not solely 
with the mere existence of God. Although the question of the existence 
of God is crucial, even its positive resolution may not be sufficient 
to settle the question of the relation of theism and moral judgment.
The mere existence of God leaves unclear the question of the relation of 
God to morals. I want to ask the additional question, should human rea­
son establish a proof of the existence of God or even the overwhelming 
probability of the existence of God, on what grounds consistent with 
that process of reasoning could an appeal to God be a warrant for moral 
judgments? If the strategy used to prove the existence of God can
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establish nothing more than the moral neutrality of the Deity, then God 
is but one of those facts about the cosmos that may be a matter of moral 
indifference to man and his conduct within the bounds of the common life.
In this chapter I will pursue the question of moral relevance 
as a clue to the exposition of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Reli­
gion. I will do four things. First, I will assess the significance a 
test of moral fruitfulness has in the interpretation of both the dramatic 
unity and the specific arguments of the Dialogues. Second, I will explore 
the importance of moral relevance to the empirical theism of Cleanthes. 
Third, I will do the same for Demea’s rational theism. Finally, I will 
assess the importance of Philo's argument from evil in showing the cen­
trality of the moral-relevance question to the exposition of the Dia­
logues. The results of these four tasks should be the resolution of the 
issues concerning the significance of moral relevance in Hume's 
Dialogues.
The Test of Moral Fruitfulness
I believe that a careful reading of the Dialogues will show 
that Hume considers the question of the moral relevance of scientific 
theism to be of primary significance. Indeed, his principal concern with 
the nature of God throughout the Dialogues is an important clue in this 
matter. Further, Hume's dramatic formulation of the Dialogues is also 
supportive of this interpretation in two ways. First, the dramatic 
scene with which the conversation begins is set in the context of three 
older men evaluating the effects of instruction in natural theology on 
the piety of Cleanthes' ward, Pamphilius. Second, the way in which the 
questions are formulated and evaluated shows that it is the relevance of
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theism to man’s social life that preoccupies the discussants. Because 
I take these literary characteristics to be of more significance than 
mere stage props for the packaging of a set of loosely related logical 
puzzles, I will look briefly at each.
As to the dramatic context at the beginning of the Dialogues,
Hume sets the scene in a library where a friendly discussion over the 
consequences of certain pedagogic strategies for piety introduces a whole 
series of counter-arguments to skepticism. To start with, Cleanthes sug­
gests that skepticism should be divided into two types. The first is a 
skepticism regarding knowledge that proves quite ineffectual against 
religion. In fact, he says, this rather "brutish and ignorant scepticism" 
becomes the companion very often of "a traditional superstition." On the 
other hand, "the refined and philosophical sceptic" requires only that 
beliefs be "proportioned to the evidence with which they.meet." This 
second species of skepticism is governed both by the necessity of logical 
relations and by the necessity of acting in common society. For example, 
"so long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics 
or criticism" it is within the test range of our common habits.^ How­
ever, it is a specific characteristic of theological thinking that it 
does not have an immediate link with the tried habits that make up the 
customs of common life.
We are like foreigners in a strange country to whom everything must 
seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing 
against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and 
converse. We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods 
of reasoning in such a subject, since even in common life and in 
that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot 
account for them and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or 
necessity in employing them.2
In short, Philo adopts a position of suspended belief, from which he can
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examine the "religious hypothesis" in order to test what warrant, if any, 
there is for theistic appeals concerning moral conduct in the common 
life. The issues at stake are not merely theoretical or solely dependent 
upon rational proofs of God's existence. In addition to these, the 
justification of theistic belief must include its moral fruitfulness for 
social life. The test of Cleanthes' success in pedagogy lies with his 
success in the moral education of Pamphilius.
A test of the moral sort regarding theological inquiry leads 
naturally to a concern with how the question of the relevance of appeals 
to God might be formulated. The problem is addressed by all three 
speakers in the Dialogues. It is Demea who first sets out the specific 
subject under question, and his formulation is neither rejected, chal­
lenged, nor radically reformulated by either Cleanthes or Philo. Demea 
assesses the merits of Cleanthes' and Philo's exchange over skepticism 
and brings the major issue of the Dialogues into focus.
By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you 
were maintaining the Being of a God against the cavils of atheists 
and infidels, and were necessitated to become a champion for that 
fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not 
by any means a question among us. No man; no man, at least, of 
common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt 
with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question 
is not concerning the being but the nature of God.^
Of course the smug overstatement one comes to expect of Demea will never
go unnoticed. Both his claims of "self-evidence" and "certainty" are
disputed. However, no challenge will ever arise over his assertion
that it is the nature and not the being of a deity that is the principal
matter for concern. In fact, Philo's reply restates Demea's formulation.
But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question 
can never be concerning the being but only the nature of the Deity.4
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And, to protect himself from the excesses of Demea while at the same
time agreeing to the formulation of the problem, Philo continues:
Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this uni­
verse (whatever it be) we call God, and piously ascribe to him every 
species of perfection.5
It should be noted that the "self-evident" and "certain" of Demea are 
replaced by a definition. Philo designates the inferred object of refer­
ence for the term "God" as "the original cause of this universe (what­
ever it be)." Furthermore, Philo, while accepting the common-sense
notion of an original cause of the universe, leaves open the basic issue 
with the parenthetical "whatever it be." Later in this chapter I shall 
return to this move of Philo’s with a further examination of his defini­
tion. Suffice it, at this point, to draw the conclusion that what con­
cerns the parties in the Dialogue is exactly that which concerns anyone 
who would determine the precise relation of theism and morality: "̂ ■That
is the nature of the deity to whom you appeal?"
The importance of the nature of the Deity for clear and explicit
use of the "religious hypothesis" is made plain by Philo. According to 
Philo, the problem regarding the nature of the Deity is one of deter­
mining exactly what the divine attributes might be. "We piously ascribe 
to him every perfection"; but as Philo further states,
. . . all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine 
that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to sup­
pose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the per­
fections of a human creature.&
The claim that perfections are relative is for Philo based upon the usual
context in which the normal practice of ascribing attributes arises. If
the speaker ascribes attributes to ordinary and mundane objects, that is
one matter; but if, out of adoration, he ascribes the same attributes to
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an infinite being, that is an altogether different case. The "object of
worship in the temple" cannot be held to correspond to any of the common
objects spoken of in the streets. Thus Philo warns.
But let us beware lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond 
to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to 
these qualities among men.^
Fhilo puts his warning into a syllogism by merely stating the two
premises:
(1) "Our ideas reach no farther than our experience."
(2) "We have no experience of divine attributes and operations."
(3) Therefore, the unstated conclusion is: Our ideas do not reach
as far as the divine attributes and operations.
In fact, Philo actually says, "I need not conclude my syllogism: You
g
can draw the inference yourself."
But the spur that goads the champion of theism is Philo's claim 
that both "sound reason" and "piety" lead to the common ground of "the 
adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being."
A common ground of this sort would allow scientific theism to fall prey 
to difficulties of moral irrelevance similar to those that Hume found to 
be the ordinary consequences of popular theism. What ensues in the 
Dialogues is the effort of both Cleanthes and Demea to overcome the 
moral impasse that such a conclusion places in the way of any appeal to 
the deity as
. . . the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of 
society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment 
absent from our thoughts and meditations?^
Cleanthes attempts to bridge the gap by arguing from the analogy of ex­
perience; I will call his position "empirical theism." On the other 
hand, Demea makes a case for theism that bites the bullet of "difference," 
but which, nevertheless, seeks to demonstrate an effective relevance. I
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will speak of his alternative as "rational theism." I will explore 
each in turn to determine what success either might have in establish­
ing the nature of a deity who might serve as the ground for moral belief.
Cleanthes* Case for Empirical Theism
The case for empirical theism is introduced by Cleanthes with
the following argument:
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it:
You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided in­
to an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of sub­
divisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can 
trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which 
ravishes into admiration all men who have contemplated them. The 
curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles 
exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance 
of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore 
the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the 
rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author 
of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed 
of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work 
which he has executed. By this argument _a posteriori, and by this 
argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his 
similarity to human mind and intelligence.^®
Cleanthes, as is readily apparent in the last sentence, is willing to 
rest his case on "this argument alone" and makes no claim for it apart 
from its _a posteriori nature. It would be expected, then, that any 
criticism internal to such an argument would arise from the skill with 
which he adheres to "all the rules of analogy." And it is here, indeed, 
that Philo offers three criticisms.
The first of Philo's criticisms of the use of analogy in 
Cleanthes* argument concerns the degree of certainty allowed by the 
proportion of likeness between the many cases of human contrivance and 
the single case of divine creation. In calling attention to the weak­
ness of the analogy, Philo points out two types of strength or weakness
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that may occur in any argument by analogy. The first of these types of
weakness rests on the degree of likeness in the case under consideration.
For example, Philo says:
After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human crea­
tures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius; 
but from its circulation in frogs and fishes it is only a presumption, 
though a strong one, from analogy that it takes place in men and 
other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker when we in­
fer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience
that the blood circulates in animals; and those who hastily followed
that imperfect analogy are found, by more accurate experiments, to
have been mistaken.H
The second type of weakness deals with the number of cases of
the particular relation of cause and effect that can be observed as
repeated occurrences of the analogy in question. Of this type Philo says:
That a stone will fall, that fire will bum, that the earth has 
solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and 
when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw with­
out hesitation the accustomed inference.
In other words, an analogy is only as strong as the similarity between
the related items and the number of repeated observations of the relation.
In his criticism of Cleanthes' argument Philo claims that the 
relation is merely contingent at best, but in the case of empirical
theism, the use of analogy is "not to be even the most certain and ir­
refragable of that inferior kind." The design argument, at least as the 
means of establishing the "religious hypothesis," is weak in both senses. 
As for the first kind of weakness, either the difference between the 
human contriver and the divine designer is too great for the analogy to 
get a foothold, or God is so similar to man as to make the argument not 
only implausible but practically useless. As for the second kind of 
weakness, the singularity of the universe leaves no cases for comparison 
or conditions of repeatability.
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The second major criticism of the dependence of the "religious 
hypothesis" upon an empirical theism grounded solely in an argument via 
analogy is an extension of the first. As can be seen in the assessment 
of the two kinds of weakness, analogy is stronger when it is based upon 
relations within a species related to a second species instead of mere 
singular cases. The analogy used in the design argument rests upon sup­
posed similarities between human contrivances (houses, ships, furniture 
and machines) and the natural universe. If the universe is the whole, 
how is it to be compared to the human contrivances that make up but a 
part? Philo wants to know the answer to his question about this use of
analogy: "Can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from
13parts to the whole?" Just how can a characteristic of a species as a 
part, the use of human intelligence in human contrivances, be analogous 
to a characteristic of the whole, the use of divine intelligence in 
creation? Despite the difference in magnitude and type, are these acts 
of a designer indeed in some sense members of a common species of intel­
ligence? Philo thinks that the answers furnished by the theists go be­
yond the reliability of an argument from analogy.
So far from admitting, continued Philo, that the operations of 
a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of 
the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another 
part if the latter be very remote from the f o r m e r . 14
In other words, the remoteness of such a similarity so greatly weakens 
the force of the analogy as to make the argument of little use. What­
ever remote analogy may hold between human intelligence and the divine 
is so weak as to offer no support to the "religious hypothesis" in any 
of its ordinary forms. In making this point Philo concludes:
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When two species of objects have always been observed to be con­
joined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one when­
ever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument 
from experience. But how this argument can have place where the 
objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without 
parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.15
There remains the third of Philo’s objections to Cleanthes' use 
of analogy. The argument via analogy seeks to explain a first-level 
order by reference to a second-level order (i.e., an order in nature by 
an order above nature). Philo asks why stop here (i.e., with a second- 
level order)? If the natural sequences in the species of houses, ma­
chines, and the like are utilized to offer an explanation of the universe 
as the creation of divine intelligence, why stop here? How are we to 
explain the cause of divine intelligence? Cleanthes replies that argu­
ment must stop somewhere, and the most reasonable stopping place is God. 
But indeed, considering the remoteness of the analogy, is it enough to 
pronounce the argument sufficient? Certainly, it will not sustain in 
and of itself the ’’religious hypothesis” as commonly interpreted. If 
we stop here, the additional hypothesis needed cannot be forthcoming.
But if we try to go on, we are again without a principle that can gener­
ate a fruitful hypothesis. Cleanthes acknowledges the point:
To establish one hypothesis upon another is building entirely in the 
air; and the utmost we ever attain by these conjectures and fictions 
is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion, but never can 
we, upon such terms, establish its reality.
To say the least, the knowledge of the Deity that can be gained by the
â posteriori argument via analogy is not nearly enough to ground the
"religious hypothesis" and the consequent claims it makes concerning
human morals.
Furthermore, Philo raises questions about the dependence of the 
argument upon the concept of mind as well as on the rules of analogy.
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The argument of Cleanthes assumes a relation between the design of man 
and human thought, wisdom, and intelligence. In addition, he must show 
what the resemblance is between human design and the intelligence of the 
Author of Nature.
In his book Eume, Newton, and the Design A r g u m e n t Robert H. 
Hurlbutt suggests a distinction that is of great help in clarifying this 
issue. He distinguishes two formulations of the design argument: an
argument from design and an argument to_ design. The argument from design 
begins with the presence of an order observed in nature. In this sense, 
intelligence is a condition of design. The order is a recognized aes­
thetic structure in the manner of perception rather than a teleological 
goal toward which things naturally move. In the latter formulation, the 
argument _t£ design, the sense of order is that of a means-end linkage. In 
other words, design is intentional and realized through the fulfillment 
of purposes. If Cleanthes^ argument is from design, there is no way he 
can conclude that there is an independent Divine purpose which serves as 
the warrant for moral responsibility. On the other hand, if Cleanthes' 
argument is design, there is not enough evidence available to support 
the analogy and justify the conclusion that there is moral purpose in 
nature. In either case, the analogy in the design argument is not strong 
enough to sustain the alleged practical and moral consequences that are 
said to follow from theism.
The pertinence of this distinction between two types of design 
argument is apparent in the Dialogues when Cleanthes responds to Philo's 
criticisms by suggesting an irregular argument from design. Cleanthes 
describes three instances in which an irregular sort of argument is ef­
fective. In the first instance, Cleanthes narrates a freakish incident
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in which an articulate voice speaks to everyone from out of the clouds 
so that each auditor hears and understands in his own language. Cer­
tainly, Cleanthes argues, there would be no difficulty in the immediate 
recognition of an intelligent cause. Likewise, in the second instance, 
Cleanthes tells of a fanciful situation in which a librairy of books like 
the Iliad or the Aeneid are propagated after the manner of plants and 
animals. Yet, Cleanthes concludes, in this case also there would be no 
doubt that it had an intelligent cause. Then, as a third instance, 
Cleanthes adds to his extraordinary tales the commonplace observance of 
the anatomy of an eye:
Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance, 
and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does 
not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensa­
tion. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favor of design; 
and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those 
frivolous though abstruse objections which can support
infidelity.18
If we consider this irregular argument from design separately, we find 
that Cleanthes gains only an aesthetic theism that cannot sustain the 
additional claims of the "religious hypothesis" concerning moral conse­
quences. The argument establishes an instructive association between 
nature’s order and God's existence. However, it cannot establish a 
divine purpose over and above the order observable in nature. The nature 
of God as knowable is limited to the intelligent structure or order ob­
served in the universe.
At this point it will prove helpful to return to the regular
design argument and formalize it. Fortunately, Leon Pearl has done this
work for us as follows:
(1) All objects possessing order in which the origin of order is 
known are human productions.
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(2) The order in human products originates from intelligent design.
(3) The universe, its parts and sub parts possess order.
Therefore,
(4) Probably the order in the universe originated from intelligent 
design.
The reasoning from (4) to the second conclusion is no different 
from that employed in comparing two human products for the purpose 
of ascertaining the differences in knowledge and ability of the two 
men who constructed them. . .
(5) The order in the universe "much exceeds the productions of human 
contrivance."
Therefore,
(6) Probably the designer of the world "is somewhat similar to the 
mind of man: though possessed of much larger faculties.
If the use of "intelligence" in (2) and (4) is correlated with "order" 
and does not imply "intention," then the extension of difference in (4) 
and (6) is simply a matter of degree and gives us no additional infor­
mation about the nature of that "intelligence." As a consequence, human 
intelligence and divine intelligence are one in kind. Philo will use 
this consequence to draw an uncrossable line between the natural attri­
bute of intelligence and such moral attributes as anyone may wish to 
infer. In fact, Philo employs the restricted consequences of the argu­
ment in three ways. First, Philo questions the consequences of holding 
a likeness-of-intelligence principle between God and man. Second, Philo 
explores alternate analogies to intelligence to determine what effect 
they might have on the strength of the design argument. And finally, 
Philo evaluates the nature of the superlative in designating the dif­
ference between God and man.
Before examining Philo's criticism, I believe it would help to 
clarify the position of the three disputants in the Dialogues. None of 
the three claims the position of atheism, although none of the three is 
ever sure that his opponent's view can be distinguished from atheism.
The classifications that emerge in the Dialogues are anthropomorphic or
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mystic. The anthropomorphic view, which is espoused by Cleanthes, holds 
that there are knowable attributes which differ only in degree and are 
common between God and man. The mystic view, which is held by the other 
two, is not so straitforward since Hume’s use of "mystic" in the Dialogues 
involves more than the ordinary sense of the term. Hume takes a bit of 
poetic license with the word in order to enhance the irony and the 
dramatic effect of his work. The plot of the Dialogues acquires some 
of its dramatic unity from Demea’s mistaken notion that he and Philo are 
fellow travelers under the rather broad umbrella of "mysticism." The 
common ground that makes Demea’s confusion possible is the opinion shared 
with Philo that the divine attributes are both distinct in kind from 
human attributes and incomprehensible. The difference between his and 
Philo’s use of "incomprehensible" becomes clear to Demea only as the plot 
of the Dialogues unfolds. Demea realizes that Philo has been'working 
from the perspective of agnosticism or suspended belief (an ironic in­
sight that Hume’s readers are supposed to have caught from the first). 
There is a bit of spoof on Philo’s part between mysticism and mere mys­
tification. Demea’s own position is the usual combination of rationalism
and fideism.
Philo’s criticisms of Cleanthes’ regular design argument is an 
integral part of the dramatic plot. Philo’s estimation of the practical 
consequences of the design argument is an aspect of his tongue-in-cheek 
play upon several of the mystifications in theism. First, if one allows
a strict likeness or similarity between the "intelligence" of God and
man, it would undercut the merits of the proposed appeal to God in 
justification of moral beliefs. That is, they may be of the same order, 
unless the attribute of omniscience is allowed some special significance.
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Demea tries to support Philo's attack on Cleanthes in the following way:
In reality, Cleanthes, consider what it is you assert when you rep­
resent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What 
is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, 
sentiments, ideas— united, indeed, into one self or person, but 
still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas which 
are the parts of its discourse arrange themselves in a certain form 
or order which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately 
gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new 
affections, new feelings arise which continually diversify the men­
tal scene and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid 
succession imaginable. How is this compatible with that perfect 
immutability and simplicity which all true theists ascribe to the 
Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and fu­
ture; his love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual 
operation; he is entire in every point of space, and complete in 
every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, 
no diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinc­
tion or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been and 
ever will be, without any new judgment, sentiment, or operation. He 
stands fixed in one simple, perfect state; nor can you ever say, 
with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that 
other, or that this judgment or idea has been lately formed and 
will give place, by succession, to any different judgment or idea.
This long panegyric of Demea is an excellent example of the bold mystic 
who, from the highest adoration, but without sufficient empirical evi­
dence, would ascribe an incomprehensible set of attributes to God. It 
should be evident from this example that theism as commonly expressed 
cannot be established by the strict analogy between the effect (natural 
order) and the cause (divine intelligence). On the basis of a strict 
analogy, Demea's panegyric is mere verbiage. If Cleanthes accepts 
Philo's criticism, the results sought in the argument from design are 
not forthcoming. That is to say, if "intelligence" and "order" are 
strictly correlated, then the resulting remote relation does allow for 
the possibility of a deity but grants no insight whatsoever about moral 
attributes over and above those found in common society.
The second of Philo's criticisms concerning the practical con­
sequences of the design argument has to do with the possibility of using
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a different analogy. This tactic of Philo serves three purposes. First, 
it points out the selectivity involved in the choice of "design," "intel­
ligence," and "contrivance" as the bases for analogy. Second, it sug­
gests the historic fact that alternative "resemblances" have been uti­
lized; consequently, any selection is historically conditioned. Third, 
it calls attention to the fact that different consequences follow from 
the particular image on which an analogy is constructed. Further, since 
the development of the several alternatives need not detain us, it will 
suffice to note that Philo lists four alternative principles: reason,
instinct, generation, and vegetation. Of these four he calls attention 
to the fact that two were used by ancient theists. The analogy of gen­
eration is an organic metaphor used by the Stoics. According to this 
metaphor the earth is a vital body and reproduces itself. The analogy 
of vegetation is of Epicurean origin and based on atomism. These two 
alternative accounts of the cosmos are not as useful to modern science, 
but they have in times past been used to describe the nature of the 
order in the universe and have done so without the entailment of the 
type of "religious hypothesis" advocated by either Cleanthes or Demea. 
Although these alternatives are not currently satisfactory to natural 
science, they continue to call attention to the remoteness, the limits, 
and the contingency with which one employs the analogy of design.
Finally, there is the third tactic of Philo in pointing out
that no practical consequences follow from the design argument. Philo
constantly advocates a natural economy of belief. The stance adopted by
Philo, unlike that of Demea, may be understood as an effort "to erect
21religious faith on philosophical scepticism." Hence, Philo's skepti­
cism must be understood as different from the total rejection of all
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religion. He agrees with Cleanthes that
To whatever length anyone may push his speculative principles 
of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like 
other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other 
reason than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing.
In other words, practical necessity forces the skeptic to act within the
sphere of common life and in doing so sets limits upon skepticism. Philo
clarifies further the nature of his particular type of skepticism as
follows:
So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or pol­
itics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense 
and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions and 
remove (at least in part) the suspicion, which we so justly enter­
tain with regard to every reasoning, that is very subtile and re­
fined. But in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; 
while at the same time we are employed upon objects which, we must 
be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of all others, require 
most to be familiarized to our apprehension.23
The necessity placed upon thinking depends upon the needs of life within 
a common society. It is the nature of "instinct or necessity" that con­
strains natural belief.
Within the limits of natural belief Philo is led to make a 
cautious assent to the argument from design. But even this limited con­
fession is hypothetical and contingent:
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to main­
tain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, 
at least undefined, proposition. That the cause or causes of order 
in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelli­
gence— if this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, 
or more particular explication; if it affords no inference that af­
fects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance; 
and if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no further 
than to human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any ap­
pearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this 
really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, 
and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to 
the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the argu­
ments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie 
against it?2^
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From Philo's confession it is apparent that there can be very little 
difference between the skepticism he espouses and the theism that 
Cleanthes is entitled to advocate. Their difference over the strength 
of the analogy between divine and human intelligence is indicated in the 
way Cleanthes speaks of it as "somewhat similar" while Philo merely says 
that it "probably bears some remote analogy." They do not differ over 
the existence of God but over what can be affirmed about the nature of 
God from the analogy. Philo calls attention to this when he says.
So little, replied Philo, do I esteem this suspense of judgment 
in the present case to be possible that I am apt to suspect there 
enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more 
than is usually imagined. . . . Here, then, the existence of a Deity 
is plainly ascertained by reason; and if we make it a question 
whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a 
mind or intelligence, not withstanding the vast difference which may 
reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but 
a mere verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies between 
the effects: to restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the
causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry the legitimate con­
clusion is that the causes have also an analogy; and if we are not 
contented with calling the first and supreme cause a God or Deity, 
but desire to vary the expression, what can we call him but Mind or 
Thought, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable
resemblance?25
The verbal difficulty, according to Philo, occurs in ordinary conversa­
tion where men differ "concerning the degrees of any quality." For 
example, is Hannibal a merely great or a superlatively great man? Such 
disputes are difficult to resolve because there are no exact standards 
for the measurements of degrees of quality. Therefore, where the evi­
dence is the same, the dispute about the modest and the superlative 
quality is quite likely nothing more than verbal. Concerning such dis­
putes there is seldom either genuine disagreement or resolution.
Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your 
dispute? The theist allows that the original intelligence is very- 
different from human reason; the atheist allows that the original
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principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quar­
rel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy 
which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any 
determination?
Is it a mere matter of temperament that separates Philo and Cleanthes?
If the answer is yes, then Cleanthes' position dissolves into Philo's. 
While Cleanthes has proposed extending the use of "intellect" to show 
that God is "possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the 
grandeur of the work which he has executed," Philo requests that the 
extension shall in no wise be allowed to differ in kind from the works 
of nature nor exceed them in grandeur. For Philo, the strength of the 
analogy arises in the human mind from instinct more than from intellect, 
ilan is of necessity forced to act on the principle that "like effects 
prove like causes." Otherwise, man could not act with any degree of 
skill and confidence. Thus, Philo argues that the conclusion of the 
analogy reflects man's instinctive necessity to act according to con­
ventions whenever he acts in an intelligent manner. In sum, the differ­
ence between Philo and Cleanthes is a matter of taste, and the two dif­
fer in the manner of feeling and not of reason.
However, the decisive consequence is that although the differ­
ence between Philo and Cleanthes is one of temperament and merely verbal, 
it still requires a concession on Cleanthes' part. If the attribute of 
"intelligence" is the sole one that survives scrutiny of the argument 
and is itself remote and unextendable, then it will follow that "it af­
fords no inference that affects human life." It is Philo's conclusion 
that
. . .  we have reason to infer that the natural attributes of Deity 
have a greater resemblance to those of men than his morals have to 
human virtues. But what is the consequence? Nothing but this, that
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the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than 
his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme Being is allowed to be 
absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs most from him 
departs the farthest from the supreme standard of rectitude and 
perfection.27
Consequently, the moral attributes of God are not established by the 
design argument. • The analogy with human intelligence cannot even suggest 
the moral perfection or infinity commonly ascribed to God. These limi­
tations of the design argument constitute a formidable obstacle to those 
who would employ it as the sole justification of a full-blown theism.
Cleanthes first realizes the extent of this obstacle when he 
confronts Philo's emphasis upon the misery of man. Philo contends that 
any exactness of correlation between man's moral sentiments and the 
divine nature is precluded by their essentially different attitudes to­
ward human suffering. It is at this juncture in the discussion that 
Cleanthes points out to Demea the direction of Philo's argument.
And have you, at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your 
intentions, Philo? Your long agreement with Demea did indeed a 
little surprise me, but I find you were all the while erecting a 
concealed battery against me. And I must confess that you have 
now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition 
and controversy. If you can make out the present point, and prove 
mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at once of all 
religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of 
the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?28
The result is that Cleanthes redefines religion so as to keep
its moral value within the scope of the analogy used in his argument.
The proper office of religion is to regulate the hearts of men, 
humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, 
and obedience; and, as its operation is silent and only enforces 
the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being over­
looked and confounded with these other motives.29
From this definition of "true religion" several things are clear about
the relationship of morals and religion. First, the role of religion
is to be supportive of common morality instead of being the source and
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sole foundation of all human morals. Second, the purpose of religion is 
to "humanize." Third, the area of concern is personal morality and jus­
tice. Fourth, religion is "silent" and unobtrusive in social life. 
Finally, religion is to regulate the human sentiments toward fulfillment 
in human society.
A summary of the discussion of empirical theism is in order. I 
believe there is sufficient evidence in the foregoing account of the 
Dialogues to conclude that Philo and Cleanthes, while differing in senti­
ment toward the deity, are in agreement concerning five propositions 
about the design argument. First, the argument is from design- Second, 
the argument can establish nothing about the nature of God that is not 
inferrable from the order of nature. Third, to conclude that a deity 
exists is merely to affirm the remote resemblance between the order in 
nature and the order in human artifacts. Fourth, it is impossible for 
the argument to offer grounds for morals other than those to be found in 
the natural order. Fifth, any disorder in nature that leads to man's 
unhappy condition will reduce the strength of the analogy.
Further, the significance of the discussion of theism between 
Cleanthes and Philo and their consequent agreements fits rather consis­
tently with the case I am making about the position of David Hume. It 
will suffice at this point merely to note that empirical theism has no 
practical consequences for the moral beliefs of man and that the atti­
tudes toward deity, to the degree that they have any effect at all, are 
due to the particular sentiment of an individual man and not to reason.
Demea's Case for Rational Theism
To return to the dramatic context of Hume's Dialogues, it is
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important to examine Demea's alternative to empirical theism. Demea 
submits a rational theology that makes its way 2̂  priori so that a theism 
worthy of the "religious hypothesis" might be proven and the true foun­
dation of faith and morals be established. I will now set out Demea's 
position.
Demea, as his character would lead us to expect, states the 
rational case in a rather involved and complex form. The whole argument 
is as follows:
Whatever exists must have a cause or a reason of its existence, it 
being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself or be the 
cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects 
to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, 
without any ultimate cause at all, or must at last have recourse to 
some ultimate cause that is necessarily existent. Now, that the 
first supposition is absurd may be thus proved. In the infinite 
chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is 
determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which 
immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, 
taken together, is not determined or caused by anything; and yet it 
is evident that it requires a cause or a reason, as much as any 
particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is 
still reasonable why this particular succession of causes existed 
from eternity, and not any other succession or no succession at all.
If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can 
be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in 
nothing's having existed from eternity than there is in that succes­
sion of causes which constitute the universe. What was it, then, 
which determined something to exist rather than nothing, and be­
stowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? 
External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word 
without a meaning. Was it nothing? But that can never produce any­
thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent 
Being who carries the reason of his existence in himself; and who 
cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. 
There is, consequently, such a Being— that is, there is a Deity.^0
In the context of the Dialogues, the whole of this argument of 
Demea has two purposes. It seeks to provide an "infallible demonstration" 
of the existence of a deity and to furnish an insight into "the infinity 
of the Divine attributes." Just as it was with Cleanthes' argument, the
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criticism of the argument is primarily concerned with the nature and not 
the being of the Deity. Demea was the first in the Dialogue to assert 
that the crucial issue was the nature of the Deity, and he explicitly 
offers his ^  priori argument as a specific way of overcoming any failure 
of the a posteriori argument to achieve such an end. So, whatever may 
be the value of the argument in establishing the existence of a deity, 
the major concern is whether it can do so in such a manner as to give 
insight into God’s nature. However, the criticism of the argument mounted 
by Cleanthes is directed at the notion of "existence" used in the argu­
ment and its fruitlessness as a means for knowing the nature of the 
deity in question. Cleanthes makes three telling criticisms.
First, Cleanthes questions the certainty of the demonstration.
He argues as follows concerning the use of "existence:"
Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. 
Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. What­
ever we conceive as existent, we cal also conceive as non-existent. 
There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contra­
diction. Consequently there is no being whose existence is 
demonstrable.
In other words, "existence" is not a matter of logical demonstration be­
cause the principle of non-contradiction does not apply. Cleanthes' ac­
count goes no further than this.
Second, Cleanthes directs a related part of his criticism at 
Demea’s use of "necessary being." It follows from Cleanthes' account of 
the use of "existence" that "necessity" in the strong and logical sense 
cannot be used of "existence." As he says, anything which we speak of 
as existing we can quite easily think of as not existing. There is noth­
ing in the concept of "existence" that entails necessity.
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Cleanthes’ third objection also turns upon Demea’s use of "nec­
essary being." Cleanthes asks: Why assume that a necessary being is
something in addition to the causal sequence itself? Philo supports this 
objection by calling attention to the role of necessity in mathematics. 
According to Philo, in mathematics "necessity" arises from the properties 
that inhere in the number or numbers involved. He then asks: If we know
the nature of each of the parts, why should this not provide the full 
explanation of the order of the whole composed by those parts?
Hume considers these objections sufficient as a response to 
Demea. What he does is to use Philo to turn the direction of the conver­
sation. Philo argues that even if these objections were met, it would 
satisfy only the speculative desires of the metaphysician. Such an ac­
count, even if true, could not function as a foundation for religious 
conduct. As I have shown in the first chapter, Hume believes that rea­
son is passive and cannot move one to act. In this discussion, Philo 
becomes his spokesman and argues that a rational necessity cannot become 
the motive for conduct except as the slave of some passion. So, again 
the dialogue reaches an impasse. Should the argument of Demea succeed, 
a thing that is held impossible in the Dialogues, it would still be nec­
essary to establish the relevance of the "religious hypothesis" to the 
practical conduct of man.
Furthermore, it is the very "difference" betifeen the Deity and 
man that Demea wishes to maintain. As Demea conceives it, the very nature 
of the Deity so far exceeds that of man that there can be no analogy be­
tween them. As a result, even if Demea should succeed in establishing the 
nature of such a deity with full clarity, it is difficult to see how the
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divine nature would prove relevant to matters of human society. A deity 
whose nature has little or no resemblance to man might not need or be 
inclined to impose moral duties similar to the usual social obligations 
or supportive of just those very moral beliefs necessitated by the common 
life. Should these moral duties prove identical, the appeal to God's 
nature would be unnecessary, and should they prove distinct, the appeal 
to God's nature would create a conflict between duty and natural incli­
nation. In the latter case, there would be no happy way to resolve the 
conflict of feelings between loyalty to the (alleged) commands of God 
and the instinctive desires definitive of the requisite conditions that 
constitute the common life. As we shall see, Hume perceives a moral 
impasse of this sort as occurring between the popular notions of God and 
the theistic accounts of suffering (i.e., theodicies).
To draw these matters concerning both empirical and rational 
theology to a close, it should be apparent that the appeal to a natural 
theism fails in each case to provide a sure foundation for the usual 
moral beliefs of man. Demea holds dogmatically to a mystic certainty 
that the Deity is of a different nature from man and the world. As a 
result, he is unable to establish a relation between the Deity and the 
demands of ordinary moral belief.
Cleanthes' case also has little success. Although his argument 
is allowed to stand as a probable ground for theism, it is allowed to do 
so in such a manner as to remove any pretensions of support for anything 
not otherwise already available to our moral beliefs. As a result, the 
argument adds nothing to what is already available in man's social life.
As for Philo, he allows for the possibility of a minimal theism. 
But he will not accept the "religious hypothesis." He holds out as follows:
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All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great 
and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn, 
while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, 
barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of 
them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the sceptic, who 
tells them that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to 
such subjects; for this plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever 
to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of 
judgment is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, 
as is commonly observed, and no defense among theologians is success­
ful, how complete must be his victory who remains always, with all 
mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or 
abiding city which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?^^
In other words, theology fails to establish any system that will not 
lead to absurdity. No theoretical system or practical application, other 
than skepticism, follows from the present state of theological discourse. 
The "religious hypothesis" as an account of the universe or as a guide 
to human conduct is of so minimal a merit as to provide no insight, in­
ternal or external, as a clue to the meaning or conduct of life.
Philo's Case for the Moral Neutrality of God 
The conclusion concerning the irrelevance of religion as a 
justification of moral beliefs is further confirmed by the perplexity 
that arises for theism in regard to the problem of evil. If the nature 
of the Deity should be established so as to supply the popular religious 
desires for both omnipotence and omnibeneficience as a divine support 
against the vicissitudes of life, then it could not be reconciled with 
the world as we experience it. The problem of evil traditionally plays 
a crucial part in evaluating theism and casts a special doubt on the 
relevance of religion for morals. I will now explore the use Hume makes 
of it in the Dialogues.
All three participants in the Dialogues agree that the problem 
that divides them is the nature and not the mere existence of a deity.
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Cleanthes and Philo agree that the reason for giving credence to the 
existence of a deity lies in an argument via analogy from design. They 
differ on the inference that can be made about the nature of the Deity 
due to the remote resemblance established by the analogy. Cleanthes 
argues for a nature like man’s, but Philo rejects this anthropomorphism 
as an unsatisfactory overstatement of the evidence. Philo is thus in 
agreement with Demea about the assessment of our knowledge concerning the 
attributes of God, but disassociates himself from the rational method 
used by Demea to establish a certain proof of the existence and the in­
finite attributes of the Deity.
At this point in the discussion Philo declares the reason for 
his disagreement with Cleanthes and agreement with Demea concerning the 
status of the attributes of the Deity in the human understanding. First, 
he agrees with Demea that the common approach to religion depends primar­
ily upon the feelings of the human heart. Instead of understanding re­
ligion from the design in nature, it would prove more fruitful to move 
directly from human feeling to the notion of the Deity. For example, 
Demea begins the discussion of evil with such a redirection of the issue:
It is my opinion, I own, replied Demea, that each man feels, in a 
manner, the truth of religion within his own breast; and, from a 
consciousness of his imbecility and misery rather than from any 
reasoning, is led to seek protection from that Being on whom he 
and all nature are dependent. So anxious or so tedious are even 
the best scenes of life that futurity is still the object of all 
our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward and endeavor, by 
prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers 
whom we find, by experience so able to afflict and oppress us. 
Wretched creatures that we are! What resource for us amidst the 
innumerable ills of life did not religion suggest some methods of 
atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly 
agitated and tormented?^^
I gather that Demea believes that a solution is available in 
religion, but whether his notions arise from a rational or fideistic
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theology is not fully clear. It is over the point of finding "atonement”
in religion that Demea and Philo part company. While Philo agrees with
the estimate of religion's dependence upon the feelings, he does not
agree that it is an effective instrument of hope. Just as in the notion
of the Deity, so also in the matter of hope, Demea sees the answer in
something beyond nature:
This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life 
but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, 
therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period
of existence.34
Thus, Demea combines the feelings of religion found in popular theism and 
his own rational theism. Philo would agree that these features of human 
hope are integral to the appeal of the "religious hypothesis." But the 
question is: Can one gain this combination if he restricts his conclu­
sions to the merits of argument and evidence? It is over the limits of 
sound argument that Cleanthes challenges Demea:
No! replied Cleanthes, no! These arbitrary suppositions can 
never be admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontro­
verted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? 
Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? 
To establish one hypothesis upon another is building entirely in the 
air; and the utmost we ever attain by these conjectures and fictions 
is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion, but never can 
we, upon such terms, establish its reality.35
With this criticism Demea's view is dropped from the Dialogues. However, 
as I have shown in Chapter II, Hume explored the evidence of natural re­
ligion on its own. As for the Dialogues, Cleanthes' interjection returns 
the discussion to the examination of the problem within the limits of 
natural theology.
The point of continuity is the agreement between Demea and Philo 
about human misery. They both hold that suffering is the ordinary lot of 
man. Demea and Philo are in agreement that it goes against the grain of
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any normal understanding of human life to propose any other conception 
of the human condition. Cleanthes is the exception, holding that man is, 
in his natural state, a very happy creature. How can Cleanthes hope to 
justify this view without violating his own strictures against "arbitrary 
suppositions," or the use of "fictions" that are contrary to fact? This 
question specifies the context in the Dialogues for the debate concerning 
the nature of the Deity and the presence of evil in the world.
However, given the very nature of Cleanthes' anthropomorphic view 
of the divine attributes, and the fact that these attributes are estab­
lished by the strict analogy between the state of nature and the character 
of deity, he must make his case over against the ordinary experience of 
evil in human life. Philo will argue that men "remain in life" not be­
cause of their pleasure in it, nor because, as Demea argues, they are 
bribed by futurity's hope, but out of the sheer terror of death.
Cleanthes' case requires that he show such fears to be psychopathic, non- 
occurrent, or misconceptions. Cleanthes concedes as much to Philo:
If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be un­
happy or corrupted, here is an end at once of all religion. For to 
what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while 
the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?
It is to show the impossibility of Cleanthes* task that Philo introduces
the old and unanswered questions of Epicurus:
Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he 
impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is 
he both able and willing? whence then is evil?37
As far as Philo is concerned, Cleanthes' theism cannot cross this impasse
and establish the moral relevance of the position. Philo announces his
triumph:
Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I 
triumph. Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes
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of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphys­
ical subtilty to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe 
and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness 
of final causes strike us with such irresistible force that all ob­
jections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and 
sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us 
to repose any weight on them. But there is no view of human life 
or of the condition of mankind from which, without the greatest 
violence, we can infer the moral attributes or learn that infinite 
benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, 
which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone.
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the difference between
Cleanthes and Philo is not over the existence of the Deity but over what
attributes that Deity might possess. Philo contends that the theodicy
advocated in the "religious hypothesis" cannot be a proven extension of
the analogical method. The fact of evil serves as a barrier to such
reasoning.
Philo’s feeling of triumph marks a dramatic change of attitude. 
The problem of evil involves Philo in the discussion in a new way. In­
stead of the careless antagonist, he now becomes the concerned investi­
gator working toward an acceptable conclusion of the matter. He willingly 
joins Cleanthes in laying out the circumstances in the world that must be 
incorporated into any account of the causes of the universe. The four 
circumstances agreed upon are: (1) living creatures are motivated by
pain or pleasure, (2) the world is administered according to general 
laws, (3) creatures have limited faculties, and (4) the workmanship in 
the springs and principles of nature is flawed.
In light of these circumstances Philo offers his own argument 
from suffering.
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, 
animated and organized, sensible and active! You admire this pro­
digious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly 
these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hos­
tile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them
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for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the specta­
tor! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, im­
pregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her 
lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive 
children!
Philo next declares that there are only four possibilities concerning the 
moral character of the first causes of the universe:
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes 
of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that
they have perfect malice; that they are opposite and have both good­
ness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed 
phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the 
uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third.
The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.^0
Philo argues that only one of these meets the requirements of the four
circumstances; consequently, the first causes of the universe are morally
neutral. Since, as we saw earlier in this chapter, Philo designated the
cause of the universe as "God," it follows that any appeal to God as a
moral ground is futile and empty.
In the last part of the Dialogues, Philo gives a plain philo­
sophical assent to the being of a God whose nature remains morally neutral. 
God can be identified with the order aesthetically present in perception, 
or God can be acknowledged as the intelligence inferred in the design 
argument. In either case the nature of God is far too ambiguous to be 
of moral consequence. Philo's conclusion concerning the moral relevance 
of theism is that a religion founded upon the evidence will be a silent 
companion of the common life.
Conclusion
At the close of Chapter II, I suggested that it is a common 
opinion that the moral impasse that arises from the motives of popular 
religion can be overcome in a scientific theology. The expectation
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hinges upon a belief that rational theism can be founded upon evidence 
and rational arguments so as to be independent of the passions of fear 
and hope. It is also anticipated that the conclusions of rational theism 
will not only fulfill the needs that give birth to religion, but do so in 
a manner commensurate with the highest possible standards of moral inten­
tion and achievement. Unfortunately, the conclusion reached in Hume’s 
analysis is that none of these expectations of rational theology can be 
realized.
In this chapter we have seen why Hume believes that the arguments 
for the existence of God can confirm precious little about the nature of 
God. Hume concludes that since the nature of God is left in an ambiguous 
and uncertain condition, no moral conclusions can be inferred as the di­
rect and sure consequences of theistic belief. But to make matters worse, 
we have seen that Hume believes that the argument from human suffering 
leads to a conclusion supported by the general circumstances of the uni­
verse; the Deity is morally neutral. Hume concludes that when the nature 
of God is perceived to be morally neutral, the hope of meeting the needs 
of the human passions that leads to the popular belief in God are hope­
lessly unfulfilled.
It is Hume's position that the moral impasse cannot be removed 
by theism. Hume's position is supplemented by his claim that the vicis­
situdes of life lead men to religion via the passions of fear or hope. 
Rational theism can neither provide another motive nor guarantee the 
favorable resolution of man's fears or hopes. Consequently, Hume con­
cludes that men are usually religious for quite different motives than 
the mere curiosity that rational theology is able to satisfy.
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Further, Hume argues that rational theology is forced to reduce 
the role of "true religion" to an enthusiasm for the morals already pre­
sent in the common life. Rational religion by itself cannot provide 
either the moral standards or the surety for moral beliefs commonly 
claimed by the pious. Hume has shown that rational religion is something 
quite distinct from the popularly practiced religions. Further, he has 
admitted that rational theology is so abstruse that it remains beyond 
the comprehension of the vulgar.
Hume's conclusions concerning natural theology set out in this 
chapter leave one further unexplored option which I mentioned at the close 
of the preceding chapter. Through some special revelation or insight a 
fideistic theology might be able to elude the horns of the moral dilemma 
in popular theism. I will explore Hume's appraisal of these claims for 
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HUME’S CRITICISM OF FIDEISTIC THEISM
In the last two chapters I have examined first Hume's criticism 
of popular theism and second his account of scientific theism. A review 
of the consequences of my exposition may prove helpful before I turn to 
the specific problem of fideism. As I have shown in Chapter Two, Hume’s 
inquiry into popular theism arrives at the conclusion that the original 
feelings from which the principles of religion emerge create adverse 
consequences in popular attitudes toward the deity and consequently cause 
the devotees of religion to be impaled upon the horns of a moral dilemma: 
either a superstitious polytheism or a dogmatic monotheism. In either 
case the dominant attitude that produces a particular popular notion of 
deity pollutes it to such a degree that popular religion is unable to 
function either as a wholesome motive or as a clear warrant for moral 
beliefs.
The moral effects of scientific theism prove equally disap­
pointing. As I have shown in Chapter Three, Hume concludes that scien­
tific reason is unable to determine just what attributes the deity might 
possess. As a direct consequence of its failure to attain knowledge of
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any moral attribute of the Deity, scientific theism is impotent as a 
reformulation of popular religion. Moreover, if scientific theism 
should allow the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience found in re­
ligious monotheism to be incorporated into its rational theology, the 
conditions normally expected to result from such attributes conflict 
with the common experience of evil in this world. So, the result is 
that Hume again finds theism impaled upon the horns of a dilemma.
Either the Deity is able but unwilling, or is willing but unable, to 
correct the conditions that give rise to the experience of evil in this 
world.
Thus, the outcome of my exposition of Hume's criticism of the 
religious hypothesis at this point is that both forms of theism examined 
so far prove to be unsuited to the establishment of a clear and useful 
warrant for moral beliefs. In this chapter I will look at the criticism 
Hume makes of yet one other form of the religious hypothesis, fideistic 
theism. I chose to refer to this third type as 'fideistic theism' be­
cause it is held to occur in human experience as an artifice of divine
intervention. Because of its origin, fideism is commonly believed to 
be distinct from all other types of theism which might emerge from ordi­
nary operations of natural belief. Fideism is a mode of theism that 
traces all belief to a unique origin in divine revelation. Surely, it 
is claimed, with such origins fideism should be able to achieve the well­
being of man as nothing else can.
In his treatment of fideism, Hume does not reject outright the
possibility of a revelation of this sort, but directs his own inquiry 
into the matter in the form of a particular question. Hume is to be
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taken as asking the fideist, "Can the form of life produced as an arti­
fice of divine revelation be other than artificial in the pejorative 
sense?" The question grows out of the general philosophy of Hume, in 
which he uses the word "artificial" in two ordinary but different senses. 
For example, Hume uses "artificial" to modify "virtue" in his theory of 
morals. Here his purpose is to point out that some virtues are human 
contrivances and not merely of instinctive origin. But Hume does not 
intend that the artificial virtues are to be judged as merely arbitrary 
because they are the result of human contrivances. They are identified 
as virtues specifically because they are actions requisite to common 
life. Artificial virtues are to be distinguished from natural virtues 
by the fact that they are based on customs governed by social conventions 
or rules.
In contrast with his positive use of "artificial," Hume also 
uses the term in a pejorative sense. For example, he speaks of an "arti­
ficial life." In this context "artificial" refers to a life that is 
feigned and superficial because it is neither requisite to common life 
nor governed by general rules.
It is easy to see that this strategy of artificial virtues might 
be taken as an open door for the claims of the religious hypothesis. One 
can readily imagine the religionist claiming that divinely sanctioned 
cultic rites and liturgical rules justify devotion and piety more than 
the pragmatic social conventions vindicate secular practices. Further, 
the fideist may confidently announce that the Deity sanctions religious 
acts not only for the common good of men in this present world, but pro­
vides a future state beyond this life which is conditioned on the present
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faithful adherence to sacred duties. How is Hume to retain control of 
his notions of "common life" and "instinctive belief" in contradistinction 
to the claims of the fideists?
As I construe the questions that Hume directs to the fideists, 
they are designed to maintain the integrity of his philosophy against 
abuse. Hume’s strategy is to clarify which of the two senses of "arti­
ficial" applies to the religious hypothesis submitted by the fideist. I 
believe that Hume is constrained by the counterclaims between himself and 
the fideist to clarify and justify his differences with them. First,
Hume must show why the artificial virtues are admissible into the scope 
of the common life while the artificial devotions of piety are not. Se­
cond, he must achieve the first aim by showing how the same criteria in­
clude the one and exclude the other. Finally, Hume must make his dis­
tinction in a manner that is consistent with his policy that the confir­
mation of these matters arises out of instinctive belief. Once Hume’s 
approach to the problem is seen in this light, the problem central to 
Hume’s inquiry into fideism is recognized as practical rather than 
metaphysical.
Unfortunately, unlike the previous cases of popular theism and 
scientific theism, Hume never wrote a single work on fideism. As a re­
sult, I will need to collect his arguments from a variety of sources.
These will include primarily his treatment of miracles in An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding^ as well as his account of providence in 
2the same work. Special use will be made of at least three related es­
says: "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm";^ "On Suicide";^ and "On the
Immortality of the Soul."^ Together, these selections provide a rather
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full and complete treatment of the issues between Hume and the fideist.
Suffice it as an entry into Hume's criticism of fideism to call 
attention to the conclusion he draws at the close of the discussion of 
miracles.
. . . the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with 
miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable 
person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of 
its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is
conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts 
all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determina­
tion to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.^
Hume is obviously marking the distinction between one who is moved to 
action by instinctive belief and one who is both "reasonable" and "moved 
by Faith." Hume suggests at least three differences between natural be­
lief and faith. First, faith originates from the miracles allegedly 
performed by the Deity and is perpetuated in the devotee by "a continued 
miracle in his own person." In a sense, faith is an artifice of the 
(supposed) divine intervention into the personal life of the believer. 
Second, faith lies outside the range of reason, custom, and experience 
and, unlike instinctive belief, is not tied to the requisite conditions 
of common life. Third, any check upon faith by the reasonable person 
would lie in such insights as miracles might furnish of a special pur­
pose or future life for the person moved by faith. In other words, 
fideism would require that Hume replace the common life with the pro­
jected life of faith as the sure footing for moral beliefs and practices. 
In this context, the question directing Hume's inquiry into fideism 
would be of this sort: Can a religion founded upon such pretensions of
personal faith provide the justification for the ordinary moral beliefs 
of man? This form of the question is consistent with Hume's normal
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strategy of looking for an account of ordinary beliefs so as to make 
clear their relevance and utility. Eume's procedure in this particular 
inquiry is to weigh the evidence supporting the miracles of faith re­
ported by fideists.
The sheer absurdity of the claims of faith can be overcome 
only if the occurrence of miracles can be confirmed by public evidence 
so that this whole approach to religion is shown to be more than self- 
deception emerging from sick men's dreams. For this reason, Hume's pur­
pose is to determine for the wise man what it is to limit his belief to 
the evidence. It is allowed that fideism, like natural belief, need not 
be confined to the limits of theoretical and rational proofs. All that
is required of fideism is that the evidence be capable of sustaining the
"artificial life" that emerges from it. This is to say that Hume's 
check upon the credibility of faith is that the miracle of believing 
should not be greater than the miracle believed. On the basis of this 
check Hume believes that a careful weighing of the evidence will show 
"that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and 
make it a just foundation for any such system of religion."^
In these matters, Hume appears to be quite sensitive to the 
difficulties of proof or disproof when applied to testimony. Once the 
strategy required by his test of miracle is clear, I believe, the effec­
tiveness of Hume's principle is devastating. I intend to show that this
is the case by developing in this chapter Hume's appraisal of fideistic
theism in three steps. First, I will make explicit why faith may be the 
basis of an artificial life only in the pejorative sense. Second, I will 
follow Hume's careful rejection of the evidential status of miracles.
91
Third, I will provide an account of the confusions Hume finds in the 
notions of providence and immortality. When these three steps have been 
set forth, it should be apparent why Hume contends that faith is impotent 
as a guide to life and undesirable as an option to the common life that 
emerges from man's instinctive beliefs.
The Distinction Between Belief and Faith 
The distinction between natural belief and faith lies in the 
instinctive nature of ordinary belief. It is this aspect of Hume's no­
tion of belief that is crucial in the distinction he continually makes 
between an authentic stability that emerges in the common life and the 
extraordinary pretentiousness of any "artificial life." Hume uses in­
stinctive belief to mark off matters of fact from reveries of the imag­
ination. In laying out the topography of belief, Hume takes it that he 
is answering a question about the fence between fact and fiction. As he 
puts it: "Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a
fiction and belief?"^
The first step in understanding how belief performs the crucial 
role Hume demands of it is to realize that he regards belief as felt in 
perception. In a paragraph common to the Treatise and An Enquiry Con­
cerning Human Understanding Hume writes :
. . . 'tis evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order 
of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their 
feeling to the mind. I confess, that 'tis impossible to explain 
perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of 
words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name 
is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands 
in common life. And in philosophy we can go no further, than assert, 
that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas 
of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them 
more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; 
infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles 
of all our actions.̂
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At least three things can be concluded from this passage. First, belief 
occurs in the mind as something felt in the manner of perception. Else­
where Hume says that because belief is something felt it "depends not upon 
the will, nor can it be commanded at p l e a s u r e . S e c o n d ,  belief is the 
force or influence of an idea that distinguishes it from a fiction.
Third, belief makes certain ideas the motivating factors in our actions.
I gather from this that instinctive belief emerges with the testimony of 
the senses and is the spring of action in the forming of habits and cus­
toms. It is the cement that holds the world of common life together.
In contrast with these characteristics of instinctive belief, 
the "mere reveries of the imagination" lack some or all of these or 
possess them in diminished degree. For example, a fiction is not felt 
with the same vivacity as belief. Rather a fiction is contrived, and 
the force or vivacity of feeling concomitant with it is contributed by 
an associated passion. To this extent a fiction does not retain an in­
fluence beyond the command of the will. Finally, a fiction becomes a 
spring of action only through the instrumentality of an attached passion 
and cannot indefinitely sustain itself in practical conflict with the 
more mundane requisite conditions of common life. But these differences 
are far more easily stated than applied.
When one considers with Hume that the distinguishing character­
istic of belief is that it is felt in the manner of perception, the dif­
ficulty of application is obvious. How can Hume show any opinion to be 
mere fiction with such private criteria? I gather that Hume would con­
ceive the strategy of correcting a false belief to be that of extensive 
exposure to the counter force of evidence contrary to the received false
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opinion. A reasonable person, the only one Hume considers likely to 
change his mind for reasons of evidence, would be dissuaded by the force 
of the conflicting evidence. This is because the force of the evidence 
brings into play the very vivacity of instinctive belief. For this rea­
son, repeated evidence to the contrary should undercut any inclination 
of habit or custom and allow the contrived force of the fiction to dis­
sipate. However, the feigned force of a fiction can prove so disabling 
that only emotional distance and redirection of the attention of the 
mind will be effective in gaining release for the obsessed individual.
Some reveries of the mind are harmless, and it may be generally 
assumed that the impact of a fiction will be diffused by time and expe­
rience. However, it is possible for a fanciful notion to retain its 
influence, especially in cases where it is aided by the interests of 
popular opinions and social institutions. In these cases where a fic­
tion persists in spite of the contrary evidence, the mind is judged to 
be under the influence of superstition. Where the fiction is fostered 
by vested interests in excess of the evidence, the result is enthusiasm 
or fanaticism. The social fabric is continually vulnerable to such 
pathological inventions of the imagination. Many social ills are merely 
the effects upon the common utility of allowing a destructive imagination 
to thwart the flow of natural belief. In these cases an artificial life 
may be said to prevail with devastating effects.
Hume believes that a major purpose of philosophy is to purge 
the common life of as much debilitating fancy as critical inquiry can 
accomplish. To do this, contrary evidence must be employed to expose a 
fiction as the trick of a runaway imagination, to break its acquired
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force, and to allow the passions to return to more ordinary channels of 
expression. Hume cites two attitudes as the leading suspects to be 
dealt with. One is skepticism and the speculative impasse into which it 
leads. The other is the religious hypothesis and the flux between super­
stition and enthusiasm that religious systems perpetuate. Hume would 
disarm both by an appeal to the practical requisites of common life. 
Further, he would encourage such critical assessments of the evidence as 
are available so as to separate the artificial impact of faith from the 
natural vivacity of belief. The outcome of these operations of philos­
ophy is to mark off three forms of life. There is the wise man, who 
refines his beliefs by the natural and pragmatic requirements of common 
life. In contrast, there is the skeptic, who is stymied by speculation 
to the extent that in his philosophizing he fails to be a man; that is 
to say, his doubts thwart his participation in the spirit of the common 
life. Finally, there is the enthusiast, who fails to restrain the ex­
cesses of the imagination to the extent that his life becomes but the 
living out of a fiction.
Hume sets out the contrasting forms of life in "A Dialogue," 
which is a "Supplement" to his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals. In this piece of writing Hume gives rein to a kind of ironic 
playfulness in sketching the alternative extremes of life he has in mind. 
The contrast he draws is between "artificial lives and manners" and the 
naturalness of the common life.
What do you understand by artificial lives and manners? said I.
I explain myself, replied he. You know, that religion had, in an­
cient times, very little influence on common life, and that, after 
men had performed their ducy in sacrifices and prayers at the temple, 
they thought, that the gods left the rest of their conduct to them­
selves, and were little pleased or offended with those virtues or
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vices, which only affected the peace and happiness of human society. 
In those ages, it was the business of philosophy alone to regulate 
men’s ordinary behaviour and deportment; and accordingly, we may ob­
serve, that this being the sole principle, by which a man could ele­
vate himself above his fellows, it acquired a mighty ascendant over 
many, and produced great singularities of maxims and of conduct. At 
present, when philosophy has lost the allurement of novelty, it has 
no such extensive influence; but seems to confine itself mostly to 
speculations in the closet; in the same manner, as the ancient reli­
gion was limited to sacrifices in the temple. Its place is now sup­
plied by the modern religion, which inspects our whole conduct, and 
prescribes an universal rule to our actions, to our words, to our 
very thoughts and inclinations; a rule so much the more austere, as 
it is guarded by infinite, though distant, rewards and punishments; 
and no infraction of it can ever be concealed or d i s g u i s e d . ^2
The suggestions of Hume's that interest me in this passage deal with the 
exchange of functions of religion and philosophy between the ancient and 
modern societies. Originally philosophy began as a guide to the common 
life and was both practical and natural. It was the means by which a 
man might elevate himself in society. But unfortunately a change of 
roles has taken place between philosophy and religion. Philosophy has 
become a matter of speculation within the closet while religion has be­
come the inspector of man’s whole conduct. Hume wishes to restore reli­
gion to the temple and bring philosophy back into the common life. To 
do this he brings all the evidence to bear upon the artificiality of 
religious life.
To illustrate the artificial character of religious life, Hume 
draws a parallel in "A Dialogue" between the ancient cynic's claim that 
philosophy cannot guide life to a natural end within society and the 
similar claim of the religious enthusiast. To dramatize the parallel 
Hume focuses his comparison upon the personalities of the cynic Diogenes 
and the fideist Pascal.
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The foundation of Diogenes's conduct was an endeavour to render 
himself an independent being as much as possible, and to confine 
all his wants and desires and pleasures within himself and his own 
mind: The aim of Pascal was to keep a perpetual sense of his depen­
dence before his eyes, and never to forget his numberless wants and 
infirmities. -Thé"ancient supported himself by magnanimity, osten­
tation, pride, and the idea of his own superiority above his fellow- 
creatures. The modern made constant profession of humility and 
abasement, of the contempt and hatred of himself; and endeavoured to 
attain these supposed virtues, as far as they are attainable. The 
austerities of the Greek were in order to inure himself to hard­
ships, and prevent his ever suffering: Those of the Frenchman were
embraced merely for their own sake, and in order to suffer as much 
as possible. The philosopher indulged himself in the most beastly 
pleasures, even in public: The saint refused himself the most inno­
cent, even in private. The former thought it his duty to love his 
friends, and to rail at them, and reprove them, and scold them: The
latter endeavoured to be absolutely indifferent towards his nearest 
relations, and to love and speak well of his enemies. The great ob­
ject of Diogenes's wit was every kind of superstition, that is every 
kind of religion known in his time. The mortality of the soul was 
his standard principle; and even his sentiments of a divine provi­
dence seem to have been licentious. The most ridiculous superstitions 
directed Pascal's faith and practice; and an extreme contempt of this 
life, in comparison of the future, was the chief foundation of his 
conduct.13
Although he does not regard either as exemplary Hume's contrast between 
the cynic and the saint reflects considerably more sympathy for the an­
cient than the modem. The withdrawal by Diogenes is not the radical 
rejection of natural belief made by Pascal- Diogenes merely rejects the 
social distortions of natural belief while Pascal attempts to construct 
an alternate life based upon his extreme contempt for the natural feelings 
of the present life. The irony of the contrast is revealed in the fact 
that the saint outdoes the cynic in his skepticism. The ancient is 
skeptical about the human understanding and practice of social life 
while the modern is skeptical about the practice of life itself. If 
there is something in common between the skepticisms, it is that both 
withdraw from the requisite operations of the common life. IC is this
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common, ego-centric aspect of the two that Hume brings into focus with 
his expression "artificial life."
It is Hume's judgment that the move from the common life of men 
to the ego-centric area of the artificial life sacrifices all the good 
to be found in the collective refinements of the common pleasures. In 
a sense it is to replace the vivacity of ordinary beliefs with a vacuum. 
Perhaps Hume is playing with the fact that Pascal refuted the ancient 
principle that nature abhors a vacuum. But Pascal goes too far when he 
would have us renounce the ordinary pleasures of social life for the mere 
vacuum of the future life of religion. As Hume puts it:
An experiment, said I, which succeeds in the air, will not al­
ways succeed in a vacuum. When men depart from the maxims of com­
mon reason, and affect these artificial lives, as you call them, no 
one can answer for what will please or displease them. They are in 
a different element from the rest of mankind; and the natural prin­
ciples of their mind play not with the same regularity, as if left 
to themselves, free from the illusions of religious superstition or 
philosophical enthusiasm.
Hume's position may be summarized in a few assertions. First, 
the contrast between belief and faith is that the first is instinctive 
and constitutive of man's social life while the latter is an artifice of 
either superstition or divine intervention. Second, the only instrument 
for resolving the puzzle about the origin of faith is to weigh the evi­
dence as to whether such a miracle of faith is possible. Third, it is 
important that the wise man inquire into these matters because the ef­
fects of faith upon the practice of life must be assessed as to whether 
they genuinely be the artifices of divine providence or the illusions 
of sick men’s dreams.
In a sense, if Hume is to take Pascal's wager seriously, he 
cannot take at face value the projected benefits of faith. They are
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neither common nor ordinary. They go against the ordinary influence of 
instinctive belief. They are and can only be the artifices of miracle.
On this point he and Pascal are in agreement. If the wager is to be 
taken by the wise man, he must have some evidence for the reliability of 
the miracles of faith. I will turn then to examine Hume's account of 
miracles.
The Credibility of Miracles as Evidence for Fideistic Theism
Hume’s view of the negative influence of the religious hypoth­
esis arises from his judgment that the religious life is artificial in 
the pejorative sense. As he understands it, religion is perpetuated by 
debilitating fancies called miracles which entice the passions through 
superstition and enthusiasm to step outside the channels of natural be­
lief to the devastating disruption of the usual requisites of common 
life. Thus, Hume's inquiry into the credibility of miracles is restricted 
by the nature of his questions about them. The aim of his treatment of 
miracles is to
. . . establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have 
such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation 
for any such system of r e l i g i o n . 15
Further, he is interested in miracles in only one sense of the term.
The evidential use of miracles as employed by the fideist requires that 
they be construed as contrived by some agent or power above and beyond 
the ordinary processes upon which natural beliefs are dependent. That 
this sense of "miracle" is the preferred one for Hume has been noted in 
his clarification of the term " n a t u r a l . I n  the Treatise Hume distin­
guishes between "natural" and "artificial" in three senses. The natural 
is opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, and the artificial. With
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reference to miracles the passage reads:
If nature be oppos'd to miracles, not only the distinction betwixt 
vice and virtue is natural, but also every event, which has ever 
happen’d in the world, excepting those miracles, on which our reli­
gion is founded. In saying, then, that the sentiments of vice and 
virtue are natural in this sense, we make no very extraordinary 
discovery.
As can be seen in this passage, Hume allows that our religion is founded 
upon miracle, but he also distinguishes miracle from the mainstream of 
the natural, where the sentiments of vice and virtue arise. Thus, from 
the very start, Hume distinguishes not only between the miraculous and 
the natural but also between the system of religion and our natural sen­
timents of vice and virtue. From the very first, Hume is not so con­
cerned to offer a knockdown argument against miracles as he is to provide 
an "everlasting check" against the possible abuse of the common life.
I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a life na­
ture, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an ever­
lasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and conse­
quently, will be useful as long as the world endures.
Hume's purpose is clear. First, his arguments are a check against the
influence of the idea of the miraculous upon the human fancy. Second,
the arguments are therapeutic in relation to the superstitious delusions.
Third, the arguments are for the wise. In other words, Hume wants to
make explicit his belief that miracles cannot provide sufficient evidence
to establish any system of religion or furnish us with a warrant for the
artificial life of faith.
The purpose of Hume's argument determines the manner of defini­
tion essential to the appeal to miracles. Some definitions neither de­
part from the order of common life nor furnish the evidence essential 
for the replacement of the instinctive beliefs with the artifice of
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faith. For example, if the miraculous be identified with the marvelous, 
then a miracle is not necessarily an artifice created apart from and in 
addition to the ordinary customs of life. Instead, a miracle may be 
interpreted as a marvelous coincidence which provides no testimony for 
the supernatural power required as a foundation for fideism.
The only definition of "miracle" that proves of interest to
Hume’s inquiry is the one he gives: "A miracle is a violation of the
19laws of nature." If a miracle is not an intervention of a deity into 
the customary channels of natural process, it is not of sufficient merit 
to carry the weight of evidence which it must if it is to be the founda­
tion of a religion of the fideistic sort. The characteristics of the 
definition emerge from the requirements of fideism and not from Hume's 
opinions concerning cause and effect or the natural order. It is not a 
definition required by Hume's account but the only one adequate to the 
fideist's cause.
There are at least two reasons why the definition given by 
Hume is the only one of interest to the fideist. First, if the fideist 
is going to argue for the supernatural, he must have some way of limiting 
the natural. Therefore the concept of "the laws of nature" is essential. 
The fideist must not only recognize that certain things follow the laws 
of nature, but that this particular event is a miracle because it does 
not come under the explanatory scope of any of those laws. Second, the 
fideist needs the otherwise emotive term "violation." The consequences 
he draws from the evidence of miracles is that a purposeful intervention 
of a spiritual being confirms the teachings of religion. A miracle must 
give evidence of personal involvement of the Deity in the affairs of men.
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if the fideist is to gain the experiential evidence that his system of 
religion requires as its foundation. The definition of "miracle" of­
fered by Hume reflects his sensitivity to the fideist’s position and 
not the polemic overstatement of what his own philosophic position will 
allow.
Hume approaches the problem concerning the evidence for mira­
cles from two directions. First, he lays out the critical procedures 
common to the judicious weighing of testimony. Second, he assesses the 
historical and empirical evidence available concerning miracles. Each 
of these merits careful exposition.
In laying out the critical procedures, Hume states that the 
evidence may be uniform and in full agreement that something is always 
the case. In such instances the evidence is taken to be a proof. This 
is not to say that the conclusion is infallible. It merely concedes 
that there is nothing to sustain a contrary opinion. Sometimes— as in 
the example of the Indian Prince who, never having experienced frost, 
declared water never freezes— the conclusion is drawn from too limited 
an exposure and must be revised in light of extended experience. How­
ever, we can and do accept the consistent testimony of the senses as 
providing sureties beyond practical doubt. Yet, on the other hand, 
there are numerous occasions where there is conflicting testimony. In 
such cases it is necessary to weigh the supporting evidence against the 
opposing evidence and draw the verdict on the grounds of the stronger 
of the two. The problem of miracles falls into this latter sort of 
procedure. Thus, the wise and prudent man must weigh the various merits 
of the evidence and be governed accordingly.
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Hume believes that a wise and judicious examination of the 
evidence will be opposed to the testimony of miracles for two reasons.
A miracle occurs to the senses. By definition a miracle is a rare oc­
currence. As a result, the standing it can have in perception would be 
weak, unclear, and insecure. The evidence for a miracle will naturally 
lack secure footing. Second, the testimony concerning any ordinary 
event is equally dependent upon the senses. But unlike miracles, ordi­
nary experiences are repeated occurrences of like events and are made 
firm by habit and custom. The miracle must violate the common processes 
by which evidence accrues and yet count its testimony as validated by 
the same judicious process of reviewing and weighing the information in 
its behalf. The deviation of miracles occurs in two respects. The orig­
inal experience of a miracle must depend upon the senses operating in a 
particular case contrary to their normal operations. Second, the testi­
mony of one who reports a miracle must be evaluated in the light of the 
evidences of the senses of the one who received the testimony. Hume is 
puzzled as to how this might be possible.
Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less 
than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the 
first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident 
it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can 
any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immedi­
ate object of their s e n s e s . ^0
The point of this particular difficulty with miracles lies in the judi­
cial norm that "a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger." But 
our religion is founded upon the contradictory claim that a miracle is 
a fideistic notion in origin and at the same time a stronger evidence 
than ordinary experience. It claims that a miracle both overthrows our 
normal evidence and is self-confirming.
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It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on 
which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them 
as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, 
and are not brought home to every one’s breast, by the immediate 
operation of the Holy Spirit.21
The word miracle cannot be allowed to conceal the distinction between a
"sign" of the deity and the evidences of the senses. In the first case
it signifies to one who has prior knowledge of the deity that his God is
doing something. In the latter case the concept of miracle is employed
as empirical evidence that there is a God of a special sort. Hume argues
that this second sense cannot be made clear or credible. Miracles are
not self-affirming but self-destructive. Hume suggests a maxim regarding
the credibility of miracles.
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of 
our attention), ’That no testimony is sufficient to establish a 
miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood 
would be more miraculous than the fact, which it endeavours to es­
tablish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of 
arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to 
that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the i n f e r i o r . ’22
It is highly unlikely that religious miracles now offered as evidence
would prove more miraculous as false than as true. To this extent Hume
has removed miracle from the category of evidence and in so doing has
undercut the persuasive force of fideism for the wise man.
Having shown the difficulty of employing miracles as evidence, 
if not the impossibility of doing so, Hume proceeds in the second part 
of his treatment of miracles to show that at least none of the miracles 
historically available in the various religions measures up to the legal 
rules of evidence. He offers four reasons why the available miracles 
fail to qualify as evidence. This part of Hume’s strategy is secondary 
to the first and only completes what the first suggests.
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The first of Hime's disqualifications of the miracles of his­
torical religion concerns the number, capacity, and integrity of the 
authorities upon whose testimony the appeal to miracles relies. In re­
gard to number, the credibility of a given miracle is not resolved by a
mere head count. The bare number of witnesses can be of no real conse­
quence apart from the known character and skill of the observers. A 
thousand blind men are not usually considered the best source of testi­
mony concerning the hues of color in a sunset. But even when the ordi­
nary capacities of sense are present, many of the claims for a given
miracle would require a special and acquired skill to detect and judge 
the circumstances in question. Of course, in addition to gullibility, 
there is the question of susceptibility where a sympathetic inclination 
creates doubts over the reliability of certain witnesses. There is also 
the possibility of fraud and deception on the part of the witnesses. 
Given these possible breakdowns of testimony, it is certainly important 
in every case where we would depart from the mundane and ordinary to 
have the most highly credited testimony possible. Now, as Hume easily 
shows, in the case of miracles highly credited testimony is missing. In 
fact, the accessibility of evidence and the presence of high standards 
of testimony seem to vary in inverse proportion to the number of appeals 
to miracle. This state of affairs is contrary to the usual precautions 
of careful inquiry.
The second disqualification taken up by Hume deals with the na­
ture of human curiosity. A normal inquiry is occupied with the ordinary 
and useful.
The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, 
is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble 
those, of which we have . . . .23
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In the case of miracles the attitude is quite different. The mood is 
one of surprise and wonder. Miracles prosper in a climate of excitement 
encouraged by "passion and a heated imagination." This is hardly the 
cool, reflective state of mind for the careful weighing of evidence.
Hume feels that the climate in which the alleged miracles of the histor­
ic religions have thrived is more closely related to that of the village 
gossip than the wise man's judicial review of testimony.
A third disqualification introduced by Hume is that miracles 
decrease in number as a culture increases in scientific skill. "Prodi­
gies, omens, oracles" and the like are less numerous in historical ac­
counts as society advances "nearer the enlightened ages." The decline 
of the miracle stories with the growth of skill in observation suggests 
the questionable nature of the earlier testimony.
Hume's fourth disqualification is of a different order from the 
first three. The previous objections have questioned the nature of the 
testimony. In the fourth case, Hume tentatively assumes that all reli­
gions have valid testimony and reliable evidence for miracles. However, 
if miracles can be credited as a proof of a system of religion, then all 
religions would be forced to hold compatible accounts of the "religious 
hypothesis." They do not. Therefore, miracles, even if reliable, have 
failed to establish a system of religion. The historic variety of re­
ligions is evidence against the success of such testimony. Should one 
try to correct this impasse with the concept of a God common to all 
cases or some principle that allows the miracles of one religion but of 
no others, it would require prior knowledge of the merits of the reli­
gious hypotheses, and it would validate miracles, not be validated by
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them. The fourth of Hume's arguments is logically flawed- The presence 
of conflicting claims is no evidence that the claims are equally good or 
bad. There is no reason why one of the claims should not be true and 
the others false. Psychologically, a number of incompatible claims may 
lead us to doubt them, all; but logically, there is no reason why it 
should.
In summary, Hume offers two arguments as to why miracles cannot 
be the foundation of any system of religion. First, the very nature of 
the degree of evidence required to offset the normal evidence of the 
senses makes validity of miracles highly unlikely if not impossible. 
Second, such evidence as religion does submit is far from satisfying from 
the maxim of acceptance; and even if miracles should pass muster, they 
could be self-defeating as the foundation of religion because of the 
contradictory religious systems appealing to miracles.
The conclusion that follows from Hume's inquiry into the evi­
dential status of miracles is that no system of religion can be founded 
on miracles. For fideism, especially "our religion" (i.e., Christianity), 
Hume feels this conclusion is devastating. This is true for Hume because 
he holds "that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with 
miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable per­
son without one."^^ Of course, under these circumstances it also follows 
that fideism cannot provide a warrant for moral beliefs.
The Possibility of a Fideist Hope in Immortality
There remains one more topic in our proposed examination of 
Hume's criticism of fideism. Fideism seems unperturbed by the absence 
of confirmation in present experience. It projects the validation of its
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beliefs as something that will happen at a future time. The difficult­
ies of religious knowledge and the dilemma concerning evil will all be 
fully resolved when the whole story is complete at some future date. To 
return to the case of Pascal, the justification of the artificial life 
of faith is construed as a wager. The prudent man will weigh the possi­
bilities as to one's personal gain or loss should the projections of the 
fideist prove to be the case. As Pascal sees it, one has little to lose 
and everything to gain if he constructs his life on the expectation that 
the future will vindicate the risk of faith. In other words, Eume's 
judgment that the life of faith is artificial will prove unfounded be­
cause the devout wager will have its full recompense at some future date. 
To conceive of Pascal's wager as more than a shot in the dark, there 
would have to be some secure notions of what "survival of death" and 
"the divine purpose" may be taken to mean. Normally in demonstrating 
the likelihood of his proposals, the fideist uses some concept of per­
sonal survival of death and speaks of another and eternal existence in 
which the evils and shortcomings of this life are overcome in a final 
act of judgment by a benevolent deity. According to this formulation 
of the religious hypothesis, this world and this life are a brief and 
probationary prelude to an age to come in which the moral rectitude of 
God and man will achieve full consummation. Thus, the moral import of 
this schema is to live a life of obedience in expectation of the bene­
fits to be gained when the ultimate destiny of man is realized. Thus, 
Pascal's "wager" and Hume's "common life" may be considered counterclaims. 
Fideism claims to be a legitimate artifice founded upon a careful assess­
ment of the possibilities that emerge from the nature and destiny of man.
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In contrast, Hume proceeds to show the futility of the wager and the 
necessity of the common life.
That Hume is aware of the fideist's proposed resolution of all
the present problems with the religious hypothesis by the projection of
a future state is fully apparent. Hume has Demea, the spokesman for a
rational and natural theology in the Dialogues, put the case in the
following manner:
This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life 
but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, 
therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period
of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger
views of things, see the whole connection of general laws, and 
trace, with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity 
through all the mazes and intricacies of his p r o v i d e n c e . 25
This statement is in fact the end of the matter for Demea as he takes no 
further part in the discussions of the Dialogues and leaves at this 
point of the debate. His departure is somewhat governed by the direction 
of the exchange when Cleanthes discounts Demea's argument on the grounds 
that it presupposes knowledge that is beyond the range of natural theol­
ogy. In the essay "On the Immortality of the Soul," Hume gives an even 
stronger rebuff to the natural theologian with reference to the question­
able moral character of such a hypothesis.
What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to con­
fine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the present 
life, if there be another scene still waiting us of infinitely 
greater consequence? Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to 
a beneficent and wise B e i n g ? 26
As can be seen throughout the treatment of miracles in An Enquiry Con­
cerning Human Understanding, Hume considers the whole issue of fideism 
to ride upon the evidence for resurrection or some form of survival of 
death that will shore up the risk of faith. What this brief survey of
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Hume's position suggests is at least three things. First, Hume acknowl­
edges the need, but insists on the unavailability, of the doctrines of 
providence and immortality to natural theology. Second, he is aware 
that the crux for fideism lies in the miracle of resurrection. Third,
Hume questions the moral implications of the doctrine from its very 
inception.
27In his essay "On Suicide" Hume has several philosophically
interesting things to say about the religious doctrine of providence.
The purpose of the essay is to examine the grounds for the legal and
moral condemnation of the practice of suicide. In doing so, Hume points
out a number of weaknesses in the arguments that the matters of life and
death of a human being should be left in the hands of divine providence.
28In his "An analysis of Hume's Essay 'On Suicide,'" Tom Beauchamp de­
velops Hume's position under three themes: (1) The Divine Ownership
Interpretation, (2) The Natural Law Interpretation, and (3) The Divine 
Appointment Interpretation. I will follow these themes in setting out 
Hume's notion that the belief in providence has no practical consequences.
The first interpretation, that of Divine Ownership, rules against 
any act of suicide on the grounds that
. . . the Almighty has reserved to himself . . . the disposal of the 
lives of men, and has not submitted that event . . .  to the general 
laws by which the universe is governed.29
Hume questions this view because it suggests that in matters of birth
and death the particular providence of the Deity comes into play apart
from the natural laws which direct the regular processes of nature.
First, Hume sees no need to assert that these events are a special act
of God, and, furthermore, he knows of no evidence that such might be the
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case. In light of these two points, Hume concludes that the notion of 
particular providence makes no sense in regard to these matters.
The second interpretation, the Natural Law Interpretation, 
deals with the nature of human disobedience of the Deity by the disrup­
tion of his law. "Law" can mean his specific command or the orderly 
processes by which nature operates. If the distinctions of particular 
providence are useless, as is argued in Hume's first point, then any 
restriction upon human conduct on the grounds that humans are not to 
disturb the ordinary processes of nature becomes absurd. Man is unable 
to live in a passive state toward nature. As Hume puts it:
If I turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb 
the course of nature; and I invade the peculiar province of the 
Almighty, by lengthening out my life beyond the period, which, by 
the general laws of matter and motion, he had assigned it.^O
The very nature and merit of human life involves the use of the general
laws of matter and motion as the means to intelligent livelihood. To
make obedience to the will of God prohibitory of action is to make the
preservation of life impossible. Either birth and death must be cases
of particular providence, or suicide cannot be considered a violation
of divine providence,
A hair, a fly, an insect, is able to destroy this mighty being 
whose life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity to suppose 
that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such 
insignificant causes? It would be no crime in me to divert the 
Nile or Danube from its course, were I able to effect such purposes. 
Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their 
natural channel?
Hume's third and final interpretation is directed against the 
Divine Appointment Interpretation. The third interpretation holds that 
the purpose of the individual life is assigned it by the Deity and that 
the individual is on probation in this life, the outcome being governed
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by how well he realizes the particular purpose of God for his life.
Hume places the statement of this doctrine in italics:
But you are placed by Providence, like a sentinel, in a particular 
station; and when you desert it without being recalled, you are 
equally guilty of rebellion against your Almighty Sovereign, and 
have incurred his displeasure. ! }
Hume replies with a question: "Why do you conclude that providence has
placed me in this station?" Hume reminds his opponent that the processes 
of birth and death can be accounted for by the relation of cause and ef­
fect and within the natural order. But there is no evidence for the be­
lief that providence assigns each individual a special and unique station 
in life. Therefore, in view of the lack of evidence each person will of 
necessity fall back upon his duties to self and society in moral matters.
The importance of Hume's essay on suicide for the purposes of 
my inquiry does not lie in his successful resolution of the debate about 
suicide but in how he disallows any moral guidance or philosophic clari­
fication to be found in the notion of providence. Hume's treatment of 
suicide helps to demonstrate his thesis that religion introduces con­
fusion into the realm of morals. The religious hypothesis about the 
meaning of life does not aid man in deliberations over good and evil. 
Rather, moral judgments must rely on the straightforward demands of the 
common life.
Another example of Hume's criticism of the use of religious no­
tions of destiny to resolve problems about the direction and manner of
33life is his essay "On the Immortality of the Soul." In this essay 
Hume deals with three classes of arguments about (1) the metaphysical,
(2) the moral, and (3) the physical.
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The metaphysical problem is, for Hume, the question of the 
meaning of "substance." Hume finds the notion of substance to be 
"wholly confused and imperfect," allowing that at best there is "an 
aggregate of particular qualities inhering in an unknown something."
Even if reality is divided into matter and spirit, these substances are 
"at bottom equally unknown" and "we cannot determine what qualities in­
here in one or the other." They might be pictured by analogy as a clay 
or paste that is modified into various forms. Yet this analogy would 
not allow a distinct difference to be made between matter and spirit.
Even if the knowledge that substance is that which is eternal could be 
arrived at by reason it would prove too much because "what is incorrupt­
ible must also be ingenerable." Furthermore, the eternality of sub­
stance would apply equally to animals, men, and all living things. For 
Hume it remains an unanswered question as to how the notion of soul can 
be the means of explaining the peculiar nature and destiny of man.
The second type of argument that interests Hume about the doc­
trine of the immortality of the soul is the moral one. Hume offers four 
puzzles concerning the relation between the doctrine of immortality and 
morals. First, the very moral nature of the Deity is unknowable. If 
God is understood to share the moral sentiments of man, then there seems 
to be some confusion in the supposition that the present problems can be 
resolved in a different place and time. The sentiments are the same. 
Second, Hume argues further, if all knowledge and sentiment is structured 
for the demands of this life, how can it be other than fraud to judge the 
performance of life on the basis of another world? And furthermore, if 
we say that the natural capacities of human nature need more time for
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development to be fully realized, how does this distinguish man from any 
other thing in creation? Third, the divisions of labor that create our 
duties and goals in life can function only in the limited structure of 
place and time in this world. For example, the role of women as Hume 
knows it cannot be accounted for on the basis of a common destiny with 
man. The elysium of eternity would have to continue the social struc­
tures of this world if it is in any sense the realization of the persons 
known to human understanding. Finally, any ultimate judgment of the 
Deity cannot be analogous with earthly use and custom. Man as he is ob­
served on earth is not divisible into two distinct species of "the good" 
and "the evil." The concept of a place of eternal punishment or reward 
is not proportionate to the crime or the character of men as we observe 
them.
Hume's third class of arguments is the physical. These are the 
only ones that Hume feels should carry weight in resolving the question. 
Hume offers two objections of this sort to personal immortality. First, 
the mind or spirit decays along with the body. There is no evidence for 
the notion that the soul is not subject to degeneration and destruction. 
Second, all known items in this world are in continual flux and change. 
There are no means available to clarify the concept "eternal."
In summary, my purpose in looking at Hume's treatment or provi­
dence and immortality is not to evaluate his particular analysis of the 
problem. It is rather to note the approach in Hume's attack upon the 
religious hypothesis. He continually comes to the same two conclusions. 
First, there is no basis in experience to hold any positive opinion in 
these matters at all. Second, statements of the doctrines of religion
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which are in. total violation of ordinary experience should not be ac­
cepted as revealed truths. The consequence of Hume’s strategy is to 
reduce religious faith to absurdity and impracticality— in other words, 
to show that the religious life is hopelessly artificial in the pejora­
tive sense.
The Conclusion of Hume's Inquiry into Fideism 
Hume does not find the benefits that are reputed to accompany 
faith to be sufficiently clear and definite to justify the wager of 
one's life upon the religious hypothesis. Neither is there evidence 
available that can confirm that miracles can and do happen, nor can the 
projections of faith concerning human destiny be clarified to the extent 
necessary for their employment in prudent decision making. As a result, 
fideistic theism is unable to offer a clear warrant for the acceptance 
of the religious hypothesis. Further, faith cannot serve as a guide in 
the practice of life in distinction to instinctive belief. Consequently, 
man must rely upon the influence of his natural belief in the construc­
tion of a common life where it is alone possible for him to find a clear 
warrant for moral beliefs. Fideism can only create a vacuum in lieu of 
the vivacity that infuses the ordinary feelings of life.
A Summary of Hume's Criticism of the Religious Hypothesis
It is now possible to summarize Hume's account of the total 
failure of the religious hypothesis to furnish a warrant for moral 
beliefs.
First, religion originates in the passions of fear and adora­
tion which are projected into the concept of a deity who is able to aid
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man In times of distress. The very attitudes out of which popular the­
ism emerges both limit and thwart the use of religion as a motive for 
human actions or as a reasonable guide for moral beliefs. Consequently, 
historical religions are constantly caught between the fears of super­
stition and the fanaticism of enthusiasm. Religion has not been able to 
rise above the passions that give it birth. Rather, the constant flux 
between the feelings which prompt it places religion in need of moral
correction, instead of conferring on it the role of the perfector or
corrector of man's ordinary moral beliefs.
Second, the combined resources of science and reason cannot 
elevate religion above the passions in which it originates. It is the 
function of natural belief to provide the cement of the universe. It 
achieves this role through habit and custom founding the natural rela­
tion of cause and effect. This most basic operation of instinctive be­
lief allows the analogy from the artifacts of the human artisans to the 
artifice of a world, the cause of which may with minimal significance be 
spoken of as "God." But it is impossible on the basis of the analogy to 
ascribe those attributes to the Deity desired by popular theism, and even 
should anyone succeed in doing so, the result would be devastating. If 
the Deity is taken as both omnipotent and omniscient, the procedures 
employed by the scientific theist set him up for impalement upon the 
horns of the dilemma created by the existence of evil in this world. It 
is this impasse that destroys the hope of rational theology to establish 
a clear warrant for moral belief.
Third, the expectations of fideistic theism projected on a 
faith originating as an artifice of divine miracle fail also. Since
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fideism by its very nature generates an artificial life, it requires the 
collaboration of evidence and the clear projection of man’s future pos­
sibilities if it is to certify itself. But it lacks both the evidence 
and the clarity. Consequently, neither faith nor divine revelation can 
deliver the religious hypothesis from the impasse experienced by both 
popular and scientific theism. Fideism is unable to furnish a warrant 
for moral beliefs.
Finally, after examining the available and known forms of the­
ism and finding in each case that the religious hypothesis cannot be 
established, Hume concludes that it is of no utility. The religious 
hypothesis is found to be empty and unable to supply the force and vi­
vacity required by a life-shaping belief. In the light of his critical 
inquiry, Hume feels secure in concluding that there is no reason to 
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Two different strategies are commonly employed in questioning 
the belief that moral propositions can be inferred from theological 
propositions. One involves a frontal assault upon the factual credi­
bility of theism. That is to say, the skeptic may attack the theistic 
principle advanced by the western religions of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam as well as the classic paganism of Greece and Rome. In this 
case the skeptic claims there is no reason to believe that God exists.
A second strategy is to disarm the religious claims about God. In this 
case the strategy is to show that the existence of God can make little 
positive difference to man's manner of life. These approaches advance 
what I will call respectively a strong and a weak thesis. The Strong 
Thesis may be stated as follows:
(ST) Any appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails in
every case because no valid proof that a Deity exists can be 
made.^
The Weak Thesis may be simply stated:
(WT) The appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails because 
the nature of God is either morally indifferent or too ambig­
uous to serve this purpose.
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In this chapter I shall examine those interpretations of David 
Hxime that take him to be holding or advocating the ST. In the first 
part of this chapter, I will challenge the conclusion that, since Hume 
disallows any of the traditional proofs, he espouses an atheistic posi­
tion. I intend to show that Hume does not hold the atheistic position 
by contrasting Hume’s stance with the ’’presumption of atheism" advocated 
by Antony Flew. In the second part of this chapter, I will question the 
view that Hume uses the fact of evil to deny the existence of God. I 
will use the defense of theism provided by Alvin Plantinga in order to 
point out how his refutation of the atheist does not apply to the argu­
ment which Hume makes from the circumstance of human misery. I will 
leave it to the next chapter to show how Hume’s distinctive insights 
fall within the WT.
The Presumption of Atheism 
As I have already indicated, the distinctive characteristic of 
the strong thesis is that it goes for the jugular vein of the religious 
hypothesis. It concentrates its criticism upon the proof of the exis­
tence of a deity. Several reasons why this strategy appeals to philos­
ophers may be listed. First, it is assumed that external criticisms of 
religion are spawned in the waters of skepticism. This approach to re­
ligious knowledge assumes that nothing is known to be the case unless it 
satisfies the skeptic’s doubt. Second, such western religions as Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism have commonly presented their systems of reli­
gion as dependent upon the existence and character of a singular deity. 
Naturally, should the existence of that particular deity be questionable, 
that would in turn call into question the whole system of religion
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advocated in that deity's name. Fourth, the correlation between the 
predominance of a monotheistic religious system and the doctrine of a 
hierarchy of being in western metaphysics has lent its support to the 
notion of an intricate and interlocked logical whole. The influence of 
this notion is seen in the attitude that new ideas must proceed by means 
of a revolution against the assumptions upon which a closed system is 
founded. Finally, because western religions have had a formative force 
in the social structure of authority, it has been a common assumption 
that both moral and political authority resides in and is in some essen­
tial way dependent upon the authority of a supreme being or deity. The 
notion implies that to overthrow the top commander is to undermine the 
whole chain of command and obedience. This group of reasons is but a 
partial account of the attitude which is commonly brought to the ques­
tion of natural religion and morality.
However, my major concern is not with the attitudes that lead 
to "the presumption of atheism" but rather with whether or not the pre­
sumption is legitimate in the first place. Fortunately for my inquiry, 
Antony Flew has provided us with both an excellent commentary on Hume's
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and a book that explores the pre-
2sumption of atheism. Further, I believe that in contrasting Flaw's 
treatment of the presumption of atheism with his exposition of Sections 
X and XI of the Enquiry, I will be able to show at least one way in 
which Hume's approach to natural religion stands outside the strategy of 
the strong thesis. This can be accomplished first by stating Flew's 
formulation of the presumption of atheism and then by contrasting this 
stance with his own account of Hume.
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Flew begins his case for the presumption of atheism with a 
clarification of the term "atheism." The use that Flew proposes for 
"atheism" is analogous with "amoral" and "atypical." The prefix "a" is 
read in the Greek sense of "non." As Flew puts it, "In this interpre­
tation an atheist becomes; not someone who positively asserts the non-
3existence of God; but someone who is simply not a theist." The reason
for this explicit distinction is as follows:
What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is 
that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in
a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain
perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it 
is up to the theist: first, to introduce and to defend his pro­
posed concept of God; and, second, to provide sufficient reason for 
believing that this concept of his does in fact have an application.^
Both of Flaw's proposed steps are significant and not so very different
from my three-fold division of natural theism stated earlier.^ For Flew
the first step deals with conceptual problems, and he refers to this
step as an "absolute beginning." Flaw's second step deals with what he
calls "proof." In order to clarify what he means by "proof," Flew draws
an'analogy with the "legal presumption of innocence." By means of the
analogy Flew hopes to reformulate a verification principle along the
lines of a minimal requirement of "defeasibility" in the sense of defeat-
able. In this case Flew's use of "defeasibility" includes (1) that the
assertions are the responsibility of the theist, and (2) that the theist's
assertions must entail refutable evidence so as to make a verdict possible.
According to Flew, this strategy offers us a rather broad sense of
"proof":
. . . the word 'proof' is being used in the ordinary wide sense in 
which it can embrace any and every variety of sufficient reason. It 
is, of course, in this and only this sense that the word is inter­
preted when the presumption of innocence is explained as laying the 
onus of proof on the prosecution.&
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Flew draws an analogy between the method to be followed in disputes over 
the existence of God and the normal procedures in a court of law. The 
analogy holds for (1) a principle: "The onus of proof lies on the prop­
osition, and not on the opposition"^ and (2) a policy: the evidence is
g
restricted to qualified witnesses who are in a position to know.
Flew defends the appropriateness of his analogy by taking St. 
Thomas and "the five ways" as an example. According to Flew, St. Thomas 
is responding to Strato's naturalism, and therefore "the five ways" is a 
case against the presumption of atheism. By pointing to the case of St. 
Thomas and noting the possibility that the "five ways" are Aristotelian 
arguments against Strato, Flew believes that his picture of the condi­
tions under which a proper case should be made is in the mainstream of 
the theistic tradition.
In summary. Flew construes the presumption of atheism as laying 
down the following conditions: (1) the concept of deity must be clearly
and consistently defined, (2) the requirements for the justification of 
theistic beliefs are to be construed in analogy with the requirements 
for a case made in a court of law, and (3) evidence for a proof is to be 
restricted to witnesses who are in a position to know. Finally, Flaw's 
proposal is not to be taken as something new; it follows the example of 
St. Thomas in offering proofs against the atheistic naturalism of Strato. 
It is Flaw's intention that these steps be taken as normative for the 
practice of natural theology.
In a review of Flaw's God and Philosophy, John Hick criticizes
Q
the former's strategy as being "in essentially the manner of Hume." It 
is this identification of Hume with Flaw's method which I wish to
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challenge. I believe the best way to mark this distinction is to be
found in Flew's exposition of "The Religious Hypothesis"— Chapter IX of
his book Hume's Philosophy of Belief. I n  that chapter Flew states
Hume's purpose in Section XI of the first Enquiry to be as follows:
He wants to indicate, as gently as is consonant with clarity, that 
it is impossible legitimately to derive from a natural theology any 
practically relevant conclusions; any such conclusions, that is, 
over and above whatever can be independently and directly supported 
by immediate study of the universe around us. At the end he even 
goes so far as to hint that the main sort of argument for such a 
system— the only sort he himself regards as seriously considerable—  
is perhaps in any case unsound.
Flew is fully aware that Hume is concerned with the practical consequences 
of religion. But he fails to see that Hume regards providence and the 
divine government of the world as the practical consequences that fail 
to follow, because neither natural nor revealed theology is able to es­
tablish the nature of the deity by the extension of the processes used 
to establish the existence of a deity. Consequently, for Hume, natural 
theology is unable to furnish us with any practically relevant conclu­
sions. Flew mistakenly assumes that Hume both accepts the traditional 
definition on "God" and concludes that since no impeccable proof of God's 
existence is available, no practical consequences follow from natural 
theology. In other words. Flew fits Hume into the mold of the presump­
tion of atheism. That this is the tenor of Flew's reading is evidenced 
in his suggestion that Hume is content to work "as gently as is consonant 
with clarity." Further, he believes that Hume offers many hints of his 
more considered opinion.
In fact. Flew believes that Hume fails to be as forceful as he 
should have been because he attempts to be "extremely circumspect." To 
explicate how this is the case. Flew proceeds to list three "veils of
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discretion" that cover Hume's true intentions. First, Flew says that 
Hume gives Section XI of the Enquiry a misleading title in the final 
edition of the work. Flew is exploiting the editorial fact that Hume 
used the title "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Theology" in 
the first edition but changed it to "Of a Particular Providence and of 
a Future State" in the last edition. Now I too wish that Hume had not 
changed the title, but I hardly see how the change serves to provide a 
cover-up of Hume's intentions. He is, in the later title, merely listing 
what are generally held to be the doctrines that follow as consequences 
from the nature and existence of a deity. Second, Flew argues that Hume 
structures the section in the style of a dialogue because he wishes to 
conceal his own position beneath the literary persona of "a friend who 
loves sceptical paradoxes." But this overlooks the fact that Hume states 
on several occasions that the dialogue was the proper instrument for the 
treatment of religious discourse. He gives as his reason that a dialogue 
allows for the matter to be stated as inconclusively as he felt the sub­
ject required. At least Hume's stated reason is consistent with the 
conclusion he reaches and requires no assumption of concealment. Third, 
Flew finds a veiled intention on Hume's part because he uses a pseudo- 
classical form. But why this need reveal more than compliance with a 
common practice of the Augustan Age by a man of letters escapes me. I 
rather believe that the whole "veils of discretion" interpretation rep­
resents Flew's reading of his own intentions into Hume's quite different 
motivation. What is otherwise in most respects an excellent commentary 
upon Hume's treatment of religion is in this instance colored by Flew's 
own presumption of atheism. I believe that Flew is mistaken to assume 
that Hume shares the same sentiments.
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My reasons for thinking that Hume stands apart from what Flew 
calls the presumption of atheism require further elucidation. I will 
begin with some further considerations of Hume's use of the literary 
pattern of dialogue. First, Hume says that his reason for selecting the 
form of dialogue lies in the inconclusiveness of arguments in matters of 
religion.
Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so ob­
scure and uncertain that human reason can reach no fixed determina­
tion with regard to it— if it should be treated at all— seems to 
lead naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Rea­
sonable men may be allowed to differ where no one can reasonably be 
positive: Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford
an agreeable amusement: And if the subject be curious and inter­
esting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company, and unites 
the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life— study and 
society.
Hume avoided the role of advocate or defender and stayed out of personal 
exchanges over points of controversy. In his view the urbane and en­
lightened man of letters should seek to combine the fruits of study ^fith 
the delights of society. Human wit should be allowed to surface in mat­
ters that admit of no fixed determination, through feelings of delicate 
taste and refined sentiments. For Hume, the polite society of the club 
rather than the contest of the court furnishes the ideal setting for re­
ligious discourse. Because in matters of religion no one can be reason­
ably positive, didactic prose, systematic formulation, or dogmatic atti­
tudes are in bad taste. The issues can flourish only in genteel con­
versation. Hume's method and temperament lead him to picture the dis­
cussion of religious topics in a totally different frame from the court 
analogy of Flew. This is not to say that Hume lowers the standards of 
exact thought. What Hume insists upon is that discussions of religion 
should strive for agreeable amusement since the uncertainty of the
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subject precludes a clear decision. One begins with the presumption of 
interest and curiosity and not with an onus of proof.
A second difference between Flew and Hume lies in the differing
foci of interest. Hume selects "religion" instead of "theism" as his
primary concern- Hume puts it this way; "the errors in religion are
13dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous." Because Hume is con­
cerned with religion as a moralist, he acknowledges, as do many of his 
day, the inclination of men to believe in a deity, but denies that such 
a belief need have the undesirable consequences it so commonly has.
Flew, on the other hand, draws a fixed strategy for the final victorious 
assault upon the citadel of religious belief:
The first problem is so to delimit the subject that it becomes
rather less unmanageably broad. This is the point of making it 
Christian theism rather than the Christian religion.
An adversary role requires careful control of the material. In marked
contrast, the "careless sceptic" of Hume’s vintage prefers to inquire
concerning natural religion wherever and however it is found to occur in
human society. In his general appraisal Hume is often astute in his
criticism but not always above bias. However, Hume’s strong distaste
for the practice of religion should not be mistaken for his working from
the presumption of atheism.
A third difference between Hume and Flew can be discovered in 
the concept of "proof." Flew's analogy requires a legal proof. But
Flaw’s explication seems to require more formal or logical tests than
the court room does. Today’s rules of evidence are far more flexible 
than Flew allows. The type of witness, the admission of evidence, the 
judge’s direction of the court are too variable to sustain Flew’s legal
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analogy. Flew’s analogy is but a thinly veiled assumption of verifica- 
tionism. Whatever the merits of Flew's position may be, his position is 
not the same as Hume's. The picture at work in Hume's concept of proof 
is that of a serious conversation in which the mind of the wise man is 
swayed by the force of belief that arises from intelligent argument. 
Through social intercourse the evidence brought into play by intensive 
study and thought is given its inherent but gentle force, enabling the 
discussion to remove the obstacles acquired by habit and custom and per­
mitting the mind to undergo a change of belief. The pursuit of clarity 
in perception, the employment of exact distinctions, and careful atten­
tion to the relations of ideas provide an ample force to overcome super­
stition or dampen enthusiasm. Hume approaches the art of social persua­
sion as a moralist and not as an academic logician or a legal advocate. 
He is not so concerned with a proof as with the shaping of belief. Evi­
dence is useful in the force it provides in shaping the aristocratic 
life-form of the wise. Hume's philosophy of belief deals as much with 
the inclination to believe as with the right to believe.
A fourth distinction remains. As I have noted, Flew’s judicial- 
process analogy places the weight of the evidence upon the testimony of 
one who is in a position to know. Flew's essay gives us little explica­
tion of just what this procedural rule includes. The courts themselves 
are constantly embroiled over questions regarding the admissibility of 
evidence. The judicial system relies heavily upon the discretion of the 
presiding judge. Flew's analogy is not nearly so instructive as he as­
sumes. Hume relies in these matters upon common reasonableness. For 
Hume reasonableness consists in the governing of the imagination by
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principles which have three definite characteristics.
In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination 
betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and uni­
versal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, 
and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are change­
able, weak, and irregular. . . .15
For Hume the reasonable man is one who guides his beliefs by 
only such principles as are permanent, irresistible, and universal. An 
example of this sort of principle is the relation of cause and effect. 
Unreliable evidence would be any belief which is solely dependent upon 
principles which prove to be changeable, weak, and irregular. The proper 
function of intelligent social discourse among reasonable men is to pro­
vide the opportunity for the natural beliefs of such men to assert their 
intrinsic force. Since the beliefs of religion, when explored in open 
discussion, repeatedly fall short of the principles of reasonableness, 
one primarily benefits from the pleasure of the quest, while the hoped- 
for conclusions remain obscure and uncertain. There is no reasonable 
resolution or agreement concerning the opposite sentiments that arise 
from religion. Wise men cannot be positive and so must be allowed to 
differ. Further, they should base their practical actions on the per­
manent and irresistible beliefs of common life, which are universal to 
man.
In summary, my comparison has revealed a distinct contrast be­
tween Flew and Hume concerning the procedure each employs in the treat­
ment of religious belief. Flew develops his strategy in analogy with 
the legal process for reaching a decision in court. Hume’s approach 
reflects the delight of the Augustan Age in the gentleman’s club. Fur­
ther, while Flew believes the purpose of the operation is to reach a 
verdict, Hume is persuaded that the benefits to be gained from effective
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religious discourse result from realizing that a verdict is neither pos­
sible nor needed. My intention in the comparison is to argue that it is 
a mistake to interpret Hume as adopting the presumption of atheism. This 
is not to deny that there are some arguments that lend support to atheism 
in Hume's Dialogues, but it must not be overlooked that Hume is primarily 
concerned to show that theistic arguments are inconclusive. What I want 
to deny is that the Dialogues should be construed as working within the 
limitations imposed by the presumption of atheism. Any attempt to read 
Hume along such lines seems to depend upon an exaggerated use of so- 
called "veiled hints," which can be accounted for more readily within 
Hume's stated and overt intentions. Further, the view that Hume is de­
liberately inconclusive is supported by his treatment of the problem of 
evil.
A careful examination of what Hume has to say about the problem 
of evil will go a long way toward obviating the confusion that would 
arise should one persist in viewing his account in accordance with the 
presumption of atheism. I believe a careful reading of the Dialogues 
shows that Hume is primarily concerned with the moral consequences of 
theism. I will turn to these matters in the next section of this chap­
ter. Before doing so, however, I want to note a third reason for re­
jecting the claim that Hume works within the presumption of atheism. 
Throughout the Dialogues a whole cornucopia of diverse possibilities is 
poured out in the course of the discussion. Hume's constant consideration 
of alternate perspectives is in keeping with his belief that religion 
merely offers a diverse number of curious options which are beyond rea­
sonable resolution. Because of the multiplicity of views about religion.
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it cannot serve as a reliable or practical guide in the common affairs 
of man. I will return to this particular topic in the next chapter, 
after I have explored Hume’s treatment of the problem of evil.
The Coherence of Theism 
The advocates of the Strong Thesis (ST) generally attempt to 
undercut theistic claims in one of two ways. On the one hand, they 
charge that theological propositions do not correspond to any actual 
state of affairs. This line of approach is easily recognized in the 
writings of Antony Flew, and I have just explored the relevance of his 
sort of presumption of atheism for the understanding of David Hume’s 
philosophy of religion. On the other hand, ST advocates often allege 
that theological propositions make up a logically incompatible set. The 
most pertinent formulation of this strategy arises from a set of diffi­
culties generally spoken of as the problem of evil. The problem results 
from various attempts to answer a specific question: How can the common
experience of human misery be related in a coherent and consistent way 
to the attributes the theist normally ascribes to the Deity?
The current philosophic practice regarding the question is to 
advance an argument to the effect that a logical contradiction results 
whenever one jointly affirms the classical attributes of God along with 
the assertion that there is evil. In other words, a contradictory triad 
is alleged to result from the joint affirmation of the following three 
propositions:
(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) God is perfectly good.
(3) There is evil.
The conclusion generally drawn on the strength of the alleged contradiction
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is that the skeptic has adequate rational grounds for discounting the
belief that there is a God.
The difficulty with this particular strategy is that the alleged
logical contradiction is not explicit. Further, the efforts to make the
contradiction explicit fall into at least two distinct formulations.
First, some argue that God could have created a world in which no evil
occurs. This Utopian Case may be stated as follows:
(UC) The occurrence of any instance of evil is in logical contra­
diction with the belief in a Creator who is both omnipotent 
and perfectly good.
Second, some argue that certain kinds of evil are irreconcilable with
the Divine nature. This Incompatibility Case may be stated as follows:
(IC) Some types of evil found in the world cannot be made logically 
consistent with a Creator who is both omnipotent and perfectly 
good.
Of the many defenses offered, two are important for my purposes. 
First, there are those who argue that a greater good results from there 
being some evil in the world. This Greater Good Defense may be stated 
as follows:
(GGD) Some evil is a necessary condition for the realization of a 
higher good.
Second, some defend theism by insisting that a world that allows for 
free will is a better world than one that does not. The Free Will De­
fense may be stated as follows :
(FWD) Such evils as are found in the world are the necessary condi­
tions for the possession of free will, which as a higher good 
is a sufficient reason for such evil as does occur.
My purpose does not require a full and detailed exposition of
the controversy over the problem of evil suggested in these claims and
counterclaims. Rather, my concern is limited to exploring the relevance
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of these current formulations to Hume's assessment of the significance 
of human misery for the religious hypothesis. Consequently, I will of­
fer a brief account of Alvin Plantinga's defense of the logical coherence 
of theism against the atheological arguments from evil. I have two def­
inite reasons for this procedure. First, Plantinga's success against 
the accusation of logical incoherence does not appear to extend to deal­
ing with the broader problems concerning human misery that disturb Hume. 
In other words, Plantinga's discrediting of one sort of atheistic argu­
ment helps to make clear just what sort of difficulty it is that troubles 
Hume. I believe Hume was not primarily concerned with conceptual coher­
ence but with theism's lack of relevance to the common affairs of man.
A comparison with Plantinga will help me make Hume's position clear. 
Second, the very argument employed by Plantinga introduces certain doc­
trines that Hume questions. These questionable doctrines prove to be 
the principles of a rationalistic ethics, which Hume rejects as contrary 
to the way we do in fact acquire moral beliefs. Consequently, a brief 
account of Plantinga's refutation of the charge of rational incoherence 
will prove useful in calling attention to the moral impasse which Hume 
says necessarily arises from the theistic explanation of evil.
Alvin Plantinga and Coherent Theism 
Alvin Plantinga's purpose is to demonstrate the rationality of 
the "theistic principle." In order to achieve his goal, Plantinga is 
satisfied to demonstrate the logical non-contradictoriness of theism.
For this reason, his argument seeks to demonstrate that all atheological 
proofs from evil not only fail to establish a knockdown refutation of 
theism but also fail to discredit the logical possibility of theism.
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With this aim in mind, Plantinga examines the atheological argument from 
evil. The part of his assessment that is pertinent to my study of Hume 
may be summarized in the answers he provides to four questions.
Does the theist contradict himself? Plantinga’s first step in­
volves a request that the alleged contradiction be made explicit in re­
lation to the triadic set A:
(Set A) (1) God is omnipotent.
(2) God is wholly good.
(3) Evil exists.
The alleged contradiction is certainly not of the form ’2  and not 2 » ’
Rather, the type of contradiction sought may be specified as follows:
. . .  a set S of propositions is implicitly contradictory if there 
is a necessary proposition p such that the result of adding p to S 
is a formally contradictory set.^G
Therefore, the problem as interpreted by Plantinga boils down to whether 
or not a necessary proposition can be added to set A that permits the 
deduction of a proposition which is the contradictory of (3). Plantinga 
examines several candidates for such a proposition and arrives at the 
conclusion that the best conceivable one would have to be somewhat as 
follows: "If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he can properly
eliminate every evil state of a f f a i r s . T h i s  proposition is what I 
have called the Utopian Case (UC). However, Plantinga points out that 
the UC is deficient as the required contradictory proposition because 
it is not necessarily true. For example, it is common practice to allow 
that a particular instance is a good state of affairs when the conse­
quent good outweighs the evil that is the particular good's necessary 
18condition (GGD). Therefore, there is no necessary reason to believe 
the theist contradicts himself in holding Set A.
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Could God have created a world containing moral good but no 
moral evil? Plantinga proceeds by pointing out that the UC assumes that 
God can create any logically possible world merely because He is omnip­
otent. Further, the UC also assumes that God could create a world where 
men are possessed of free will but always in fact choose the good. Ac­
cordingly, the UC leads to the conclusion that God is morally obliged in 
light of (2) to create the best of possible worlds. Consequently, any 
world in which evil occurs is not the best of possible worlds. Accord­
ingly, the UC arrives at the conclusion that Set A is implicitly contra­
dictory when the UC proposition is added. Quite to the contrary, 
Plantinga believes that by the GGD the theist successfully removes the 
threat of contradiction. Plantinga expands the GGD by means of the FWD. 
Free will is a greater good and is crucial for the Divine selection 
among possible worlds. In clarifying the FWD, Plantinga stipulates that 
free will can only mean that the choice is not otherwise determined.
That is to say, Plantinga discounts the compatibilist notion that the 
same act can be both caused and free. Plantinga insists that without 
the actual choice of evil, a world would be without free will. Conse­
quently, on God's part, the creation of a world with free will and evil 
is a greater good than a merely deterministic world without evil (FITO). 
This use of free will is an essential part of Plantinga's rebuttals of 
the charge of incoherence. I shall have reason to return to it when 
Hume's views concerning voluntary belief are recounted in the next 
chapter.
Is God's existence compatible with the amount of moral evil the 
world contains? Having dismissed the UC on the grounds of GGD,
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Plantinga must protect his use of the FWD against the charge that it is 
not always the case that free will is a factor in a specific case of 
evil and the further charge that the degree of evil in the world is out 
of proportion to the good gained with free will (IC). Plantinga defends 
his use of the FWD against the first charge with the traditional appeal 
to the possibility of non-human persons, such as demons or fallen angels, 
whose acts of will may explain the occurrence of natural evil. As to 
the second demand, Plantinga argues that there is no necessary proposi­
tion that rules out a theodicy. I will examine the question of a pos­
sible theodicy in this chapter and the next. But I need to set down 
Plantinga's own conclusion first.
Does the existence of evil make it unlikely that God exists? 
Plantinga concludes that the problem of evil does not undermine the prop­
osition that God exists. A (plausible) necessary proposition creating a 
contradiction cannot be found. Further, Plantinga concludes that with 
the GGD and FWD he has been able to demonstrate "that the existence of
God is compatible, both logically and probabilistically, with the exis- 
19tence of evil." I believe Plantings has overstated his achievement.
He may be granted the logical consistency of the nature of God with the 
fact of evil. Hume allows as much but argues that this sort of resolu­
tion does not provide a solution to a more perplexing aspect of the 
problem of evil. Plantinga's argument at best can win only a Pyrrhic 
victory from the atheists. Hume diagnoses what he believes to be a more 
serious problem. It is man's nature to be repulsed by pain and misery. 
Consequently, Hume believes that the crucial question is: How can the
attributes of God be reconciled with the natural disapprobation of human
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sentiment at the presence of evil? Plantinga is not unaware of this 
element of human frustration, but feels it has been resolved in prin­
ciple. I will next examine Eume's reasons for thinking such a resolu­
tion is effective.
Hume and the Relevance of Coherent Theism 
As I have said, Hume and Plantinga find different problems for 
theism in the human experience of evil. Plantinga seeks to refute the 
claim that the occurrence of evil implies that traditional theism en­
tails a logical contradiction. Once Plantinga has successfully demon­
strated the logical possibility of theism, he is willing to leave the 
details of a particular theodicy to be filled in where possible and as 
the need arises. On the contrary, since Hume believes the experience of 
evil raises a question about the practical relevance of any theodicy 
founded upon classical or any other theism, he argues that whatever 
premises are submitted in a theodicy will eventually prove morally stul­
tifying. Hume has Philo raise the question whether the logical compati­
bility of theism and evil is of any help in confirming the moral rele-
20vance of religious belief.
The difference is not that the two men are merely working on 
the same problem from different perspectives. Hume's challenge is that 
any success gained from Plantinga's type of argument will be at the ex­
pense of the alleged fruitfulness of theism for moral beliefs. In other 
words, coherence can be gained only in ways that leave theism devoid of 
any positive practical significance.
In order to study the various distinctions between the two dif­
ferent understandings of what problem it is that evil poses for theism.
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I plan to do three things. First, I will clarify the distinction 
Plantinga makes between a free will defense (FWD) and a theodicy. Sec­
ond, I will sketch Hume's argument against theodicy in Parts X and XI of 
the Dialogues. Third, I will lay out the irreconcilable conflict of 
feeling that Hume sees as a moral impasse created by the attempts of the 
compatibilist to resolve the problem of evil. Once these three tasks 
are complete, I believe it will be evident that Hume does not hold or 
defend the atheological or strong thesis. Further, I believe I will have 
shown that Hume's skepticism concerning the religious hypothesis is of a 
moral and not of a theological sort.
Plantinga's distinction between a free will defense and a the­
odicy. Plantinga makes a distinction between a defense and a theodicy 
on the grounds of the different sorts of questions being answered. When 
the inquirer asks: "Does the theist contradict himself?" he is asking
if there is a logical contradiction between the traditional attributes 
ascribed to God and the presence of evil. When the theist responds with 
the proposition that free will is a necessary condition for moral re­
sponsibility, he believes he has a necessary proposition that can sup­
plement Set A and provide a FWD for theism. However, if the question 
under consideration is the quite different one, "IVhy does God permit 
evil?" then there is a request for a theodicy. Plantinga says that the 
failure of the theologian to furnish a satisfactory theodicy in no way 
invalidates the use of the FWD. The failure of any and all proposed
theodicies "shows little or nothing relevant to the rationality of be- 
21lief in God." The rationality of the belief that there is a God can 
be defended as long as the logical possibility of a theodicy can be
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demonstrated. In other words, Plantinga is persuaded that the free will 
proposition is a necessary proposition and serves to refute the usual 
claim, based on the fact of evil, that theism contains a logical contra­
diction. Further, by limiting his defense to the necessary truth of the 
free will premise, Plantinga resolves the philosophical quandary over 
evil without the additional burden of trying to develop a theodicy. The 
problem of theodicy can be put aside as a secondary task and remain an 
open but still unrealized possibility.
It will not be necessary for me to deal with the cogency of 
Plantinga's stance on free will. It is true that his stand is contrary 
to the soft determinism advanced by Hume. However, what is important 
for my inquiry is that Plantinga’s appeal to free will is an argument 
contingent upon a necessary relation between an otherwise undetermined 
choice and moral obligation. In short, Plantinga's case rests upon the 
connection between morality and a theory of voluntary judgment. Since 
Hume argues that reason is the slave of the passions, he not only ques­
tions voluntarism, but I believe he would also argue that the unavail­
ability of a specific theodicy is primarily due to a mistaken notion 
about the moral motivation which lies concealed under a faulty notion 
of free will.
Hume says that the problem of evil calls attention to the ab­
sence of practical consequences in theism. Hume suggests that there are 
two reasons why no practical consequences follow from theism. First, 
there is no strict correlation possible between the instincts and motives 
of human action and a religious theodicy. Second, there is a moral im­
passe that arises between the evidence that warrants a belief in the
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existence of God and the desires of the passions that prompt a religious 
response to the existence of God.
In fairness to Plantinga, it should be noted that he acknowledges 
the limits of his inquiry. Plantinga has deliberately restricted his 
analysis to the dispute over the rational coherence of theism. Neverthe­
less, the sharp distinction Plantinga draws between the logical possibil­
ity of theism and the need for a relevant theodicy is useful in making 
Hume's position more explicit. Plantinga's stand on free will is not 
only what makes his distinction possible but also what marks off his 
ethical theory from Hume's. Plantinga's procedure requires that propo­
sitions added to Set A be necessarily true and not merely contingently 
true. Therefore, should the free will premise prove to be contingent, 
Plantinga's distinction would collapse, the FWD would not succeed, and 
the problem of evil would remain unresolved.
Hume's argument from evil. The reader of Hume's Dialogues will 
be frustrated if he expects to find either the presumption of atheism or 
the logical incoherence argument as the formative issue in Hume's treat­
ment of the problem of evil. Instead, the careful reader will discover 
that Hume constructs his discussion around a conflict between human de­
sire and the nature of things that arises with every effort to employ the 
religious hypothesis in a practical manner in the common affairs of man.
A precis of Hume's discussion, in the Dialogues, of the occurrence of 
evil follows:
I. Demea's speech begins Part X, but its subject matter con­
tinues a topic introduced by Philo in the final paragraph 
of Part IX. Philo's point was that men derive their reli­
gion from sources other than a priori species of reasoning. 
Demea merely expands his agreement with Philo by suggesting 
that religion normally arises from individual passions in 
reaction to the misery or suffering that is part of human 
experience.
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II. Demea and Philo join in pointing out how common is the no­
tion that it is the miseries of life that drive men to re­
ligion. Philo notes that Leibniz is an unusual exception. 
The conversation continues in this way for the first 
twenty-four paragraphs of Part X. Cleanthes interrupts 
once to deny that be has the feelings being discussed.^"
III. The outcome of the long account of human misery is a ques­
tion about the impact of this rather common condition upon
the human understanding of the moral nature of God. "In 
what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble 
the benevolence and mercy of m e n ?"23 This question leads 
Philo to mention the as yet unanswered questions of 
Epicurus:
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is 
he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he 
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then
is evil?24
This reference to Epicurus' old questions introduces the 
problem of making a character assessment of the Deity from 
the evidence in the universe. The problem is not primarily 
one of logical consistency but one of moral coherence be­
tween the motive and the action. The issue is one of the­
odicy. How can the evident acts of God be linked with 
causal motives that resemble or are consistent with our 
normal criteria for connecting actions and motives? Until 
the criteria for assigning motives are clear, we cannot 
ascribe moral attributes to God with any cogency. Cleanthes 
acknowledges that this is a crucial issue for t h e i s m 2 5  be­
cause there can be little interest in establishing the 
natural attributes if the moral attributes remain in doubt. 
The consequence, he says, would be "an end at once of all
religion."26
IV. As a reply to Cleanthes' consternation, Demea offers the 
traditional explanation that this world is but a prepara­
tion for another world in which these evils are r e s o l v e d .27 
However, Cleanthes rejects this form of theodicy because it 
is built on arbitrary suppositions. He insists that the 
only way to support divine benevolence is to discount the 
evidence that leads us to believe man suffers so much or 
so universally as Philo and Demea claim.
V. The remainder of Part x23 involves Philo's response to
Cleanthes' rash claim. Philo takes the question under dis­
cussion to be: "Why is there any misery at all in the
world?" Philo concludes Part X with a claim of triumph. 
Logical compatibility between the existence of God and the 
existence of evil is not enough to answer this question.
The defender of the moral attributes of God or the custom­
ary hopes of religion would have to show cause for these 
conclusions on the grounds of the inadequate and mixed 
phenomena found in human experience.
VI. Cleanthes begins Part XI with a proposed modification of 
the Divine attributes and requests Philo to join him by
142
constructing an account of the evidence found in the world 
for making a new approach to the understanding of the 
Divine nature.
VII. Philo responds with a generalized account of what might be 
expected of a Deity beforehand from the nature of things. 
The revised concept of God would need to conform to four 
aspects of the evidence: (1) the function of pain and
pleasure is an essential condition of human action, (2) 
the ordering of the processes of nature is along the lines 
of general laws, (3) individuals are possessed of only 
limited powers and faculties, and (4) "the inaccurate work­
manship . . .  of the great machine of nature."29 
VIII. Philo concludes his requirement with an argument similar 
in form to that advanced by Cleanthes as the design argu­
ment in Part II. Both began with "Look round this uni­
verse . . . "  Philo says, "the true conclusion is that the 
original source of all things is entirely indifferent. . . 
and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat 
above cold. . . ."30 
IX. The new direction of the discussion exhausts the patience 
of Demea and he leaves.
X. In Part XII Philo and Cleanthes agree on what it is to as­
sent to mitigated theism. They conclude that "true reli­
gion" is a passionate delight in the flourishing of natural 
virtues within the common affairs of man. They share in an 
aesthetic theism.
In summation, Hume’s argument from evil is personified in Philo, 
who seeks to moderate the extremes represented by Demea and Cleanthes.
The exchange of views reaches a climax when Philo submits an argument 
that resembles the design argument of Cleanthes and that draws the con­
clusion most compatible with the design argument (i.e., the author of 
nature is morally indifferent). Philo's triumph is set between the con­
cluding remarks about Demea's a priori argument in Part IX and Demea's 
hasty departure in total frustration at the close of Part XI. Hume uses 
the dramatic plot of his Dialogues as well as careful argument to focus 
attention upon his own conclusion that there is no connection between the
existence of God and the moral life of men that is of any practical 
31consequence.
The moral imnasse between theism and the natural instincts. In
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order to present Hume's account of the moral impasse between theism and 
the natural instincts, it will prove helpful to recount briefly the re­
lation between the direct passions, the natural virtues, and the origin 
of religious ideas in the passions. Hume develops all three of these 
doctrines but never combines all three of them into one common exposi­
tion. By bringing them together, I will be able to shed some light on 
why Hume holds that there is a moral impasse that precludes religion 
from having individual or social utility.
Hume's story of the direct passions begins with the immediate
32experience of pleasure or pain. The perceptions of pain or pleasure 
activate the mind in respect to the passions of desire or aversion. 
Whenever the gratification of either of these passions is certain, the 
resulting state of mind is either joy or sorrow. However, when the out­
come of desire or aversion is uncertain, the consequent state of mind is 
either hope or fear.
The account of the natural virtues forms a sequel to the story 
33of the direct passions. Whenever the reflections of the mind are 
fixed through the reoccurrence of particular feelings which are uniformly 
and regularly accompanied by satisfaction or distress, these fixed in­
clinations may be characterized as virtues or vices. The actions moti­
vated by these fixed inclinations are the outward signs of the inner 
character acquired by the particular individual from the regular opera­
tions of his mind. Because of their habitual character, these fixed 
operations in a particular mind are recognizable as the calm passions 
commonly spoken of as good or evil. This completes Hume's narrative 
concerning the origin of the natural virtues.
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The history of the origin of religious ideas is more complex. 
Religious ideas arise either as a learned response to the passions or as 
a studied or a spontaneous assent to the order in the nature of things. 
Since religious ideas are of diverse origin, they tend to develop along 
the lines of their differing pedigrees. The ideas drawn from the pas­
sions tend to develop in the patterns of the historical but vulgar faiths. 
The ideas used in natural theology are refined by reason and tend to 
develop according to the limits of the understanding.
It is the inevitable impasse between the passions and the under­
standing that creates the block between sound theology and practical 
morals. For example, when religious ideas are the individual’s response 
to the uncertain desires of the passions, religious faith serves as a 
pathological mechanism for the mind’s expressions of uncertainty and 
anxiety. The religious rites, creeds, and dogmas reflect the oscillation 
of attitudes between hope and fear. The failure of religion lies in the 
fact that it can stabilize the anxiety of the passions only through a 
feigned certainty purchased at the expense of the understanding’s faith­
fulness to the evidence. Thus, instead of pious attitudes eventuating 
in resolutions similar to those of the calm passions, religious actions 
become cases of either fanaticism or superstition.
On the other hand, when the mind of the religious believer is 
limited to the moderate conclusions warranted by the mixed phenomena of 
human experience, the desires that motivate vulgar religion remain un­
satisfied. A religion restricted to the evidence has nothing to add to 
the mundane reasonableness provided for in the common affairs of men.
For Hume, true religion occurs whenever one assents to living within the
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scope of the customary utility of the common life. Beyond these limits 
religions are but sick men's dreams that corrupt and pervert the neces­
sary conditions under which the calm passions can efficiently create the 
moral climate of the common life.
In conclusion, the religious act is without its own sentiment 
and acquires no social utility on its own. Unfortunately, the very de­
sires that motivate the vulgar religions induce us to feign an escape 
from normal affairs which precludes their (i.e., the desires) gratifi­
cation within the only moral circumstances available to man. When man 
assents to true religion, his philosophical reason has directed the de­
sires which give birth to religion into the role of supporting what is 
already available to man in the common affairs of life. Any effort of 
religion to overstep these bounds will run into the impasse between our 
religious hopes or fears and those passions that govern the moral incli­
nations. Unfortunately for man, religious aspirations generally exceed 
their legitimate grounds, and the history of the vulgar faiths is one of 
superstition and fanaticism.
Conclusion
The strong thesis of atheology does not express Hume's actual 
position concerning religion. It is not Hume's strategy to discount the 
existence of God in order to do away with religion. As I have shown, 
Hume neither structures his criticism of theistic arguments from the 
presumption of atheism, nor does he seek a knockdown proof against the 
existence of God. In addition, I have shown that Hume does not construe 
the problem of evil as concerned with the existence of God but rather 
with the nature of God. Furthermore, unlike Plantinga, who interprets
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the problem of evil as an. atheological argument against coherent theism,
I have shown that Hume's concern with the problem of evil is in respect 
of the lack of positive moral or practical consequences in theism. Since 
the strong thesis fails to convey Hume's position, I will examine the 
merits of the weak thesis in the next chapter.
ENDNOTES
^ h e  ST might be stated in a stronger form:
(ST) Any appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails in every 
case because there are adequate grounds for denying all theistic 
propositions.
Since Hume does not defend or advocate this form of the ST, and since it 
does not have any relevance for my study, I will not pursue it either.
2Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (New York: Humani­
ties Press, 1961); and Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism and Other 
Essays (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1976).
3Presumption, p. 14.
4Presumption, pp. 14-15.





9John Hick, review of God and Philosophy, by Antony Flew, in 
Theology Today, April 1967, pp. 85-87.
^^Hume's Philosophy of Belief, pp. 214-242.
^^ume's Philosophy of Belief, p. 215.
^^D, p. 4.
13T, p. 272.
14Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Dell Publishing




^^Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), p. 16.
^^God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 22.
X8For a statement of the GGD see p. 132 above.
19God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 64.
^°D, p. 92.









31That this conclusion is distinctively Hume's can be established 
apart from the Dialogues. For example, an early addition of An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding gives the following title to Section XI: 




‘d . p. 88.
'D, P- 88.
'd . P- 89.
'd , p. 89.
D, p. 89.
'D, PP . 90-
D, PP . 94-
'd . PP . 103
CHAPTER VI
THE WEAK THESIS
In the last chapter I concluded that the strong thesis does not 
represent Hume's position on the relation between theism and morals.
The strong thesis, it may be remembered, is as follows:
(ST) The appeal to God as the warrant for moral beliefs fails in
every case because no impeccable proof that a Deity exists can 
be made.
My procedure in showing that Hume does not espouse the ST involved two 
comparisons of Hume's stand with someone who was obviously working along 
the lines of the ST. First, I contrasted Hume's use of dialogue with 
Antony Flew's advocacy of a presumption of atheism. This comparison 
resulted in the conclusion that Hume maintains an open and flexible out­
look instead of the firm assertive, and conclusive resolution demanded 
by Flew. Second, I contrasted Alvin Plantinga's resolution of the prob­
lem of evil with the interpretation of that problem by Hume. I concluded 
that while Plantinga decided that an atheological argument from evil was 
contingent upon a logical contradiction between the attributes of God 
and the fact of evil, Hume found a different difficulty for theism.
Hume isolates a moral impasse between the motives for belief in the
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moral attributes of God and the motives that govern man's ordinary moral 
attitudes. Hume contends that although theism can be made rationally 
consistent with the presence of evil, it cannot be done in such a way 
that morally fruitful consequences follow from the principle of theism. 
The outcome of both comparisons is that Hume does not organize his in­
quiry concerning natural religion around the ST.
In this chapter I will examine the weak thesis, which is as
follows:
(WT) The appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails because 
the nature of God is either morally indifferent or too ambigu­
ous to serve this purpose.
I will employ the procedure of clarification by comparison and contrast
that I used in the last chapter. First, I will discuss Nelson Pike's
effort to resolve the problem of theodicy in relation to the problem of
evil. When Pike's difficulties in these matters are explored, his
struggle with the interpretation of Hume will offer distinct clues as to
why Hume rejects theodicy as a morally fruitful exercise. Second, I
will use H. H. Price's account of Hume's analysis of belief as an aid in
pointing out Hume's reasons for rejecting the sort of free will defense
employed by Plantinga. Again, I will arrive at Hume's conclusion that
no important practical consequences can follow from the principle of
theism. My feeling is that these two studies in contrast will provide
sufficient reasons for the conclusion that Hume holds the WT.
Nelson Pike and the Problem of Theism 
Recent literature on Hume’s philosophy of religion includes two 
important writings by Nelson Pike. The first of these is an essay on 
Hume and the problem of evil,^ while the second is a commentary on Hume's
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2Dialogues. By tracing the changes that occur between the first and the 
second of these interpretations of Hume, one can gain a better insight 
into the problems involved in a careful exposition of Hume's thought.
My narration of Pike's struggle to understand Hume will deal with four 
topics. First, I will set down Pike's earliest interpretation of Hume's 
account of the problem of evil. Second, I will examine the sort of dif­
ficulty over moral criteria that later troubles Pike about his earlier 
resolution of the problem of evil. Third, I will weigh the reasons Pike 
gives for rejecting the WT interpretation of Hume's Dialogues. Finally, 
I will evaluate Pike's suggestion that the Dialogues contains an irreg­
ular argument for the existence of God. These four topics will take me 
a long way into the critical evaluation of the WT as a defensible inter­
pretation of Hume's philosophy of religion.
The Problem of Evil Again 
In his essay "Hume on Evil," Nelson Pike construes Hume's pur-
3pose in the argument from human misery to be the refutation of theism. 
Pike then states his own purpose: "I shall argue that the argument
against the existence of God presented in Part X of the Dialogues is 
quite unconvincing."^ The reason Pike believes the argument is uncon­
vincing is the same as the objection raised by Plantinga: the premises
that make up the argument are not logically incompatible and therefore 
are not prohibitive of the conclusion "God exists." Pike lists the 
alleged "inconsistent triad" of premises Philo is supposed to have used 
in making a knockdown refutation of theism:
(1) The world contains instances of suffering.
(2) God exists— and is omnipotent and omniscient.
(3) God exists— and is perfectly good.5
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At this point there is no significant difference between Pike and 
Plantinga.
However, in contrast with Plantinga, Pike construes the force 
of the argument along the lines of rhe Utopian Case (UC).̂  This is evi­
dent from Pike’s interpretation of the moral attributes in proposition
(3): "to say of God that he is perfectly good is to say that God would 
prevent suffering if he c o u l d . O n  the basis of the UC interpretation 
Pike proceeds to argue that the premises of the argument from evil are 
not sufficient for the conclusion Philo supposedly drew from them.
It seems to me that this argument is deficient. I do not think it 
follows from the claim that a being is perfectly good that he would 
prevent suffering if he could.&
Pike's objection is that the claim of the UC is not true. As an argu­
ment by counter-example Pike mentions the case of a parent who causes 
momentary displeasure to a child by forcing it to take some unpleasant 
medicine in order that the child might suffer less in the long run.
Pike argues that moral culpability does not arise where a case of pro­
voked suffering occurs only as an appropriate means to a greater good 
(GGD). Pike applies this argument to theism with the following 
explication:
As a general statement, a being who permits (or brings about) an 
instance of suffering might be perfectly good providing only that 
there is a morally sufficient reason for his action. Thus, it does 
not follow from the claim that God is perfectly good that he would 
prevent suffering if he could. God might fail to prevent suffering, 
or himself bring about suffering, while remaining perfectly good.
It is required only that there be a morally sufficient reason for 
his action.9
To facilitate his criticism of the UC, Pike suggests that the moral 
proposition of the alleged inconsistent triad might be corrected as 
follows:
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(4) The world contains instances of suffering.
(5) God exists— and is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
(6) An omnipotent and omniscient being would have no morally suffi­
cient reason for allowing instances of suffering.10
But Pike is not satisfied with (6) for two reasons. First, the
truth of (6) cannot be established by observation, because it is impos­
sible to examine every instance. Second, given the inability to confirm 
the truth of (6) by observation, (6) would need to be necessarily true 
if the triad is to be a contradiction. But since (6) is not known to be
true, no contradiction has been established in the triad (4) - (6). Fur­
ther, if there is no contradiction, it is not a refutation of theism.
At this point there is little significant difference between 
the positions of Pike and Plantinga. There is an effort at economy on 
the part of the former in that he does not employ the FWD. Their common 
argument may be briefly stated as follows: Since it is impossible to
establish a logical contradiction between the attributes of God and the 
existence of evil, both theism and a theodicy are logical possibilities. 
Of course the merit of Pike’s criticism of Hume lies with the assumption 
that the significant issue at stake is the existence of God (ST). Fur­
ther, if Hume’s requirement that all concepts be cashable in terms of 
impressions is accepted. Pike’s case requires a further assumption that 
the attributes of God can be known and fixed in keeping with Hume’s 
challenge. Finally, Pike’s position depends upon a third assumption 
that an adequate response to Hume’s alleged atheological argument has 
been made if one is able to secure the possibility of theism and leave 
the door open to a possible theodicy, although a satisfactory one is not 
even suggested. These unresolved issues raise further questions about 
Pike's proposal that it suffices for a theodicy to be possible in
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principle though not available in fact.
The Problem of an Unresolved Theodicy
Pike later acknowledges that his bare-bones defense of theism
in "Hume on Evil" needs some amplification.^^ He says that his reason
for a shaken confidence in the adequacy of his earlier argument comes
12from an essay by Terence Penelhum. A brief summary of Penelhum's 
essay should make explicit the reasons for Pike's concern.
Penelhum says he is interested only in the traditional concept 
of God. He argues that he chooses to be finicky in this matter for two 
reasons. First, only the combined attributes of omnipotence and moral 
goodness meet the desired standard of being "worthy of reverence." Sec­
ond, the absence of moral goodness as a divine attribute would allow for 
a moral rejection of theism. Consequently, it is a reasonable expecta­
tion not only that God have the character of moral goodness but further­
more that every aspect of the account of theism be relevant to and con­
sistent with perfect moral goodness. Therefore, the mere logical possi­
bility of a theodicy leaves too much up in the air. Penelhum makes his 
point as follows:
There is something very odd about suggesting that although some­
one is morally good I have no idea what he would do in a wide range 
of situations; though it is quite possible for me to say that I do 
not know how he would handle some particularly knotty problem.^3
The crux of the matter is that the attribution of moral goodness to God 
requires the use of some criteria that the calling of someone good satis­
fies. As a bare minimum the criteria must include those used by the 
speaker who affirms the goodness of God. Even though it is true that 
concepts of God, as well as the particular criteria employed, vary among
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individuals, it is more important to observe that the requirement of 
criteria is not waived. Further, the mere requirement of criteria makes 
possible both the refinement and even the rejection of a particular view 
of God. In addition, it is the requirement of criteria which furnishes 
the requisite guidelines for detecting whether a certain concept of God 
signifies a God who meets the standards of being both morally satisfying 
and worthy of worship. The consequence of the requirement of criteria 
is the narrowing of the conditions in which the existence of a moral God 
can be affirmed. In other words, there are specified moral limits and 
conditions regarding the existence of a Deity who is perfectly good.
I will name these narrowing conditions inherent in the require­
ment of criteria for the ascription of moral attributes, the Requirement 
of Ethical Consistency (REG). The requirement may be formulated as 
follows:
(REG) Any ascription of a moral attribute to God requires some prior 
criteria for calling someone good and accordingly narrows what 
might be the case concerning the character of God should He be 
called good.
Pike both acknowledges the merits of the REG and is puzzled as to the 
effect it might have upon his own conclusions. Whatever consequences 
the REG may have upon Pike's account, my interests will be limited to 
the effect the REG has upon Pike's understanding of Hume's argument from 
suffering.
It seems to me that it is quite possible within Hume's philos­
ophy to conceive of God apart from the attribute of goodness. Conse­
quently, it does not follow that to deny the moral attributes is the 
same thing as to deny that there is a God. Rather, since God's existence 
is independent of His goodness, one would need to weigh the evidence as
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well as check the criteria to see if it is plausible to speak of God as 
being perfectly good. Plantinga and Pike differ from Hume in that while 
the former assume that any God worthy of the name is perfectly good,
Hume is satisfied merely to identify God with whatever causes the uni­
verse and to infer what attributes he can from the observed state of the 
universe. The difference is decisive in how the problem of evil is for­
mulated. The two distinctive sorts of arguments from human suffering 
may be specified as follows:
(A) The argument from evil fails to refute the existence of God be­
cause it does not establish a logical contradiction between the 
attributes of God and the occurrence of evil.
(B) The argument from evil raises the question whether we have ade­
quate grounds for ascribing moral attributes to the cause of the 
universe.
The distinction between these two arguments is often ignored, 
and fatally so in the exposition of the philosophy of Hume. Since Hume 
employs an argument of the sort B, the outcome of his argument is not 
that God does not exist but rather that the God who is the cause of this 
universe is morally indifferent. Hume does mention an argument of the 
sort A within his case for B, but he allows that even if A were true the 
problem of B would remain. In other words, Hume's argument from evil is 
not so much an argument against the existence of God as it is an argu­
ment against the moral relevance of God. However, since Pike thinks 
that Hume advances an A argument, I will try to determine what his rea­
sons are.
The Place of Theodicy in the Dialogues 
In a "Postscript" to the topic "Evil and 'experimental theism,'" 
Pike replies to the suggestion of William Capitan that the argument in
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Part X of the Dialogues deals with the nature and not the existence of
14God. Pike sets out the distinction between his and Capitan’s inter­
pretation as a choice of one among three theses:
(1) Given that God is to be understood as all-powerful, infinitely 
intelligent and perfectly good, and given that "powerful,” "in­
telligent," and "good" are to be taken as carrying the full im­
plications of their ordinary meanings, God does not exist.
(2) Given that God exists, and given that the terms "powerful," "in­
telligent," and "good" are to be taken as carrying the full im­
plications of their ordinary meanings, God is not all-powerful, 
infinitely intelligent and perfectly good.
(3) Given that God exists, and given that God is all-powerful, in­
finitely intelligent and perfectly good, either "powerful," "in­
telligent," or "good" must be understood otherwise than as carry­
ing the full implications of its ordinary meaning.
Pike believes that (1) is the correct interpretation of Hume and that
Capitan is mistaken in holding (3). Pike offers three reasons why he
thinks (1) is correct. The first is an external reason. Pike says the
first is better because "the logical issues underpinning the traditional
problem of evil seem to emerge i^ith greater c l a r i t y . B u t  this reason
is of merit only if the traditional problem is the one perplexing Hume.
Pike offers only two reasons why the text of the Dialogues requires (1).
Pike believes that (1) gives the best sense of unity to Parts X and XI.
Pike also claims that the conclusion of Part X supports (1). I believe
that neither of these reasons will survive close scrutiny of the
Dialogues.
The unity of Parts X and XI arises from a sequence of questions 
introduced in the process of the discussion and to which answers are ad­
vanced. The order may be outlined by listing the questions as they 
arise. The order of the questions may be classified as follows:
I. The Due Sense of Religion is Ordinarily Caused by Misery.
A. "For is it necessary to prove what everyone feels within
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B. "And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own 
immediate feelings and experiences?"^^
II. The Moral Attributes of God-20
A. Is it possible to assert that the moral attributes of the 
Deity are of the same, nature with virtue in human
creatures? 22-
B. How does the divine benevolence display itself in the sense
of the anthropomorphites?22
C. What is the purpose of establishing the natural attributes 
of the Deity while the moral are doubtful and uncertain?23
III. The Argument from E v i l . 24
A . "Why is there any misery at all in the w o r l d ? 2 5
B. If it be allowed that the concept of God is compatible 
with evil, what are you advanced by these concessions?^^
IV. The Evidence from the Order in the World.27
A. "Is the world, considered in general and as it appears to 
us in this life, different from what a man or such a 
limited being would, beforehand, expect from a very power­
ful, wise and benevolent Deity?"23
B. Is Philo a more dangerous enemy of Demea than is Cleanthes?29
It seems to me that the questions which govern the direction of the dis­
cussions in Parts X and XI are the clue to the unity of those parts. 
Further, none of the questions concerns the existence of God but only his 
nature as observed through his effects. A careful reading of Parts X 
and XI as answers to these questions would go against Pike’s position (1).
As for the second internal reason of Pike’s concerning the con­
clusion of Part X, I can see no reason for concluding that it supports 
(1) in preference to (2) or (3). In fact, the "Triumph Passage," with 
which Part X ends, appears to me to support (2). In that passage, Philo 
suggests that a concession of the compatibility between the attributes 
of God and the existence of evil can be made for the sake of argument.
Even with this concession, Philo argues, the problem of evil remains, 
because the real issue is the question how the moral attributes can be 
inferred from the mixed phenomena that make up the world.
My reading of the "Triumph Passage" is supported by the discus­
sion of the non-inferrability of moral attributes that follows in Part XI.
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First, Cleanthes suggests that the attributes of God should be modified 
so as to remove the aspect of "infinity" or "perfection." Second, Philo 
recounts how the order discovered within the universe can establish only 
the moral indifference of the secret powers that are the unknown cause of 
order in the universe. Third, in the narrative order of the Dialogues, 
when Demea discovers that his partner in the mystic attitude toward the 
divine attributes, Philo, is more an enemy of full-blown theism than the 
anthropomorphite Cleanthes, he leaves the party in a huff.
An additional factor should be noted. The word "existence" oc­
curs only once in Hume's total argument from evil in Parts X and XI. The
30particular use occurs in Part XI. In paragraph four of Part XI Philo 
argues that "such a deity" as the one proposed in the first paragraph by 
Cleanthes, where he replaces the metaphysical notion of "infinity” with 
religious attributes like "holy," cannot be inferred to exist in light 
of the order of the world any more than the traditionally conceived God. 
This merely says that the evidence does not support the belief that there 
are instances of either of these two types of concepts.
Since I can find no reasons internal to the text of Hume's 
Dialogues to support Pike's interpretation, the conclusion of the matter 
seems somewhat along these lines; Pike is mistaken in thinking that Hume 
holds (1). Pike is led into this mistake by two oversights. First, he 
tries to interpret Hume's argument from evil along traditional atheolog­
ical lines. Second, he tries to set aside the usual concerns over a 
theodicy by concluding one is possible in principle if not available in 
fact". The combination of these two shortcomings leads Pike not only to 
miss Hume’s point but to underestimate the consequences for the moral
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relevance of theism when an explicit theodicy is not forthcoming. It is 
this latter problem which is dominant in Hume’s Dialogues.
Pike’s oversight is all the more inexcusable when seen in the 
light' of a special suggestion he provides concerning an irregular argu­
ment for theism in Part III of the Dialogues. Pike's success in this 
matter, as well as his use of the irregular argument to account for the 
unity of Philo's position in Parts I-XI with Part X, makes the oversight 
about Hume's use of the argument from evil most unfortunate. I will 
clarify these accusations in the next section.
The Irregular Arguments for the Existence of God 
Pike believes that there are two types of argument from design 
in Parts II through VIII of the Dialogues. The first version, the reg­
ular or scientific version, is presented by Cleanthes in Part II and 
consists in the argument that there is an order in the universe analo­
gous to that found in a machine. It is the argument by analogy that 
Philo criticizes and rejects in Parts IV through VIII. The second is an 
irregular argument proposed by Cleanthes in Part III. Cleanthes points
to the immediate awareness of order by means of his contrived examples
31of "the articulate speech from the clouds" and "the self-propagating 
32library," as well as the common observation of the operations of na-
33ture such as those found in an eye. Cleanthes argues that each of 
these accounts specifies an incident where design or order is an imme­
diate impression and not mediated through reason and logical inference.
In other words, it is an instinctive awareness of order. Now, as Pike’s 
account of Hume’s story goes, it is this second version of belief in God 
that Philo assents to in Part XII. There Philo claims that the immediate
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sense of order is irresistible and legitimate. It is an immediate in­
ference of the sentiments and not mediated by rational proofs. It is 
not only of legitimate origin, but it is irresistible and instinctive.
It is very similar to instinctive natural beliefs.
Now my conclusion concerning Pike and the problem of theodicy 
is this; First, Pike is representing his own concerns and not Hume’s 
when he suggests that the issue at stake is the existence of God. Sec­
ond, Pike tacitly concedes the weakness of his and Plantinga's case when 
he acknowledges that he is troubled by Penelhum's criticism. What this 
criticism amounts to is the requirement of continuity between the cri­
teria of calling something good in common affairs and calling God good. 
The outcome is that some actual correlation must be established between 
ordinary experience and the divine attributes. Third, although Pike 
denies that Hume is concerned with the criteria problem regarding the 
attributes of God, he fails to make this case with a careful reading of 
the Dialogues. It is more likely that a thorough reading of Hume will 
show that he is concerned with the nature of God. Finally, Pike makes 
a helpful suggestion about the instinctive belief in God or order and 
shows how it is the common position of Cleanthes and Philo in the Dia­
logues . This exposition is more consistent with the Capitan reading of 
the problem of evil than with Pike's. Hence, I conclude that the issue 
in Hume is not atheology but theodicy and that Hume's primary aim is to 
show why natural theology has no practical consequences. In other words, 
the argument from evil in Hume follows an alternate strategy to that 
found in Pike and Plantinga. That this is indeed the direction in which 
Hume's account moves gains further credit when his analysis of the free­
dom of assent is considered.
162
The Problem of Belief in Regard to Theism 
Indeterminists conmonly argue that man.’ has the ability to as­
sent to any logical proposition and that rational beliefs can motivate 
human action. Indeterminism usually involves a belief that rational 
self-determinism is a necessary condition of moral responsibility. As 
we have seen, Plantinga uses a FWD to establish the compatibility of 
theism and evil. For Plantinga free will means "being free with respect 
to an a c t i o n . H e  explains "being free" as follows:
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free 
to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no 
antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will per­
form the action, or that he w o n ' t .35
Plantinga adds that an action is morally significant when it is right to
36choose and wrong not to choose or vice versa. In what follows, I will 
contrast this view of Plantinga's with that of Hume's in order to clar­
ify the different consequences that follow from their respective notions 
of religious assent. I will rely to some extent upon H. H. Price's lec­
tures "Hume's Analysis of Belief" and "The Freedom of Assent in Descartes
37and Hume" published in his book Belief. My account will include three 
things. First, I will contrast the two different models of assent behind 
the self-determinism of Plantinga and the soft determinism of Hume. Se­
cond, I will briefly deal with Hume's account of belief as summarized by 
Price. Finally, I will lay out the consequences of Hume's doctrine of 
belief for his account of religion.
The Free Will Defense Again 
As I pointed out, Plantinga establishes his case for theism on 
an appeal to the necessity of free choice as the requisite condition for
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a moral universe. The FWD entails a necessary proposition of this sort:
"It is not within God's power to create a world containing moral good
38but no moral evil." Plantinga believes the proposition is intuitively 
true because it states both the sufficient conditions for free assent 
and the necessary conditions for moral responsibility. Plantinga’s 
whole case appears to be construed along the lines of a rationalistic 
model of assent (RMA). The crucial proposition in the RMA is that rea­
son may be the motive of an action. The model may be constructed as 
follows:
(RMA) Step 1: Belief x is known to be a logical possibility.
Step 2: The grounds for believing are appraised and reason 
finds person ^  is entitled to credit x as either true, 
or probable, and to act accordingly.
Step 3: Person ^  is motivated by reason (alone) to perform
action A in light of the assured reliability of belief
3C.
Step 4: Person ^  is a free agent to the exact degree that his 
choice to do A is motivated by the reasonableness of x.
In contrast to the RMA, a different story of the motivation of human
actions is spelled out by Hume. His account construes assent as deter­
mined by the passions. This alternative attitudinal model (AMA) may be 
sketched as follows:
(AMA) Step 1: Belief ^  is a feeling that occurs in person
Step 2: Belief x may be vindicated as probable in light of the
evidence or found to be instinctive because x is uni­
versal, irresistible, and of utility to the common 
life.
Step 3: Belief x will of its own force and vivacity move per­
son 2  to do action A unless a stronger belief %  inter­
venes, or unless belief x, being neither instinctive 
nor empirically vindicated, is not associated with the 
strength of passion P_"
Step 4: Person ^  is reasonable to the exact degree that his 
actions are motivated by vindicated or instinctive 
beliefs.
The decisive difference between RMA and AMA is the difference in the
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mechanism of motive. The RMA envisions the motivating push to depend 
upon a free choice of reason between various possibilities. Quite to 
the contrary, the AMA views the motivating impetus as coming from the 
inherent force of a dominant passion. In the latter case the merits of 
an action depend upon the character of the passion that motivates the 
person to act. Reason is limited to the clarification of means or the 
elucidation of ends. In this sense, reason is the slave of the passions.
Plantinga has a larger range of alternatives in the use of RMA 
than Hume has with the AMA. For Plantinga, any set of beliefs that are 
rationally coherent are possible although they may not be of equal prob­
ability or of comparable ease of achievement. In Hume's case, only 
those beliefs that originate in impressions, or arise instinctively from 
the necessary conditions of life, or are contrived to promote the common 
utility are legitimate. However, the relative merit of these two diver­
gent accounts of motivation turns on the resolution of the problem of 
assent.
Hume in fact warns against the rejection of the AMA on the
39ground that it might be destructive to religion and morals. He is 
quite aware of the temptation to argue for the rationalistic view of 
free assent because of the alleged fringe benefits it is said to provide 
for some institutionalized beliefs and practices. Hume insists that the 
evidence alone can vindicate an answer to this problem. If there is any 
surface weakness in Hume's case, it is his reduction of the dispute to 
the mutually exclusive dichotomy between reason and passion, while leav­
ing unquestioned the mechanical model of human motivation which gives 
rise to the problem. I will only mention this latter oversight and not
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pursue it. Furthermore, since Plantinga seems to evince the same limited 
vision concerning these matters as Hume does, I will proceed by looking 
into Hume’s doctrine of belief.
Hume's Doctrine of Belief 
H. H. Price has an excellent lecture on Hume's doctrine of be-
40lief. The lecture begins with three preliminary cautions to the in­
terpreter of Hume's narration of the story of belief. First, one should 
keep in mind that Hume constructs his doctrine of belief within the con­
text of an account of causality. The result is that Hume's "official" 
view of belief is severely limited to causal beliefs. Second, Hume was 
exploring new territory in his treatment of belief. Consequently, he 
has no ready-made terminology and stumbles about looking for adequate 
modifiers to amplify his characterization of belief. The interpreter is 
to be warned against an under-emphasis upon "lively" at the expense of 
other words like "firm," "steady," and "solid." Third, Hume's adoption 
of the language of "ideas" must not mislead the interpreter into a mis­
understanding of the doctrine of belief. There is the danger that the 
interpreter might collapse the distinction between a "vivid image" and 
a "lively idea" at great expense to Hume's remarkable insights into 
belief.
With these precautions, H. H. Price submits the following brief 
but insightful summation of Hume's doctrine:
1. The difference between believing and not believing is a dif­
ference in the manner of conceiving an idea, and not in the content 
of the idea conceived.
2. We can roughly indicate what this manner of conceiving is, 
by saying that a believed idea is one which feels strong or forceful 
or lively or solid.
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3. Except in the special case of madness, the forcefulness or 
liveliness of the idea arises from its relation to (its associative 
linkage with) a present impression; the idea gets its liveliness 
from its relation to something actually perceived (or introspected) 
at the moment.
4. In sensible or sober or sane belief, this associative link 
between idea and impression arises from past experiences of constant 
conjunctions. The impression A enlivens or strengthens the idea 
because A-like impressions and ^-like impressions have been con­
stantly conjoined in the past experience of the believer.
5. If, or to the extent that, the associative link between idea 
and impression is of another sort (if it is just association by re­
semblance or by contiguity), then or to that extent the belief is 
subnormal or silly or unjustifiable. And ^  fortiori the belief is 
subnormal or silly or unjustifiable if the liveliness or forceful­
ness of the idea does not arise from its relation to a present im­
pression at all, but merely from purely physiological causes (or as 
Hume might have added, from the effects of hypnotic suggestion)
The crux of the dispute between Plantinga and Hume lies in their
different understandings of belief. An account of belief like that found
in Hume undercuts the FWD of Plantinga. In Hume's story of belief there 
is no role for volition apart from the agent's awareness of the sponta­
neousness of his own motivation.
H. H. Price calls attention to the "Appendix" of the Treatise, 
where, he believes, Hume offers a reductio ad absurdum of the rationalist
notion of the freedom of a s s e n t . T h e  passage in the Treatise is as
follows:
First, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and 
separable from the idea of particular objects. 'Tis impossible, 
therefore, that this idea of existence can be annex'd to the idea 
of any object, or form the difference betwixt a simple conception 
and belief.
Secondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can sep­
arate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases: so that if belief 
consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd 
be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd. We may, therefore, 
conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or senti­
ment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise 
from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not 
masters.43
Hume's argument is designed to deny that assent is an act of free will.
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and that it is in our power to assent to whatever we can imagine. In 
fact, Hume argues elsewhere that, when the propositions have the irre­
sistible endorsement of instinct, nature is too strong for the human mind
44to withhold assent, except for short spells of philosophical inquiry.
The point Hume is making is that assent is involuntary. The mind may be 
induced in certain circumstances to believe a deception or fall for a 
belief through ignorance. Preferably the mind will be inclined to believe
as a result of habitual association. However, the mind cannot of its own
choice will the sentiment of belief.
Hume does not consider his soft determinism as in any way a 
problem for moral principles. In fact, he thinks a form of soft deter­
minism is essential for any account of our moral actions.
Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and 
where they proceed not from some cause in the character and dis­
position of the person who performed them, they can neither re­
dound to his honor, if good; nor infamy if evil.
The sum of Hume's analysis of belief is that man does not have free will
in the sense used by Plantinga, nor is Plantinga's sense of free will a
requisite condition of moral responsibility.
The difference between Hume and Plantinga over the nature of 
belief exposes two distinct views of reasonableness. Plantinga empha­
sizes logical consistency as the primary condition of reasonableness.
In contrast, Hume emphasizes the conformity of the conclusion to the de­
gree of evidence. Hume's reasonable man is one whose beliefs correspond 
to the evidence acquired in sense experience, reflection, memory, and 
from testimony. Assent is the consequence of the force transferred 
through the manner of perception into the fixed attitude of the mind.
If the firmness of the evidence and the solidity of the conviction are
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comparable, then the individual is able to feel a spontaneity in assent. 
If the choice of an action is the unobstructed expression of the fixed 
attitude of the mind, then the individual acts in spontaneous expression 
of his own character. Consequently, if Hume's notion of the reasonable 
man is correct, then Plantinga's FWD is stripped of all its apologetic 
significance.
Hume and the Reasonable Assent to Theism
In the Dialogues we have a piece to literary art as well as a 
collection of philosophical arguments. As the writer, Hume does not in­
trude into the discussion, but allows the drama as a whole to portray 
his thoughts about religion. As a non-participant, Hume depends upon 
the persons engaged in conversation to convey the progress of the action 
by their constancy of character and expression of attitudes. The plot 
narrates the struggle of three men to come to grips with the evidence 
for theism. It is Hume's medium for dramatizing how reasonable assent 
and dissent occur in regard to religion.
The plot of this intellectual and verbal drama turns on the at­
titudes of the conversants. The very manner in which Hume calls atten­
tion to the development of feeling in the Dialogues portrays his own 
doctrine that morals (and religion) "are more properly felt than judged 
of.ti^S Hume describes is how the evidence, when allowed to have
its own weight, sways the feelings through its residual force and moves 
the mind to assent.
The Dialogues plots the course of assent in the following
manner:
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I. Act One (Parts I-IX).
A. Scene One; Philo and Demea coalesce in a mystic attitude 
toward man's knowledge of the Divine attributes- The rea­
son for the mystic attitude is that there is no analogy 
between the passionate nature of man and the intellectual 
nature of God. The consequence for Demea is that the 
agency of God is construed on the rationalistic model, 
while the consequence for Philo is that he suspends belief 
about what God is like. Cleanthes alone argues for the 
anthropomorphic attitude.
B. Scene Two: Interlude about alternate cosmogonies to the 
rationalistic model.
C. Scene Three; Demea affirms an a priori defense of theism. 
Cleanthes indicates the isolation of such arguments from 
the force of the evidence. Philo suggests that the ratio­
nalistic model does not correspond with the way people 
come to hold religious beliefs.
II. Act Two (Parts X-XII).
A. Scene One: Philo and Demea diverge over the consequence of 
the sentiment of misery. Demea argues that the implication 
of evil is that this is a probationary world where man's 
free assent to good under duress prepares him for a better 
world. Cleanthes classes this notion as merely an abstract 
position without persuasive evidence. Philo abandons his 
position of suspended belief and argues that theism has no 
persuasive resolution for human suffering.
B. Scene Two: Interlude about cosmic circumstances preventing 
a rationalistic theodicy.
C. Scene Three: Following the departure of Demea, Philo and 
Cleanthes converge in an assent to a mitigated theism.
They agree that no one can fully deny the inclination to 
believe prompted by the immediate sense of design or order. 
They further agree that theism has no practical consequence 
of its own.
Ivhen the expositor of Hume's Dialogues keeps this plot in mind, 
he is in a position to answer the difficulty T. E. Jessop raises as the 
primary problem: What is the connection between Philo's suspension of
belief in the first eleven parts and his confession in the last?^^ The 
answer lies in the simple enumeration of the stages by which Philo is 
led to assent:
Step 1: Philo distinguishes between the nature and the existence of 
God in defining the matter under dispute. The debate con­
cerns the nature of God.
Step 2: Philo dissents from any ascription of attributes to God be­
cause such knowledge is beyond the evidence. Philo suspends 
belief and challenges any claim to know on Cleanthes' part.
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Step 3: Philo notes that the way men come to belief differs from 
that supposed in the ^  priori argument of Demea.
Step 4: Philo claims a triumph for his dissent from the attributes 
of God in light of the evidence of human misery.
Step 5: Philo abandons his attitude of suspended belief and lays out 
the circumstances that preclude a theodicy.
Step 6: Philo assents to the existence of a Deity whose nature does 
not exceed these circumstances.
Step 7: Philo allows for a "true religion" (i.e., a benign civil re­
ligion) that is a silent force supporting the natural incli­
nation of the passions in moral belief.
Hume maintains the consistency of Philo's character. He is always a rea­
sonable man led by the force of the evidence. The final impact of the 
evidence is felt by Philo in two senses. First, there is the limited 
proposition of mitigated theism (MT):
(MT) That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear 
some remote analogy to human i n t e l l i g e n c e .
This proposition expresses the attitude of Philo that stands in suspended 
belief to any inference from the nature of things to a substantial or 
full-blown theism. He admits only that there is some probability of a 
God of ambiguous nature. But there is another confession that stands in 
line with the irregular argument from the immediate sense of order sug­
gested by Cleanthes in Part III. Since this type of evidence is not 
mediate but immediate to the manner of perception, Philo is moved to as­
sent. This second type of assent is to an aesthetic theism (AT) of the 
following form:
(AT) A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most
careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened 
in absurd systems as at all times to reject it.49
By combining these two forms of Philo’s confession, Hume is able to ac­
count for two things. First, he has narrated the processes by which men 
are led to assent (AT). Second, he has defined the limits of reasonable 
assent. In doing so, Hume's Dialogues successfully portrays how theism
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can be a part of man's legitimate and natural feelings. Thus, Hume can 
account for the general inclination of men to religious belief. At the 
same time he has the instruments to mark off sane from silly belief. He 
can consistently exclude superstitions and fanatic religions from "true 
religion." Hume has effectively isolated the moral sense from the senti­
ments of religion and has shown them to be independent and distinct. But 
he has also allowed that a benign civil religion may be a social support 
for polite society and, in this manner, a reinforcement of the moral 
fiber in common life.
Conclusion
In summary, I have argued for the WT against the two expositions 
of Hume which take him as both holding the ST and being mistaken in his 
arguments. In the first case, I looked at the exposition of Nelson 
Pike. He was seen to hold that Hume defends the logical inconsistency 
form of the argument from evil and fails to demonstrate the soundness of 
the position. I have shown how Pike misconstrues the significance of 
Hume's argument. I have argued that Pike's counter-argument leads to a 
perplexity over how one can use specific criteria to ascribe goodness to 
God and not use the same criteria to offer a relevant theodicy. I sug­
gested that Pike's problem in this matter was the actual one found in 
Hume. Further, I sketched Pike's account of the irregular argument for 
the existence of God in Part III of the Dialogues. I suggested that 
this exposition of Hume provides further evidence from Pike himself that 
Hume is not concerned with atheology but theodicy in the argument from 
evil.
In the second case I looked again at Plantinga's FWD. With the
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help of H. ÏÏ. Price's account of Hume's doctrines of belief and invol­
untary assent, I pointed out why Hume would not be satisfied with 
Plantinga's rationalistic account of motivation. I then proceeded to 
show how Hume's account of belief and religious assent is a consistent 
whole without either the use of free will or the loss of moral respon­
sibility. Further, I showed why natural belief and religious assent of 
the sort acknowledged by Hume lead to a confession of mitigated or aes­
thetic theism. In both cases, there is assent to the existence of a 
limited Deity who is morally indifferent or of too ambiguous a nature 
to serve as the warrant for moral beliefs. This is the WT.
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The combined exercises of an exposition of Hume's writings and 
the comparison of Hume's position with some current philosophical ac­
counts have led me to some important claims into the relation between 
morals and religion as they are set forth in Hume's philosophy of reli­
gion. I originally set out to examine Hume's interpretation of religion 
in light of a heuristic principle— that the core question of Hume's in­
quiry is: Does religion provide a credible warrant for man's moral be­
liefs? I can now summarize the results gained from using this core 
question in the examination of Hume's writings about religion. The sum­
mary will be divided into two distinct types of results. The first will 
consist of an enumeration of the conclusions reached in each chapter, 
which should add up to a consistent interpretation of Hume's account of 
religion. The second will be a summary of some suggestions scattered 
throughout my study where I have indicated that Hume was, in some things, 
going along with the accepted opinions of his times. Some examples of 
these shared beliefs are the way of ideas, the mechanistic model of mo­
tivation, and a universally common human nature. Ifherever I have called 
attention to any of these notions that Hume shares uncritically with 
others of his day, I have not tried to amend or correct Hume's account.
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Rather, I have indicated Hume’s dependence upon such notions merely to 
suggest that Hume's conclusions are open to further consideration. With 
these preliminary remarks in mind, I will proceed to review respectively 
each of the two types of results.
In Chapter I, I concluded that Hume had a workable scheme for 
the justification of moral judgments (i.e., their origin in the passions 
and their utility to the common life) apart from any appeal to religious 
beliefs. Further, I suggested that as a consequence of his own ethical 
theory Hume considered the appeal to religion superfluous and vacuous.
In Chapter II, I traced Hume's investigation into the origin of reli­
gious belief and saw that Hume concluded that religion begins in the un­
certain passions of fear or hope. As I showed, Hume could discover no 
reason why the sure and calm passions of moral attitudes needed or might 
gain an added veracity from such an insecure source. More important, I 
noted Hume's conclusion that the moralist cannot afford to ignore the 
difference of origin in the passions because the difference of pedigree 
triggers a conflict of motives that eventuates in an impasse between 
moral attitudes and religious sentiments. In Chapter III, I related how 
Hume assessed the possibility that reason might perfect the religious 
hypothesis and avoid the moral impasse upon which, Hume says, popular 
theism is impaled. But, as I indicated, rational theology fails to 
overcome the impasse for two reasons. First, the human understanding of 
the nature of God is too ambiguous to serve as the ground or source of 
moral beliefs. Second, the problem of evil shows that the motive for 
belief in rational theism is as dependent upon the uncertain passions of 
fear or hope as popular theism and ends up in the same moral impasse.
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Consequently, I concluded that Sume argues that no significant practical 
benefits follow from the adoption of rational theism. In Chapter IV, I 
recounted how Hume appraised the fideist claim that Divine intervention 
provides an escape from the limitations of the human passions. As I 
indicated, Hume found these claims wanting for two reasons. First, fi- 
deistic theism abandons the necessitous common life for the illusionary 
advantages of an artificial life. In other words, the wager of faith is 
taken on the basis of greater utility while at the same time it is re­
jecting the frame of reference that the principle of utility requires to 
be effective. Second, as was noted, Hume makes it clear that miracles 
are more a problem than a solution. That is to say, there is no motive 
for assenting to a miracle that does not fall back upon the very motives 
the notion of miracle is alleged to circumvent. Hume was observed to 
conclude that the belief in a miracle would be a greater miracle than 
any miracle believed. In sum. Chapters II, III, and IV have shown that 
the three forms of theism— popular, rational, and fideistic— are all 
hopelessly entangled in a conflict of motives that precludes theism's 
effective service as a ground of moral judgment. Throughout my inquiry, 
Hume has been interpreted as allowing for the possibility of the exis­
tence of God, but as showing that no practical utility could follow from 
the possibility. The core question may be credited with providing for a 
consistent reading of Hume's stance on religion.
A second stage in the testing of whether the core question is 
the key to Hume's philosophy of religion was introduced in Chapters V 
and VI. In these two chapters Hume's account of religion was tested in 
relation to a strong thesis and then in regard to a weak thesis in order
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to determine if the heuristic principle employed in Chapters I through 
IV offers a better understanding of Hume's writings on religion. The 
ST is:
(ST) The appeal to God as the warrant for moral beliefs fails in
every case because no impeccable proof that a Deity exists can 
be made.
Two positions regarding the ST were engaged in the works of Antony Flew 
and Alvin Plantinga. In contrast to Flew, I found that Hume does not 
work from the presumption of atheism. In contrast to Plantinga, I 
showed that Hume understands the problem of evil as an assertion of the 
moral emptiness of theism and not as an effort of atheists to construct 
a knockdown refutation of theism. Having shown the ineptitude of the ST 
in expressing Hume's stance, I turned to the weak thesis, which is 
another form of the heuristic principle:
(OT) The appeal to God as a warrant for moral beliefs fails because 
the nature of God is either morally indifferent or too ambigu­
ous to serve this purpose.
Two positions interpreting Hume along the lines of the ST were used to 
test the WT. First, I indicated that Nelson Pike could not reconcile a 
view of Hume along the lines of the ST with the "irregular argument" for 
God he found in the Dialogues. In addition, I noted that Pike's refuta­
tion of the ST as the consequence of an argument from evil runs aground 
on the problem of determining God's moral nature. It was suggested that 
the WT might help Pike work out the inconsistencies in his own interpre­
tation of Hume. Second, in comparison with Plantinga's "Free Will De­
fense," I indicated how Hume's theory of belief removes the possibility 
of the sort of assent required by either rational or fideistic theism. 
Hume argues that man is motivated to assent, as well as to approve.
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solely on the basis of the motives generated in the passions. The out­
come of both my exposition of Hume and my consideration of contrary in­
terpretations is that Hume holds the WT and is best understood from the 
perspective of a core question: Does religion provide a credible warrant 
for man’s moral beliefs?
I will now turn to review the other type of conclusion, which 
deals with the picture at work in Hume’s analysis of the operations of 
the human mind. I may summarize what I have suggested throughout my in­
quiry under three heads: the way of ideas, the mechanistic model of mo­
tivation, and the science of human nature. I will review each of these
briefly.
First, Hume’s success rests to some extent upon "the way of 
ideas." His method of challenge is a procedure for testing ideas by 
their pedigree,or origin in impressions. As we have seen, Hume’s ac­
count of the origin of moral attitudes, as well as the origin of reli­
gious sentiments, is shaped by his picture of how the contents of the
mind are acquired. The picture is crucial to Hume’s conclusions. Only
by means of this picture is Hume able to restrict the original passions 
and consequent reflexions of the mind to the set patterns he describes.
As I have had ample opportunity to mention, the picture is the source 
of the chasm between the Divine intellect and the human mind that carries 
so much weight in Hume’s perspective on religion.
Second, it was repeatedly noted that Hume works from a point of 
view derived from a mechanical model of motivation. The model pictures 
human motives as causes that operate like springs upon the component 
parts of human nature. I found that Hume excludes reason from this
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operation of the mind and designates all springs of actions as human 
passions. The by-product of Hume’s model, when joined with the way of 
ideas, was seen to be the reduction of religion and morals to their own 
distinctive springs of action or passion. This reduction was seen to 
eventuate in a conflict of motives that produces a fixed moral impasse 
as an obstacle to any practical rapprochement between moral attitudes 
and religious piety. Again, the picture Hume uses to portray the oper­
ations of the mind is formative for his construction of the problem and 
in this case has a special influence upon the interpretation of motives.
Third, as I indicated, Hume correlates the way of ideas and the 
mechanical model of motivation into a science of human nature. The na­
ture common to all men was found to be constitutive of the requisite 
conditions of common life. I have had repeated occasion to note Hume's 
remarkable confidence that human conventions arise collectively from the 
necessities of human nature and acquire their objectivity from a common 
utility. As I showed, this picture of a common human nature is essential 
to Hume's secular ethic and a major tool in his rejection of any practi­
cal merit for theism.
These three central notions are collated into a cohesive picture 
of the mind's operations, which Hume shared with the times in which he 
was writing. Because of the cohesiveness of these central notions, they 
should not be judged as either arbitrary or uncritical notions. They 
are, in a sense, the core propositions that constitute the central order 
of Hume's web of belief. Without them, Hume's philosophy as a whole, as 
well as his philosophy of religion, would require serious revision. I 
mention this to suggest that my heuristic principle cuts through to the
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bedrock of Hume’s philosophy. In other words, these notions that pic­
ture the operations of the human mind are the foundation upon which 
Hume builds.
If Hume’s picture remains the most fruitful way to focus atten­
tion on the operations of the mind, then he has solid reasons for the 
conclusions he reaches. In that case, religion as commonly practiced by 
man is without positive moral and practical consequences. But the exami­
nation of these conditions imposed by the picture of the human mind is 
another story. However, if the picture from which Hume operates is al­
lowed, I have recounted the fatal consequences for any appeal to reli­
gion as a warrant for moral beliefs.
In addition to the establishment of the WT, I have opened the 
way for the further study of Hume’s philosophy of religion. I have been 
concerned to establish Hume’s positive attitude toward a minimal theism. 
In short, I indicated that Hume’s account of theism is distinctive in 
three ways. First, Hume concludes that the human knowledge of the Divine 
attributes is so severely limited that the analysis of religion must 
shift from the nature of God to the appraisal of man’s inclination to 
believe. Second, Hume finds that the causes of man’s inclination to be­
lieve lead to an irresolvable conflict in the human passions between the 
motives for believing in God and the nature traditionally imputed to God. 
Third, since the desired assurances of the ’’religious hypothesis" cannot 
be inferred from the "theistic principle," or realized by the human in­
clination to believe, Hume concludes that an account of credulity is the 
proper approach to the study of religion.
It is in his account of credulity that Hume makes a positive
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contribution to the study of the relation between morals and religion. 
Hume’s pathology of belief provides an insight into the popular but 
mistaken belief that there is some connection between theism and the 
warrant for moral belief. A full account of Hume’s pathology of belief 
would, in the case of morals and religion, involve a study of Hume’s 
notions of natural belief, the mechanism of sympathy, and the use of 
general rules. However, this further task does not fall within the 
scope of my present inquiry. It is sufficient for this study that I 
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